1944 Supreme(SC) 38
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, LORD GODDARD AND SIR MADHAVAN NAIR.
GOVIND RAM - Appellant
Versus
MADAN GOPAL - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Allahabad
Decided On : Nov. 22. 1944.
Important Points
Subject
Civil Law - Property and Trust Law
Act Referred
Headnote
(B) Interpretation of Statutes - Consolidation Act - The Registration Act, 1908, being a consolidation act, does not affect provisions of other enactments in force unless expressly repealed. The requirement for registration of a trust of immovable property under the Trusts Act, 1882, remains an essential condition for its validity, regardless of whether the document is a composition deed exempt from registration under the Registration Act.
Facts of the case:
A decree-holder sought to attach immovable property to satisfy a decree. The claimants asserted that the property was held by trustees under an unregistered composition deed. The lower courts held the deed invalid due to non-registration under the law governing trusts. The claimants argued that the deed was exempt from registration under the registration law and that this exemption cured the defect of non-registration under the trust law.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the exemption provided for composition deeds in the Registration Act only applies to the requirements of that specific Act. It does not exempt such deeds from registration requirements imposed by the Trusts Act for the validity of a trust concerning immovable property.
Issues: Whether a composition deed relating to immovable property is exempt from registration under the Registration Act, 1908, such that it overrides the requirement of registration for the validity of a trust under Section 5 of the Trusts Act, 1882.
Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that Section 17(2)(i) of the Registration Act only states that certain clauses of the Registration Act do not apply to composition deeds; it does not state that composition deeds are exempt from registration under any other law. Since Section 5 of the Trusts Act provides its own sanction for non-registration, namely invalidity, the trust created by an unregistered composition deed in relation to immovable property is invalid. The trust is the essential machinery of a composition deed and not a mere accident.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
property law
-
registration of documents
- composition deeds
-
trusts
- trusts of immovable property
-
registration of documents
Solicitors for appellants: T. L. Wilson & Co.
Solicitors for respondent No.1: Douglas Grant & Dold.
Judgement
Appeal (No. 40 of 1943) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (November 9, 1938) which affirmed a judgment and decree of the Civil Judge of Aligarh (December 14, 1936).
The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee One Seth Kashi Nath obtained a decree (in suit No. 42 of 1930) against the present respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 6, and one Lala Sagarmal. Lala Sagarmal died, and his sons, the present respondents Nos. 4 and 5, were substituted for him on the record in the present suit. The respondent No. 6 had been declared insolvent and the Official Receiver, Aligarh, was also brought on the record in the present suit. (For convenience the original defendants to suit No. 42 of 1930 or those representing their interests from time to time will all be included in the words "the debtors".) Seth Kashi Nath having obtained his decree applied to attach certain immovable property as being the property of the debtors and liable to be sold in execution of the decree. He was met by an objection filed on behalf of the present appellants claiming the property as trustees under a deed of May 25, 1929. The objection was allowed. Thereupon Seth Kashi Nath commenced the suit in which this appeal arose, claiming a declaration that the property was liable to be attached and sold in satisfaction of his decree. To that suit he joined the present appellants as co-defendants with the debtors. By his plaint he alleged that the said deed was a collusive and fraudulent document. He also alleged that it had not been registered. By their written statement the appellants alleged that there was no necessity for the deed to be registered, and that the plaintiffs allegation as to want of registration had no effect.
The deed in question was a composition deed by which the debtors conveyed assigned and transferred to the appellants (therein called the trustees) (1.) the lands, hereditaments and premises described in the 1st Schedule thereto, (2.) the shares and other personal properties the particulars whereof were con tained in the 2nd Schedule thereto, and (3.) all other the property of the debtors and-each of them except the property described in the 3rd Schedule thereto, upon trust for sale and conversion, the proceeds to be divided among the “creditors" (as therein defined) of the debtors as therein provided, and the surplus (if any) to be paid to the debtors. The deed contained powers and provisions commonly found in a composition deed which creates a trust of property for the benefit of creditors.
The point at issue was whether by reason of s. 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, the deed of May 25, 1929 (hereinafter called the said deed), was exempt from any requirement to be registered, notwithstanding that s. 5 of the Trusts Act, 1882, enacts that no trust in relation to immovable property is valid unless registered.
The trial judge decreed the suit, holding that the said deed was a collusive document, and was not binding on Seth Kashi Nath. The appellants appealed to the High Court. Pending the hearing of the appeal Seth Kashi Nath died. His son (the present respondent No. 1) was substituted for his father on the record. The High Court (Allsop and Bajpai JJ.) held on September 26, 1935, that the said deed, not having been registered in accordance with s. 5 of the Trusts Act, 1882, was invalid. The appellants, however, had applied to be allowed to amend their written statement, and to plead that the defect due to non-registration had been cured by the registration of a document dated June 6, 1929, and the High Court made an order on September 26, 1935, (1.) setting aside the decree of the court below, and (2.) remanding the case to that court to dispose of it after hearing argument and any relevant evidence as to the effect of the registered document of June 6, 1929. The case was then heard before the Civil Judge, who held that the registered deed did not cure the defect. He accordingly, by decree dated December 14,