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1933 Supreme(SC) 6
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD BLANESBURGH, LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, AND SIR JOHN WALLIS.
MAHANTHRAM CHARAN DAS - Appellant
Versus
NAURANGI LAL (DEFENDANTS) - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Patna.
Decided On : January 17, 1933.
Solicitors for appellant:Watkins & Hunter. Solicitors for respondents: H. S. L. Polak & Co.
A manager of a math can create an interest in math property valid only for his lifetime. Consequently, adverse possession of such property begins only upon the death or cessation of office of the alienating manager, regardless of whether the grant was for necessity.
Headnote:(A) Limitation Act - Article 144 - Suit for possession of immovable property - Period of limitation twelve years from the time when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
(B) Law relating to Math property - A manager of a math has the power to create an interest in property appertaining to the math which will continue during his own life or tenure of office, regardless of whether the disposition was made for legal necessity. A grant purporting to be permanent or absolute is effective only for the limited period of the manager's life interest. Consequently, adverse possession of such property commences only when the manager who disposed of it ceases to hold office by death or otherwise.
Facts of the case:
A manager of a math executed a permanent lease and subsequently a sale deed of certain property appertaining to the math. Both transactions were found not to have been executed for legal necessity or for the benefit of the math. The manager died a few years after the transactions. The successor manager instituted a suit for possession and mesne profits several years after the death of the previous manager, but more than twelve years after the original lease and sale. The lower courts differed on whether the limitation period began at the date of alienation or the date of the manager's death.
Findings of Court:
The lease and the deed of sale were good and effective only so long as the alienating manager continued to hold office. Therefore, adverse possession only commenced upon the death of the said manager, and the suit was not barred by limitation.
Issues: Whether the suit for recovery of math property was barred by limitation, specifically whether the period of limitation began to run from the date of the purported alienation or from the date of the death of the alienating manager.
Ratio Decidendi: A manager of a math is not in the position of a trustee but of a manager. He is competent to create an interest in math property that endures during his own lifetime or tenure. Any grant, whether a lease or an absolute sale, that purports to exceed this duration is valid only to the extent of the manager's life interest. Therefore, possession under such a grant is not adverse during the manager's lifetime and becomes adverse only upon his death or cessation of office.
Result: Appeal allowed; decree of the High Court set aside and decree of the Subordinate Judge restored.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
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religious and charitable endowments
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math property
- alienation by mahant
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math property
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religious and charitable endowments
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limitation law
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adverse possession
- commencement of limitation period
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adverse possession
Judgement
Appeal (No. 92 of 1932) from a decree of the High Court (April 8, 1930) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Patna (September 6, 1927).
On December 21, 1909, Rampat Das, the mahant of a math, executed a mukarrari lease to respondent No. 1 of certain property appertaining to the math, and put him into possession ; on February 13, 1911, Rampat Das executed a sale deed of the same property, subject to the lease, to respondent No. 3, the wife of respondent No. 2. In or about July, 1913, Rampat Das died. After a dispute as to the office the appellant became mahant.
On May 27, 1924, the appellant, as mahant, instituted the present suit against the three respondents claiming possession of the property and mesne profits.
Both the mukarrari lease and the sale deed purported to have been executed in order to meet the expenses of the math, but that was negatived by concurrent findings of the Courts in India.
Upon the present appeal the sole question was whether the suit was barred by limitation as pleaded by the defendants. Both Courts held, and it was not disputed upon the present appeal, that the article of the Limitation Act applicable was art. 144 and not art. 134.
The trial judge rejected the plea of limitation, holding that both under the mukarrari lease and the sale adverse possession time began to run only upon the death of Rampat Das.
An appeal to the High Court was allowed by a judgment delivered by Fazl Ali J., Wort J. agreeing. The learned judge held that the property was to be deemed to have been vested in the math or idols, in the absence of a deed of trust, and that consequently the decision in Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das (( 1910) L. R. 37 I. A. 147.) applied, with the result that the suit was barred. In his view the authority of that case was not affected by Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar . (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) He was of opinion that, as the vendee and the mukarraridar were of the same family, adverse possession under the lease began when possession was obtained under the sale deed. The appeal is reported at I. L. R. 9 Pat. 885.
1932. Dec. 2. Parikh for the appellant. Possession did not become adverse under either deed until the death of Rampat Das, and consequently the suit was not barred as to either transaction. The judgment of the High Court was based upon such cases as Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das (( 1910) L. R. 37 I. A. 147.) and Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (( 1899) L. R. 27 I. A. 69.), which followed Vurmah Vahia v. Ravi Vurmah Mutha . (( 1876) L. R. 4 I. A. 76.)
But in those cases the alienations were void and no property passed, as they were attempts to deal with the office of the shebait or mahant and with the whole endowment. Here the transactions were voidable and not void ; they were effected by the mahant as manager, and if they had been for necessity, as they purported to be, they would have been valid. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar (L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) it was held that the mahant is not in the position of a trustee, but of a manager, and that a permanent lease by him, even if not for necessity, is valid during his lifetime. For the purpose of this case no distinction can be drawn between the sale and the permanent lease. The judgments in Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohamad Mustapha Maracayar (( 1923) L.
R. 50 I. A. 295.) and Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (( 1923) L. R. 51 I. A. 83, 89.) draw no such distinction. That there is a distinction between Vidya Varuthis case (L. R. 48 I. A. 302.) and cases such as Damodar Dass case (L. R. 37 I. A. 147.) has been recognized by the Patna High Court in Ramrup Gir v. Lal Chand Marwari . (( 1922) I. L. R. 1 Pat. 475.) On appeal to the Privy Council (( 1925) L. R. 53 I. A. 24.) in that case it was not necessary to determine whether adverse possession began at the date of the alienation or when the alienating mahant died.
Wallach for the respondents. The distinction between the class of case o
