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1934 Supreme(SC) 62
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD ATKIN, LORD ALNESS, AND SIR SHADI LAL
MAHADEO PRASAD SINGH - Appellant
Versus
KARIA BHARTI - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Allahabad.
Decided On : Dec. 18. 1934.
Solicitors for appellants :T. L. Wilson & Co. Solicitors for respondent: Hy. S. L. Polak & Co.
A de facto head in actual possession of a religious institution can maintain a suit to recover its property for the institution's benefit. Possession of the head does not become adverse to the institution merely by a compromise if they continue to act as the head.
Headnote:(A) Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - Article 144 - Recovery of property belonging to a religious institution - Maintainability of suit by de facto head - Adverse possession - A person in actual possession of a religious institution is entitled to maintain a suit to recover property appertaining to it, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of the institution.
(B) Adverse Possession - Possession of the head of a religious institution does not become adverse to the institution merely by a compromise regarding the distribution of properties, provided the person continues to hold the office, describes themselves as the head in subsequent transactions, and justifies alienations based on legal necessity.
Facts of the case:
A village belonging to a religious institution was sold by the then head of the institution without legal necessity. The successor claimed the property but was found not to have been formally installed as the head. However, it was established that the successor had been managing the institution's affairs and was treated as the head by interested parties. The former head had previously entered into a compromise regarding the institution's properties but continued to hold the disputed village and describe himself as the head in the sale deed.
Findings of Court:
The successor, being the de facto head in actual possession, is entitled to recover property for the benefit of the institution. The former head's possession did not become adverse from the date of the compromise as he continued to act as the head and cited legal necessity for the sale of the property, meaning the limitation period did not begin until his death.
Issues: Whether a person who is not formally installed as the head of a religious institution but is in actual possession can maintain a suit for recovery of its property, and whether the limitation period for such recovery began from the date of a compromise or the death of the former head.
Ratio Decidendi: A person in actual possession of a religious institution can maintain a suit to recover its property for the institution's benefit. The possession of a head of an institution does not become adverse to the institution simply by a compromise if the person continues to hold the office and describes themselves as the head in legal documents.
Result: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
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religious endowments
- management of math
- alienation of endowed property
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religious endowments
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practice and procedure
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limitation
- adverse possession
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limitation
Judgement
Appeal (No. 8 of 1933) from a decree of the High Court (April 20, 1931) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpur (March 31, 1927).
In 1926 the respondent, Karia Bharti, brought a suit against the appellants claiming possession of the village Sitkna. By his plaint he alleged that the village appertained to a math at Kanchanpur ; that he had been installed as mahant of the math upon the death in 1916 of Rajbans Bharti; and that Rajbans had sold the village to the appellants in 1914 without necessity. The appellants by their written statement denied that the respondent had been installed as mahant, and the other facts alleged ; they pleaded (inter alia) that the suit was barred by limitation. Rajbans had been installed as mahant in 1894 and had died in 1916. In 1904 a deed of compromise had been entered into by Karia and Rajbans with reference to the math properties ; the effect of the deed was one of the matters in dispute upon the appeal.
The facts appear fully from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
Both Courts in India found that the village appertained to the math and had been sold without necessity.
The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff could not maintain it, as it was proved that he had not been installed as mahant as he alleged in his plaint.
An appeal to the High Court was allowed and a decree made for possession and mesne profits. The learned judges (Pullan and Niamat-ullah JJ.) held that although the plaintiff had not been installed he had been de facto mahant since the compromise of 1904, and that as such he could maintain the suit, and that the suit was not barred by limitation, as it was commenced within twelve years of Rajbans death.
1934. Nov. 16, 19. De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the appellants.
Wallach for the respondent.
The contentions appear from the judgment. Reference was made to Damodar Das v. Adhikari Lakhan Das (( 1910) L. R. 37 I. A. 147.) ; Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain (( 1911) L. R. 38 I. A. 87.); Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302.); Ram Charan Ramanuj Das v. Gobinda Ramanuj Das (( 1928) L. R. 56 I. A. 104.); Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal (( 1933) L. R. 60 I. A. 124.); and Naurangi Lal v. Ram Charan Das . (( 1930) I. L. R. 9
P. 885, 895.)
Dec. 18. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
SIR SHADI LAL. This appeal relates to a village known as Saktni, which is situated in the District of Gorakhpur in the Province of Agra. The village formed part of the estate annexed to the math of Kanchanpur in that District and was sold to the defendants, hereinafter called “the appellants," on March I, 1914, by one Rajbans Bharthi alleged to be the mahant of the math at that time. Rajbans died on March 21, 1916, and the present action was brought on February 23, 1926, by Karia Bharthi, who claimed to be his successor as the mahant of the shrine.
A large number of pleas were raised to defeat the suit, but there are only two questions which have been argued on this appeal first, that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain the suit ; second, that the claim was barred by limitation.
The facts of the case bearing on these questions do not admit of any real dispute. In April, 1894, one Bachchu Bharthi, who was admittedly the mahant of the math, died, and two persons, namely Rajbans Bharthi and Karia Bharthi, came forward to claim the office of the mahant. Karia was, at that time, a boy of only about thirteen years of age ; and his father, acting as his guardian, settled the dispute with the rival claimant by a compromise. In accordance with this compromise Rajbans executed on May 2, 1894, a deed by which he promised to adopt the boy as his chela and declared him to be his successor to the office of mahant. As a result of this settlement, Rajbans was recognized and installed as the mahant of the math.
On attaining majority Karia repudiated the compromise and instituted in 1899 a suit to establish his
