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1923 Supreme(SC) 35
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD SUMNER, LORD PHILLIMORE, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND MR. AMEER ALI
LAL RAM SINGH - Appellant
Versus
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF PARTABGARH - Respondents
On Appeal from the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh.
Decided On : July 3. 1923
Solicitors for appellants:Watkins & Hunter. Solicitor for respondent: Solicitor, India Office.
Property granted via settlement under a statute allowing alienation, where the recipient would not have inherited it by descent under Mitakshara law, is treated as self-acquired property rather than ancestral property, thus permitting disposition by will.
Headnote:(A) Oudh Estates Act, 1869 - Sections 15 and 22 - Transfer of taluqdari estate - Effect of transfer to a person not being a taluqdar or grantee - Such transfer operates to take the estate out of the special limitations of descent and subjects it to the rules governing property bought from a non-taluqdar.
(B) Construction of Settlement Deeds - Interpretation of the phrase "heirs and representatives" - Where a settlement provides that a person and his heirs and representatives shall succeed to an estate after the expiration of preceding life interests, such words are to be treated as words of limitation and not of purchase, indicating the grant of an absolute estate rather than a life estate.
(C) Hindu Law - Mitakshara Law - Nature of property bequeathed by a father to a son - Whether property is ancestral or self-acquired - The principle that property is ancestral if the son would have received it by descent under Mitakshara law does not apply if the property was subject to a statute that allows the holder to will it away and would not have descended according to Mitakshara law in the absence of the settlement.
Facts of the case:
A dispute arose regarding the succession to a taluqdari estate governed by a specific Act. A settlement deed had established a sequence of life interests, after which the reversion was granted to a relative and his heirs and representatives. The original plaintiff claimed the estate under the applicable school of Hindu law or via a will. The respondent contended that the estate was impartible or that the holder had no power to dispose of it by will. The lower courts had disagreed on whether the reversionary interest was a life estate or an absolute estate and whether the property was ancestral or self-acquired.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the reversionary interest granted was an absolute estate. Furthermore, the property was determined to be self-acquired rather than ancestral because, at the time of the settlement, the estate was governed by a statute that allowed for alienation and would not have descended according to the rules of the applicable school of Hindu law.
Issues: The main issues were whether the reversionary interest granted under the settlement was a life estate or an absolute estate, and whether such an absolute estate was ancestral property or self-acquired property, thereby determining the power of the holder to dispose of it by will.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the phrase "heirs and representatives" serves as a word of limitation to express an absolute estate. It further held that property cannot be deemed ancestral under the principle of descent if the recipient would not have inherited it by descent under the applicable personal law but instead received it through a settlement governed by a statute that permits alienation.
Result: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
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succession
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taluqdari estates
- oudh estates act, 1869
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taluqdari estates
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testamentary disposition
- wills
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succession
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hindu law
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mitakshara law
- ancestral property
- self-acquired property
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mitakshara law
Judgement
Appeal (No. 104 of 1922) from a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner (April 4, 1919) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mohanlalganj.
The suit was instituted by Narain Singh, represented by the appellants, against Avadhesh Singh, a minor represented by the respondent, to recover possession of a taluqa named Rampur Kaithaula.
The material facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The trial judge dismissed the suit, and that decision was affirmed (though on different grounds) upon appeal to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. The effect of the judgments in India appears from the present judgment. The question of res judicata, one of the grounds of the decision of the trial judge was not material to the present decision; it is therefore not necessary to state the facts as to it.
1923. June 4, 5, 7. Sir George Lowndes K.C., and Kenworthy Brown for the appellants. The appellate Court rightly reversed the finding of a custom of lineal primogeniture, but erred in allowing a new defence based on the deed of 1871 and the alleged will of 1888. The limitation to Lachman Singh and "his heirs and representatives .... as provided by s. 22 of Act.1. of 1869 " was invalid under the rule in the Tagore Case (( 1872) L. R. I. A. Supp. 47.), as laying down a rule of inheritance other than that prescribed by law Rajindra Bahadur Singh v. Raghubans Kunwar . (( 1918) L. R. 45 I. A. 154.) If Lachman had a vested interest under the deed, it was merely a life interest Tarakeswar Roy v. Shoshi Shikharesivar (( 1885) L. R. 10 I. A. 51.); Kristoromoney Dossee v. Norendro Krishna . (( 1888) L. R. 16 I. A. 29.) Bhoobun Mohini Debya v. Hurrish Chunder Chowdry (( 1893) L. R. 5 I. A. 138.) is distinguishable on the words of the deed; the decision helps the appellant as showing that a benignant construction should be adopted. Ghulam Abbas Khan v. Amatul Fatima (( 1921) L. R, 48 I. A. 135.) was also referred to. If, however, Lachman took absolutely he took the estate as ancestral property and could not dispose of it by will. On this point reference was made to Mitakshara, Ch. I., s. 4, sub-ss. 1, 6, 28, and to the series of decisions in India referred to in the judgment of their Lordships.
De Gruyther K.C., Wallach and Dube for the respondent. [Their Lordships were satisfied that Lachman did not take otherwise than absolutely.] It was admitted that the estate was impartible by custom; Lachman accordingly took the estate under the settlement as impartible property, and the further descent of the estate was subject to that custom Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram (( 1893) L. R. 20 I. A. 77.); Janki Per shad Singh v. Dwarka Per shad Singh (( 1915) L.
R. 40 I. A. 170.) ; Ghulam Abbas Khan v. Amatul Fatima . (( 1921) L. R, 48 I. A. 135.) Consequently, even if Lachman took the estate as ancestral property he had the right of alienation which attaches to impartible estate Sartaj Kuari v. Deoraj Kuari (( 1888) L. R. 15 I. A. 51.); Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh . (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 195.) But Lachman did not take it as ancestral property; first, because he would not have taken under an intestacy, secondly, because if he had taken under the Act he would have had a power of disposition. [Maynes Hindu Law, para. 275, was referred to.] The Indian decisions, upon consideration, support the respondent on this point.
Sir George Lowndes K.C. in reply. The effect of s. 15 is that in Lachmans hands the estate was not to be regarded as a taluqdari estate; no custom by which acquired property was impartible was set up. The descent is therefore not governed by custom. On that point Murtaza Husain Khan v. Mahomed Yasin Ali Khan (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 269.) is conclusive; Sitla Baksh Singh v. Sital Singh (( 1921) L.
R. 48 1. A. 228.) accords with it. Lachman took the property as ancestral property. Under s. 15 of the Act the estate is to be regarded as if Lachman had "bought" it; further, the property was not
