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1928 Supreme(SC) 22
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
VISCOUNT SUMNER, LORD ATKINSON, LORD SINHA, SIR JOHN WALLIS, AND SIR LANCELOT SANDERSON.
KAMAKHYA NARAYAN SINGH - Appellant
Versus
RAM RAKSHA SINGH (DEFENDANTS) - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Patna.
Decided On : March 22, 1928.
Solicitor for appellant:Solicitor, India Office. Solicitors for respondents: Watkins & Hunter.
Important Points
Subject
Property Law - Land Tenure and Adverse Possession
Act Referred
Headnote
(B) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 116 - Holding over - The principle of holding over does not apply where the parties are at arms length, consistently asserting conflicting rights over the nature of the tenure, and there is no express or implied agreement to continue the possession as a tenancy.
(C) Adverse Possession - A person who remains in possession of land after the termination of a life lease, asserting a permanent right and denying the landlord's right to re-entry, acquires title by prescription if the possession continues for the statutory period of twelve years.
Facts of the case:
Life leases were granted for several villages. After the death of the original grantees, their heirs and assignees remained in possession. The landlord contended that the leases expired upon the deaths of the grantees and that the possessors became yearly tenants. The possessors denied being yearly tenants, claiming instead a permanent, heritable interest acquired by adverse possession. In some instances, rent was paid, but the landlord issued receipts in the names of the original grantees. When the possessors demanded receipts in their own names, the landlord refused, and rent payments ceased. The landlord subsequently filed suits for possession and mesne profits.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the original leases were indeed for the lives of the grantees only. It was determined that the landlord did not recognize the possessors as tenants after the expiration of the life leases. The payment of rent to a mortgagee or the acceptance of marfatdari receipts did not establish a tenancy, as the parties remained in conflict regarding the nature of the interest in the land.
Issues: Whether the possession of the heirs and assignees after the expiration of the life leases created a tenancy from year to year by operation of law or whether such possession was adverse, thereby barring the landlord's suit under the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: A tenancy from year to year is not created by the mere payment of rent if the landlord refuses to recognize the possessor as a tenant and the possessor asserts a permanent right. Where the parties are at arms length and the landlord consistently maintains that the possessor has no right to be in possession, the possession is adverse. Consequently, if such adverse possession continues for more than twelve years, the suit for recovery of possession is barred by the Limitation Act.
Result: Appeals dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
-
leases
- life estates
- holding over
-
limitation
- adverse possession
-
leases
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practice and procedure
- recovery of possession
Judgement
Law Rep. 55 Ind. App. 212 ( 1927- 1928) Kamakhya Narayan Singh V. Ram Raksha Singh
52
Consolidated Appeals (Nos. 13, 82 and 102 of 1926) from three decrees of the High Court (August 6, 1924, and March 19, 1925) reversing three decrees of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh.
The appeals were in three suits instituted by the appellant against the several respondents in 1919 and 1920 to recover possession of villages included in mukarrari istimrari grants made by his predecessor in title. It was not contested in the present appeal that the grants expired on the deaths of the respective grantees. The plaintiff alleged that after the grantees deaths the defendants, who were heirs or assignees of the grantees, and persons claiming under them, became yearly tenants, and that the tenancies had been determined by notice. The defendants all denied that they were yearly tenants, and pleaded that they had acquired a permanent, heritable and transferable interest by adverse possession, and that the suits were barred under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I., art. 144.
The material facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
They may be stated shortly as follows —
In P. C. Appeal No. 13 the grantees died about 1891, and an assignee remained in possession, contending that the holding was permanent and heritable, the grantor contending to the contrary. The assignee paid decrees for rent obtained by a usufructuary mortgagee against the grantor and himself. After that mortgage came to an end in 1898 no rent was paid. The assignee was willing to pay rent to the grantor provided that his name was entered as the holder of the mukarrari interest, and that he ^as given receipts made out in his own name ; he declined to accept receipts in the marfatdari form, i.e., in the names of the original mukarridars.
In P. C. Appeal No. 86 the last survivor of the grantees died in 1883, and their heirs remained in possession. For some years they paid rent to the grantor ; receipts were given in the names of the original mukarridars, but the names of the persons who made the payment also were entered in the documents. In 1898 one of the defendants asked for a receipt in his own name, which was refused. After that no rent was paid.
In P. C. Appeal No. 102 the facts were substantially the same as in Appeal No. 86.
The trial judge allowed the plaintiffs claims, but the High Court upon separate appeals held that the suits were barred by limitation. The first appeal (No. 238 of 1921 ; P. C. No. 13 of 1926) was heard by Jwala Prasad A.C.J. and MacPherson J., and is reported at I. L. R. 4 Pat. 139. The other appeals (No. 246 of 1921 and No. 22 of 1922) were heard by Benches differently constituted, but all the learned judges concurred in the view expressed in the judgment of the learned Acting Chief Justice. Shortly stated he held (agreeing in that respect with the trial judge) that the leases terminated with the lives of the grantees. In his opinion the defendants predecessors who remained in possession were merely trespassers ; there was no tenancy, either by operation of law or otherwise ; and the suits were barred by adverse possession under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I., art. 144.
1927. Dec. 12, 13. Sir George Lowndes K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the appellant. It is now settled by decision that the original leases were for lives and not permanent. After their expiration the defendants predecessors paid rent for some years. In the second and third appeals they paid direct to the grantor; in the first appeal they paid rent decrees obtained by a usufructuary mortgagee, and having regard to s. 76 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the mortgagee was agent for the
Law Rep. 55 Ind. App. 212 ( 1927- 1928) Kamakhya Narayan Singh V. Ram Raksha Singh
53
grantor. The relationship of landlord and tenant was thereby constituted. That would undoubtedly be so in English law and was also so in India Ram Chandra Singh v.
