Back
1916 Supreme(SC) 27
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND MR. AMEER ALI.
MALRAJU LAKSHMI VENKAYYAMMA - Appellant
Versus
VENKATA NARASIMHA APPA RAO - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : Mar. 9; May. 15. 1916.
Solicitor for appellant: Douglas Grant.
Solicitors for first respondent: T. L. Wilson & Co.
Solicitor for cross-appellant: Edward Dalgado.
A definite proposal, accepted through the conduct of the parties and performance of conditions, constitutes a binding contract. Once a party acts upon such a proposal, the other party is barred from resiling under the principle of rei interventus.
Headnote:(A) Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 8 - Registration Act, 1877 - Section 17(b) - Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 - Section 544 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order xli, Rule 33 - Formation of contract through proposal and acceptance by conduct - A definite promise regarding the transfer of property, where the promisor reserves a life interest and the promisee accepts by performing a condition, such as continuing residence, constitutes a completed and enforceable contract. (Paras 49-50)
(B) Acceptance by conduct - Where a party acts upon a proposal and such actings are known to the proposer, the power to resile from the engagement is barred by the principle of rei interventus, which excludes the plea of locus penitentiae. (Para 52)
(C) Dying declarations - A statement made on the death-bed reaffirming a prior agreement serves as a confirmation of the existing contract rather than a testamentary disposition if the right to the property had already been effectively granted under a contract. (Para 54)
Facts of the case:
A plaintiff claimed ownership of a village based on a promise made by her great-aunt. The great-aunt had purchased the property in her own name but wrote a letter stating the property was for the plaintiff, while reserving a life interest for herself. The plaintiff and her husband continued to reside with the great-aunt for several years based on this arrangement. Upon her death, the great-aunt reaffirmed that the property was intended for the plaintiff.
Findings of Court:
The court held that a completed contract existed. The letter provided a definite proposal regarding the subject matter and ownership, and the plaintiff's continued residence constituted acceptance and consideration. The death-bed statement was a reaffirmation of this contract.
Issues: Whether a binding contract was formed via a written promise and subsequent conduct, and whether the promisor's estate was bound to deliver possession after the expiry of the life interest.
Ratio Decidendi: A proposal with a condition, once accepted by performance, is equivalent to a contract. When parties act on the faith of a proposal, the power of resiling is barred by rei interventus. A subsequent death-bed declaration confirming the arrangement reaffirms the contractual obligation.
Result: Appeal allowed with costs, and the cross-appeal dismissed with costs.
Law. Rep. 43 Ind. App. 138 ( 1915- 1916) Malraju Lakshmi Venkayyamma V. Venkata Narasimha Appa Rao 45
Consolidated Appeals from a decree of the High Court (November 26, 1909) reversing a decree of the District Judge of Godaveri (November 3, 1904) and rejecting an application by the cross-appellant.
In 1902 the appellant instituted a suit in the District Court of Godaveri against Rangayya Appa Rao, Narasimha Appa Rao, and Pathasaradhi Appa Rao (hereinafter referred to as the first, second, and third defendants respectively) claiming possession of the village of Repudi. The village had belonged to Rani Papamma Rao (the appellants great-aunt), and upon her death in 1899 the defendants, after litigation in which a receiver had been appointed, were declared to be equally entitled to it. The receiver also was joined as a defendant.
The appellant by her plaint alleged facts upon which it was claimed that she was entitled to the village upon the death of the Rani, either under a contract made by the latter or by reason of a verbal bequest. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of their Lordships.
On November 3, 1904, the District Judge made a decree in the appellants favour. He held that the village had been purchased under the alleged contract, and that the Rani had subsequently agreed to hold it in trust for the appellant, subject to its remaining in the Ranis possession until her death. He was also of opinion that the evidence showed an oral bequest by the Rani on the day of her death. Against this decree the second defendant alone appealed to the High Court; the other defendants were joined as respondents, but took no part in the proceedings. The appeal was valued at a third of the value of the village.
The appeal was heard by Sankaran Nair and Abdur Rahim JJ., who, while agreeing that no bequest had been proved, differed as to whether there was a contract. The appeal was accordingly dismissed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 572. The second defendant appealed under s. 15 of the Letters Patent, the other defendants being again made respondents, and the appeal being valued at a third of the value of the village.
On November 26, 1909, the Letters Patent appeal was heard and dismissed by the Chief Justice and Wallis and Miller JJ. The learned judges were of opinion that the evidence did not establish either a contract or a bequest. A decree was made by which it was ordered that the decree of the District Judge be reversed and that "the plaintiffs suit as against the second defendant be dismissed."
The third defendant (the present cross-appellant) applied that he might have the benefit of the decree so far as concerned his share in the village ; he relied on Order xli., r. 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
The learned judges rejected this application, saying "the third defendant, who has not appealed, asks the Court to set aside the decree against him also, but s. 544 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, does not apply to the case as the present appeal is not against the whole decree. Before the present Code came into force the plaintiff had become entitled to hold her decree against this defendant undisturbed, and the provisions of the present Code cannot be applied retrospectively so as to deprive her of it."
Against the decree of November 26, 1909, the plaintiff preferred the first of the present appeals, her appeal being admitted on May 18, 1910.
On May 19, 1914, the third defendant, without first applying to the High Court, lodged a petition to His Majesty in Council praying that he should be added as a respondent and should have special leave to cross appeal. Upon the report of the Judicial Committee it was ordered (1.) that the third defendant
Law. Rep. 43 Ind. App. 138 ( 1915- 1916) Malraju Lakshmi Venkayyamma V. Venkata Narasimha Appa Rao 46
should be joined as a respondent, (2.) that he should have special leave to cross appeal, and (3.) that such leave should be subject to all objections w
