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1914 Supreme(SC) 71
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD DUNEDIN, LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE, AND MR. AMEER ALI.
HAMABAI FRAMJEE PETIT - Appellant
Versus
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.
Decided On : Oct. 28, 29; Nov. 18, 1914.
Solicitors for appellant in first appeal: T. L. Wilson & Co. Solicitors for appellants in second appeal:Latteys & Hart. Solicitor for respondent: The Solicitor, India Office.
"Public purpose" in land resumption clauses does not require the land to be available to the general public; it is satisfied if the objective serves the general interest of the community rather than private interests, such as maintaining the efficiency of public services.
Headnote:(A) Contractual Resumption Clauses - "Public Purpose" - Interpretation - In a lease or sanad containing a power of resumption for "public purpose," the term does not necessarily mean the land must be made available to the public at large. The true test is whether the object or aim is one in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned.
(B) Government Discretion - While the government is not an absolute judge of what constitutes a public purpose, courts will generally not interfere with the government's determination unless it is clearly wrong, especially when the scheme is intended to maintain the efficiency of public services.
Facts of the case:
The respondent sought to recover possession of lands held under a long-term lease and a sanad. Both instruments contained provisions allowing the government to resume possession for "public purposes" upon notice and payment of compensation. The government issued notices to resume the lands to construct residences for government officials at moderate rents, citing a shortage of suitable housing which hindered the efficiency of public services. The appellants challenged the resumption, arguing that the proposed use did not constitute a "public purpose" as the land would not be available to the public at large.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the proposed construction of housing for government officials to ensure the efficiency of public services constitutes a "public purpose" within the meaning of the lease and sanad.
Issues: Whether the construction of residences for government officials, intended to be let at moderate rents to improve the efficiency of public services, constitutes a "public purpose" under the terms of a lease and a sanad.
Ratio Decidendi: The term "public purpose" in a contractual grant does not require the land to be open to the public at large. Instead, it encompasses any purpose where the general interest of the community is directly and vitally concerned, as opposed to the private interest of individuals. Maintaining the efficiency of government services by providing adequate housing for officials falls within this definition.
Result: Appeals dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
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land tenure
- lease and sanad
- resumption of land
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land tenure
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administrative law
- public purpose
Judgement
Appeals from two decrees of the High Court (September 5, 1911) affirming decrees of Beaman J. (April 11, 1910).
67 Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 44 ( 1914- 1915)
Hamabai Framjee Petit V. Secretary of State 168
The appeals depended upon the determination of substantially the same question and were heard together.
The suits were instituted by the respondent in the High Court to recover possession of certain lands situated upon Malabar Hill, Bombay. The land in suit in the first appeal had been leased by the East India Company in 1854 for a term of ninety-nine years with a proviso that " in case the said Company shall for any public purpose be at any time desirous to resume possession of the premises" they should be at liberty to re-enter, subject to giving the notice and compensation thereby provided.
The land in suit in the second appeal was granted by a sanad in 1839 at a small annual rent subject to a stipulation, " the said ground to be at any time resumable by Government for public purposes " upon notice and payment of compensation.
In 1908 the Government of Bombay gave notice that they desired to resume possession of the land held under the lease and sanad for a public purpose, stating in reply to an inquiry as to the purpose intended that they proposed to utilize the land for the residence of Government officers. The compensation payable tinder the lease and sanad respectively was duly ascertained. The respondents, however, refused to accept or agree to the valuations, and declined to give up possession. The suits were thereupon instituted.
Both suits were tried before Beaman J. At the trials evidence, which was common to both suits, was given that the intention of the Government was to erect residences on the land and to offer them at moderate rents to Government officers; that owing to the dearth of suitable houses in Bombay and the high rents demanded officials were reluctant to accept appointments there, and that this was prejudicial to the efficiency of the various public services. No order or resolution of the Government was put in evidence.
The learned judge delivered judgment for the plaintiff (respondent) in both suits and made decrees for delivery of possession.
The High Court (Chandavarkar and Batchelor JJ.) affirmed these decisions.
De Gruyther, K.C., and McCardie, for the appellant in the first appeal ; De Gruyther, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the appellants in the second appeal. The purpose for which it is proposed to use the land is not a public purpose within the meaning of the lease and sanad. The true test is that there must be an intention to change the nature of the occupation from a private to a public occupation, and to render the land available to the public at large. Every act of Government, as a Government, is for a public purpose, but in this lease and sanad the expression must be given a more limited meaning. If this is not so the lease, which purports to be for ninety-nine years subject to the proviso, would in effect be determinable at will. To resume possession with the object of raising the rents and increasing the public revenue would be a public purpose in the wide sense, but it would not be a public purpose within the meaning and intention of the grants as appearing from their terms. [Land Acquisition Act (I. of 1894), s. 6, and Shastri Ramchandra v. Ahmedabad Municipality (( 1909)
I. L. R. 24 Bomb. 600.) were referred to.]
Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Dunne, for the respondent in both appeals, were not called upon.
The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
67 Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 44 ( 1914- 1915)
Hamabai Framjee Petit V. Secretary of State 169
LORD DUNEDIN. The same general point is raised in these two appeals.
The first appellant was lessee under the Government as successors of the East India Company under a lease of date April 18, 1854, which lease contained a power of resumption in favour of the lessor if " the Company, their successors or assigns, shall, for any public pur
