Judgme nt

Consolidated Appeals (Nos. 108 and 109 of 1932) from two decrees of the High Court (January 13, 1931) reversing a decree of the Sikh Gurdwara tribunal at Lahore (June 18, 1928).

A further appeal (No. 10 of 1932) was not pressed, the respondent having died since the date of the High Courts decree.

The question raised on these appeals was whether a religious institution at Manak, Lahore District, was a Sikh Gurdwara within the meaning of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925, as contended by the appellants, who claimed that they were entitled to its control and management.

The facts appear fully from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

The Sikh Gurdwara tribunal (appointed under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925) decided by a majority that the institution should be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara.

Appeals by the present respondents to the High Court (Broadway and Johnstone JJ.) were allowed. The learned judges held that (1.) Udasis cannot be classified as Sikhs for the purposes of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 ; and (2.) the institution at Manak was not established for use by Sikhs for public worship, and was not, therefore, a Sikh Gurdwara within the meaning of the Act of 1925. The appeal is reported at ( 1931) I. L. R. 12 Lah. 497.

1935. Dec. 9, 10. De Gruyther K.C. and Krishna Menon for the respondents took a preliminary objection to the competency of the appeal. The High Court had no power at all to certify the case as fit for appeal to the Privy Council. The Sikh Gurdwaras Act is a special Act, dealing with a special matter, and there is no appeal given to the Privy Council by virtue of it, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply. The right of appeal to His Majesty in Council must be given by Statute, and this Act does not give it. Under s.12, sub-s.9 of the Act of 1925 the position as to procedure, powers and costs is to be the same as under the Code of Civil Procedure. [Reference was made to ss.14, 34, of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, under which a party aggrieved may appeal to the High Court, and to ss.36, 37, 41, 70, 76, 106 and 142.] There is absolutely exclusive jurisdiction in the tribunal in matters of this kind. The Civil Courts are not permitted to interfere with any order passed by the tribunal or on appeal. The judgment in Rangoon Botatoung Co. v. The Collector, Rangoon (1), covers this case absolutely. That case was weaker than this there the High Court had given its certificate, but when the appeal came before the Board it held that it was incompetent to hear it. This is not a decree of any Court made in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction. The question in Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramaniya Sastri (( 1887) L. R. 14 I. A. 160.), was whether there was a right of appeal at all there were two grounds of decision, (( 1912) L. R. 39

I. A. 197..) there is no right of appeal given by the Act, and (2.) there must then be proved a right of appeal in the general law—that is, from a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure. Is the present matter a decree or order made in a civil suit? Not only can there be no civil suit, but no civil suit is permissible. Sect. 36 of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act makes it clear that, " No suit shall lie in any court to question anything purporting to be done by the Local Government, or, by a tribunal, in exercise of any powers vested in it by or under this Act.

The judgment in Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. M. A. Shakur (( 1925) I. L. R. 3 R. (F. B.) 560, 576.) covers the exact point I am raising in this case, and the case of National Telephone Co., Ld. v. Postmaster-General ([ 1913] A. C. 546.), referred to in that case draws the vital distinction which I wish to make. [Reference was also made to Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar.(( 1917)

L. R. 44 I. A. 261.)] It is stated in Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. M. A. Shakur (3) that (3.) "....when, by an Act of the Legislature, a new authority is constituted for the purpose of determining questions concerning rights whi