Judgement

Appeal (No. 65 of 1925) from a decree of the High Court (February 8, 1924) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram.

The suit was brought by the respondents for possession of certain immovable property with mesne profits. They claimed title under the will of a deceased Hindu, Ramakrishna Ayyar. The appellant (defendant No. 3), a minor, pleaded that the will, which devised the testators property in part to the appellant, in part to the testators widow for life, in part to charity, and in part to the respondents (relatives of the testator), was not binding upon him. The appellants natural father, before the adoption took place, had executed a deed consenting to the provisions of the will.

The Subordinate Judge held that, as the adoption subject to the agreed dispositions was beneficial to the appellant, the will was valid. That decision was affirmed by the High Court (Spencer A.C.J. and Kumaraswami Ayyar J.).

The facts and the grounds of the decision in the High Court appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

1927. Feb. 7, 10. De Gruyther K.C., and Narasimham for the appellant. The appellant upon adoption became a co-sharer with the testator, and entitled to all the rights of a natural son, subject to minor exceptions which do not apply Nagindas Bhugwandas v. Bachoo Hurkissondas (( 1915) L. R. 43 I. A. 56.), Maynes Hindu Law, para. 184. The appellants natural father was not competent to agree that the rights which under Hindu law the appellant would acquire by the adoption should be curtailed. There is no decision of the Privy Council determining the question, but an observation in the judgment delivered by Lord Macnaghten in Bhaiya Rabidat Singh v. Indar Kunwar (L. R. 16 I. A. 53.) supports the appellants contention. In certain cases in India ante-adoption agreements by the natural father limiting the sons rights have been held valid. In those cases, with few exceptions, the validated disposition was only in favour of the testators widow; the decisions to that effect are distinguishable, as a widow is entitled to maintenance. The reasons assigned in the decisions in India in support of such agreements by the natural father vary; it is submitted they are not satisfactory in law. The appellants contention is supported by the referring judgments in Visalakshi Ammal v. Sivaramien (( 1904) I. L. R. 27 M. 577.) and in Vyasacharya v. Venkubai (( 1912) I. L. R. 37 B. 251.), also by Balkrishna Motiram v. Uttar Narayan Dev (( 1918) I. L. R. 43 B. 542.), and by Jagannadha v. Papamma (( 1882) I. L. R. 16 M. 400.); in Maynes Hindu Law, para. 196, no definite opinion is expressed, but in West & Buhler, 3rd ed., p. 1101, the view is that such agreements are inoperative. [In addition to the Madras and Bombay decisions referred to in the judgment reference was made to Bepin Behari Bundopadya v. Brojo Nath (( 1882) 8 Cal. L. J. 362.) ; Panchanon v. Binoy Krishna (( 1916) 27 Cal. L. J. 274.); Kalidas v. Bijoy Shankar (( 1891) I. L. R. 13 A. 391.); and Purshottam v. Rukhmabai.(( 1913) 16 Bom. L. Rep. 57.)]

Kenworthy Brown for the respondents. An agreement such as that now in question is valid if the adoption subject to its terms is for the benefit of the adopted son. There is a concurrence of judicial decisions dating from 1869 by judges familiar with Hindu law and customs supporting the validity of such agreements. The respondents rely more particularly upon Ravji Vinayakrav Jaggannath Shankarsett v. Lakshmibai (( 1887) I. L. R. 11 B. 381.) and the decision of the Full Bench in Visalakshi Ammal v. Sivaramien.(( 1904) I. L. R. 27 M. 577.) The referring orders relied on were merely opinions, and may have been made before the learned judges had considered the whole current of authority. One of the referring judges in the case last mentioned was a party to the Full Bench decision, and the other was a party to Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal.(( 1891) I. L. R. 21 M. 10.) Neither Vinayak Narayan Jog v. Govindrav Chin