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1927 Supreme(SC) 104
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD SUMNER, LORD ATKINSON, LORD SINHA, SIR JOHN WALLIS, AND SIR LANCELOT SANDERSON.
KONAMMAL - Appellant
Versus
ANNADANA - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : December 15, 1927.
Solicitor for appellant: H. S. L. Polak.
Solicitors for respondent: Douglas Grant & Dold.
An impartible estate is presumed joint family property for succession purposes unless a clear intention by junior members to renounce their succession rights is proven. Partition of partible property or separate residence does not constitute such renunciation.
Headnote:(A) Madras Impartible Estates Act II of 1904 - Section 2 and Section 4 - Mitakshara Law - Succession to impartible estates - Impartible estates are creatures of custom and, in the absence of special custom, are governed by Mitakshara law with qualifications due to their impartible nature - For purposes of succession, such an estate is regarded as joint property of the holder and his family and passes by survivorship, unless shown to be the separate property of the holder or his branch, in which case it descends according to rules of separate property.
(B) Separation of Joint Family - Effect on Impartible Estate - To establish that an impartible estate has ceased to be joint family property for succession, it is necessary to prove an intention, expressed or implied, on behalf of the junior members of the family to give up their chance of succession - The fact that members of a joint family exercise their right of partition over partible property does not divest them of their interest in an impartible estate over which they have no right of partition, as such an act does not imply renunciation of succession rights.
(C) Evidence of Separation - Separate residence and absence of joint worship are of little weight in determining separation regarding an impartible estate, particularly in regional customs where joint household worship is uncommon and junior members typically do not reside with the estate holder.
Facts of the case:
A dispute arose over the succession to an impartible estate after the last holder died without issue. The appellant, the mother of the deceased holder, claimed the estate as the nearest heir to his separate property. The respondent, a member of the senior branch of the family, claimed succession by survivorship, asserting the estate remained joint family property. The history of the estate involved a previous arrangement where the junior branch had succeeded the senior branch. The appellant argued that the estate had become separate property due to a separation of status between the branches and the conduct of the parties.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the arrangement allowing the junior branch to succeed did not constitute a separation of the branches. Furthermore, the partition of partible property or separate living arrangements did not prove an intention to renounce the right of succession to the impartible estate. The evidence regarding separate food and worship was deemed inconclusive and of little weight.
Issues: Whether the impartible estate had become the separate property of the last holder's branch through family separation or conduct, thereby altering the line of succession from survivorship to inheritance.
Ratio Decidendi: An impartible estate is presumed to be joint family property for succession purposes unless a clear intention to renounce or surrender the right of succession is proven. Partition of partible property does not automatically result in the loss of succession rights to an impartible estate. Evidence of separate residence and lack of joint worship is insufficient to establish such renunciation.
Result: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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family law
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hindu law
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impartible estates
- succession
- survivorship
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impartible estates
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hindu law
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property law
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joint family property
- partition
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joint family property
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practice and procedure
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evidence
- burden of proof
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evidence
Judgement
Appeal (No. 31 of 1924) from a decree of the High Court (October 26, 1922) reversing, so far as material to the present appeal, a decree of the District Judge of South Arcot.
The appeal related to the succession to an impartible jaghir situate in Kallayan hills in South Arcot, on the death in 1914 of the holder without issue. In 1822 the younger son had succeeded by arrangement and the jaghir had since descended from father to son. Upon the death of the holder in 1914 the respondent, who was the senior member of the senior branch, took possession. Thereupon the appellant, the mother of the last holder, instituted the present suit, claiming the jaghir as heir to his separate property. The respondent claimed to succeed by survivorship. By his written statement he pleaded that " no arrangement, or act, capable of effecting a separation has ever been made, or done, between or by the members or branches of the family.”
The suit raised other questions which were not material to the present appeal
The material facts, with a pedigree, appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The District Judge held that the arrangement in 1822 did not operate as a separation of the branches; that view was affirmed on appeal. He found, however, that, at some undetermined date long before the suit, the joint family had been divided. He so inferred from evidence as to an absence of joint residence and community of worship, and other circumstances. He held that in consequence the jaghir was separate property, and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff.
On appeal to the High Court the decree was reversed so far as it related to the succession to the jaghir, and the defendant was held entitled to succeed.
Krishnan J. said " It is a well settled proposition of law that the succession to an impartible estate is governed by the rule of survivorship if it is joint family property, and by the rule of inheritance to separate property if it is separate property. That was so laid down in the Sivaganga case (( 1863) 9 Moo. I. A. 543.), and has since been affirmed in several cases, the last one being the case of Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh . (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 195.) In the present case there is no difficulty in choosing a single individual out of a class for the jaghirship, for it is conceded that if the rule of survivorship applies, the first defendant is entitled as the senior member of the senior line whereas if the rule as to succession to the separate estate applies, the first plaintiff, the mother, is entitled.”. In his opinion the decision of the Privy Council in Tara Kumari v. Chaturbhuj Narayan Singh (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 192.), and of the High Court in Gurusami Pandiyam v. Pandia Chinna Thambiar (( 1920)1. L. R. 44 Mad. 1.), were distinguishable, as in both those cases the evidence of the estate being the separate property of the last holder was much stronger. He agreed with the view arrived at by Ramesam J. that the evidence fell short of proving that the joint family rights of the defendant in the jaghir were extinguished at any time.
Ramesam J. was of opinion that the authorities, which he discussed, showed that a family separation did not have the effect of making an impartible estate the separate property of the holder, unless there was an intention on the part of the junior members, either express or implied, to give up their chance of succeeding. The learned judge considered in great detail the evidence as to a separation after 1822. He observed that the holder of an impartible estate rarely considers it consistent with his dignity to permit other members of the family, except perhaps his brothers, to reside under the same roof with himself. With regard to the evidence as to an absence of joint worship he said "I will only observe that in Southern India there is no such thing as a private temple or a thakur or idol or deity in a house. Except in a few orthodox homes of the higher castes, which are daily d
