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1926 Supreme(SC) 59
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD SINHA, LORD BLANESBURGH, LORD SALVESEN, AND SIR JOHN WALLIS.
KALYANASUNDARAM PILLAI - Appellant
Versus
KARUPPA MOOPPANAR PLAINTIFFS - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : Dec. 13. 1926.
Solicitor for appellant: H. S. L. Polak.
Solicitors for respondents: Douglas Grant & Bold
A gift of immovable property, once executed, delivered, and accepted, is complete. Registration is a formality for enforcement and, per Section 47 of the Registration Act, relates back to the date of execution, meaning subsequent events like adoption cannot invalidate the gift.
Headnote:(A) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Sections 122 and 123 - Indian Registration Act, 1877 - Section 47 - Gift of immovable property - Effect of registration - Whether adoption of a son after the execution and delivery of a deed of gift, but before its registration, renders the deed void against the adopted son - Registration is a necessary solemnity for the enforcement of a gift of immovable property, but it does not suspend the gift until registration actually takes place - Once the instrument of gift has been handed by the donor to the donee and accepted by him, the donor has done everything in his power to complete the donation - Registration does not depend upon the donor's consent but is the act of an officer appointed by law - Neither death nor express revocation by the donor is a ground for refusing registration if other conditions are complied with.
(B) Indian Registration Act, 1877 - Section 47 - A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration.
Facts of the case:
A donor executed a trust deed for the gift of immovable property for charitable purposes and delivered the deed to the trustees on the same day. Subsequently, the donor adopted a son and entered into a partition deed with him. The deed of gift was registered a few days after the adoption. The adopted son contended that the gift was incomplete until registration and that his rights as an adopted son intervened to invalidate the gift.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the deed of gift had been delivered to and accepted by the trustees on the day of its execution. Consequently, the deed was held to be operative against the adopted son.
Issues: Whether the adoption of a son after the execution and delivery of a deed of gift, but before the registration thereof, renders the deed void as against the adopted son.
Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that while Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act requires registration for the enforcement of a gift of immovable property, Section 47 of the Registration Act ensures that the document operates from the date of execution. Once a gift deed is executed, delivered, and accepted, the donor's part is complete. Registration is a formal requirement that does not suspend the gift's validity; thus, subsequent events such as adoption or death do not revoke the gift.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
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transfer of property
- gifts
- registration of documents
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transfer of property
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family law
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hindu law
- adoption
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hindu law
Judgement
Consolidated Appeal (No. 144 of 1924) from two decrees (November 13, 1922) of the High Court in Letters Patent Appeals, affirming two decrees (November 22, 1920) of that Court, which affirmed two decrees of the District Judge of Tanjore, which modified two decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam.
The appeal arose out of two suits against the appellant, each brought with the sanction of the Advocate-General in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. In the first suit respondents 1, 2 and 3 sued as trustees of a temple; they prayed for a declaration that certain properties were trust properties, for removal of the defendant-appellant from being a trustee, and for other relief. The other suit was brought by persons interested in a feeding charity.
The trust in favour of the temple and providing for the feeding charity were contained in a deed of gift executed on September 9, 1891, by a Hindu named Vaithilingam Pillai. He had thereby transferred to trustees a portion of his immovable property, being the property in suit; the deed was delivered to the trustees on the same day. On September 10, 1891, the donor duly adopted the appellant. On September 12, 1891, a partition deed was entered into between Vaithilingam Pillai and the appellant, and the family properties other than those which were the subject of the deed of gift were divided. On September 15, 1891, the deed of gift was registered by the donor. The appellant on becoming a major assumed the management of the trust under the provisions of the deed, and it was alleged neglected the performance of the trust.
The appellant by his written statements pleaded (inter alia) that the deed was inoperative against him, as it had not been registered until after his adoption.
The High Court by the decrees now appealed from, held that the deed was operative against the defendant. The learned judges (Schwabe C.J., Coutts-Trotter and Kumaraswami Sastri JJ.) followed the decision of the Full Bench in Venkati Rama, Reddi v. Pillati Rama Reddi. (( 1916) I. L. R. 40 M. 204.)
1926. Nov. 19, 20. De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the appellant.
Sir George Lowndes K.C. and Narasimham for the respondents.
[Reference was made to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, ss. 122, 123; Indian Registration Act, 1877, ss. 17, 47; Venkati Rama Reddi v. Pillati Rama Reddi (( 1916) I. L. R. 40 M. 204 (F.B.).); Subba Rama v. Venkatsubba (( 1924) I. L. R. 48 B. 435.) ; and Atmaram Sakharam v. Vaman Janardhan . (( 1924) I. L. R. 49 B. 388 (F.B.).)]
Dec. 13. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
LORD SALVESEN. These are two consolidated appeals from a judgment and two decrees dated November 13, 1922, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras. It is unnecessary to restate the prior procedure or judgments which dealt with a number of contentions in law, and questions of fact now either finally disposed of or no longer insisted upon. It is sufficient to say that when leave to appeal was granted by the order of the High Court of April 19, 1923, it was on the specific ground that it raised the substantial question of law— namely, " whether an adoption of a son by a Hindu made after the execution and delivery of a deed of gift, but before registration thereof, renders a deed void as against the adopted son." This is the only ground of appeal which is set forth in the appellants case, and the respondents in their case, para. 2, take up the same position. Although, therefore, other grounds were indicated in the argument addressed to the Board which might have been equally fatal to the appeal, their Lordships think it right, in all the circumstances, to deal only with that which was the ground of judgment of the High Court, and in respect of which leave to appeal was given.
The relevant facts, which are no longer disputed, lie within short compass. On September 9, 1891, a certain Vaithilingam Pillai executed a trust deed by which he appointed trustees to administer a trust for charity in the wide sense,
