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1923 Supreme(SC) 23
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
VISCOUNT FINLAY, LORD ATKINSON AND MR. AMEER ALI.
INDRAJIT PRATAP SAHI - Appellant
Versus
AMAR SINGH - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Patna.
Decided On : May 15. 1923
Solicitor for appellant:H. S. L. Polak. Solicitors for respondents: W. W. Box & Co.
The appellate court can admit additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if a party demonstrates a "substantial cause," ensuring that procedural rules do not hinder the administration of justice.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XLI, Rule 27 - Admission of additional evidence in Appellate Court - The rule provides that while parties are generally not entitled to produce additional evidence in the Appellate Court, such evidence may be allowed if the lower court refused evidence that ought to have been admitted, if the Appellate Court requires it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause.
(B) Rules of procedure are not made for the purpose of hindering justice - The power to admit additional evidence extends to instances where a party applies for the admission of documents essential for the determination of the action under the provision of "substantial cause."
Facts of the case:
A suit was filed for declaration of title and possession of two villages. The central dispute was whether a specific designation used in a grant referred to a single village or a composite group of three villages. The lower courts held that the grant covered only one village and rejected an application to admit further registered documents as evidence in the appellate stage.
Findings of Court:
The registered documents produced by the appellant established that the designation in the grant referred to all three villages as a composite revenue unit. The appellate court erred in refusing to admit these documents on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to do so.
Issues: Whether the appellate court has the jurisdiction under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure to admit additional evidence when a party demonstrates a "substantial cause," even if the court did not itself discover a lacuna in the evidence.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the prohibition against additional evidence in appeals is not absolute. The phrase "any other substantial cause" allows the court to admit evidence that is essential for the determination of the case, and this power is not limited to situations where the court acts suo motu to fill a gap in the record.
Result: Decrees of the Courts below set aside and the plaintiffs' suit dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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practice and procedure
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evidence
- additional evidence in appeal
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evidence
-
property law
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land tenure
- mukarrari grants
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land tenure
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civil law
- possession and ejectment
Judgement
Appeal (No. 70 of 1921) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (June 25, 1919) affirming a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Gaya.
The suit was brought by respondents 1 to 3 for a declaration of their mukarrari title to two mauzas, and for possession with mesne profits.
The sole question was whether, as the first defendant alleged, a grant of May 30, 1880, included the two villages under the designation Damodarpur Lakhawar.
The trial judge held that the villages were not included in the grant and decreed the claim. The High Court affirmed the decree, rejecting an application to admit further documents in evidence in circumstances stated in the present judgment.
1923. March 15, 19. De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the appellant.
Dunne K.C. and Wallach for the respondents.
May 15. The judgment (This report is directed only to the question of procedure appearing in the headnote; passages in the judgment are accordingly omitted where indicated.) of their Lordships was delivered by
MR. AMEER ALI The facts of this litigation are set out in detail in the judgments of the Courts in India; it is consequently not necessary to state them here at any length. The suit relates to two villages, named respectively Lakhawar Khas and Lakhawar Faridpur, lying within Mahal Margaon, appertaining to the Tikari estate in the Province of Behar. it appears that in 1843 there was a Government survey of Mahal Margaon, in the course of which a khasra map was prepared by the Amin of these two villages along with another called Damodarpur Lakhawar. The map is exhibit 14 in this case, and the memorandum on the back is marked 14a.
In the middle of the nineteenth century the Tikari estate belonged to one Raja Mode Narain Singh. He died somewhere in the year 1856 or 1857 without any male issue, leaving him surviving two widows named respectively Rani Asmedh Koer and Rani Sunit Koer, a brothers son, Ran Bahadur Singh and a sisters grandson, Krishna Pratap Sahai, the ancestor of the present appellant often named in these proceedings as the Raja of Tankuhi. On Raja Mode Narain Singhs death, in the absence of any direct male heir, natural or adopted, his widows took possession of the estate for their lives, Ran Bahadur Singh, who, under the circumstances, was the reversioner, appears, however, to have acquired possession by some arrangement with the widows.
In 1875 Raja Krishna Pratap Sahai brought a suit against Ran Bahadur Singh and the two widows of Raja Mode Narain Singh, for recovery of the whole estate, on the allegation that he had been adopted by the widows subsequent to the death of the Raja under authority given by him in his lifetime. This suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge; from his decision an appeal was preferred to the High Court of Calcutta. Whilst the. appeal was pending the parties came to a settlement and an ekrarnama, dated May 30, 1880, was executed by Krishna Pratap in which were embodied the terms of the compromise. By the terms of this agreement Raja Krishna Pratap Sahai undertook to withdraw all claims to the estate, in consideration of the grant to him by Ran Bahadoor Singh, of a mukarrari settlement of certain villages set out in detail in that document. Pursuant to this agreement Ran Bahadoor Singh, by a patta of even date, granted to Krishna Pratap Sahai, the mukarrari of the villages named in the ekrarnama and set out specifically in the grant. The patta recites the agreement already referred to and then proceeds to describe the properties demised thereunder. One of these is named as "Damodarpur Lakhawar."
The controversy in the present suit relates solely to the question what does "Damodarpur Lakhawar" denote?
It should be noted here that the rental fixed for the mukarrari was Rs.27Ol per annum.
Raja Krishna Pratap Sahai, the grantee, appears to have taken possession, under the patta, of the properties conveyed to him thereunder by Ran Bahadur Singh. The plaintiffs claim that under the designation of
