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1946 Supreme(SC) 1

PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
VISCOUNT SIMON, LORD THANKERTON AND SIR JOHN BEAUMONT.
MOULVI SAMIULLAH - Appellant
Versus
COLLECTOR OF ALIGARH - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Allahabad.
Decided On : January, 14, 1946.

Advocates:
Solicitors for appellant:Douglas Grant & Dold. Solicitor for respondent: Solicitor, India Office.

Important Points

An agreement between parties regarding the basis of valuation for land compensation cannot bind a land acquisition officer or a court in the performance of their statutory duties under the Land Acquisition Act, as they must exercise independent judgment.

Subject

Property Law - Land Acquisition

Act Referred

Headnote

(A) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 11, 18, 19, and 23 - Compensation for compulsory acquisition - Statutory duty of Land Acquisition Officer and Court - Binding nature of agreements between parties - The land acquisition officer, in awarding the amount of compensation under Section 11, is performing a statutory duty that affects the expenditure of public money. In assessing compensation, the officer is bound to exercise independent judgment as to the correct basis of valuation, and such judgment cannot be controlled by an agreement between the parties interested. Similarly, on a reference under Section 18, the court must exercise its own judgment to determine whether the award was based on a correct principle and is not bound by private agreements that would restrict its statutory obligations. (Paras 14-16)

(B) Valuation of land - Occupancy tenants - Deduction for tenancies - Where land is burdened with occupancy tenants and the comparable sale deeds (exemplars) used for valuation are not, a deduction for the trouble and expense involved in dealing with such tenancies is permissible. Questions relating to the specific quantum of such deductions are matters of value and local knowledge, which appellate courts generally do not interfere with unless there is a clear error in calculation. (Paras 18-20)

Facts of the case:
Land held as both trust property and personal property was compulsorily acquired for a public purpose. The parties had agreed on the criteria for selecting sale deeds (exemplars) to determine the market value. The land acquisition officer fixed a flat rate based on an average of selected exemplars. The matter was referred to a civil court under Section 18 of the Act. The trial court increased the compensation by relying on a specific exemplar that closely resembled the acquired land. The High Court modified this, holding that the initial agreement on the basis of valuation was binding and applying a deduction because the acquired land was burdened with occupancy tenants, whereas the exemplars were not.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the agreement between the parties regarding the evidence to be used for valuation did not bind the land acquisition officer or the trial court in the performance of their statutory duties. Regarding the deduction for occupancy tenants, the court held that the appellant failed to prove that the exemplars used for comparison were also burdened with such tenancies, and the quantum of deduction was a matter of local valuation.

Issues: Whether an agreement between the parties regarding the basis of valuation binds the land acquisition officer and the court in the performance of their statutory duties under the Land Acquisition Act, and whether a deduction for occupancy tenants was justified in the calculation of compensation.

Ratio Decidendi: The land acquisition officer and the court perform statutory duties under the Land Acquisition Act; therefore, their assessment of compensation must be based on independent judgment and cannot be restricted by private agreements between parties. Furthermore, valuation adjustments based on the presence of occupancy tenants are matters of fact and local knowledge, and such findings by lower courts are generally not disturbed.

Result: Appeal dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • administrative law
    • land acquisition
      • compensation
  • property law
    • tenancy
      • occupancy tenants
  • practice and procedure
    • statutory duty

Judgement

Consolidated Appeals (No. 75 of 1944) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (September 3, 1940) which modified a judgment and decree of the District Judge of Aligarh (August 18, 1936) which in turn had modified an award of the land acquisition officer, Aligarh (November 7, 1933).

The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The land to which the first appeal relates consisted of twelve bighas and nine biswas, which were held by the appellant as the mutawalli of waqf property. The land to which the second appeal relates consisted of one bigha which was the appellants personal property. These lands were acquired, together with other adjacent lands belonging to other owners, for the Co-operative Housing Society, Ld., Aligarh, under Government Notification dated May 29, 1930, and issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. At that time the whole area held by the appellant was occupied by two tenants, Abdul Karim and Karu.

During the proceedings before the land acquisition officer it was agreed between all the parties before him first, that in order to ascertain the market value of the land concerned all the sale deeds relating to the sales in respect of an area less than seventy-five yards should be struck off, and secondly, that the exemplars for evolving sales, that was, sale deeds relating to other sales, should be taken into consideration as far back as the year 1923, that was, seven years preceding the year 1930, excluding the transactions which had some special grounds for being too high or too low or which might be inadmissible on any other ground to be decided by the land acquisition officer.

The land acquisition officer decided to apply a flat rate in respect of the lands under acquisition, and to fix that flat rate at 5 annas, 1 pie per square yard, and he fixed the compensation payable to the appellant on that basis. It was not shown in the award made by the land acquisition officer how the figure of 5 annas, 1 pie per square yard was arrived at, but from the judgment of the High Court now under appeal it appeared that the land acquisition officer took twenty-eight exemplars, selected from a much larger number, which had taken place within the previous seven years, that he added up the number of square yards sold in such transactions and the prices paid thereon and, by striking an average reached the figure of 5 annas, 1 pie per square yard, and awarded to the appellant in respect of both his personal and waqf property a sum of Rs.14,127, 13 annas 6 pies.

On August 27, 1934, the appellant lodged an application to the collector as land acquisition officer under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for reference to the civil court regarding the acquisition of the properties on the ground that the compensation awarded was inadequate. In his written statement the collector pleaded that the award of the collector was made on the basis of the statement of parties " that the value " be fixed on the basis of certain sale deeds on the file " and therefore the applicant had no right to question the award. The learned District Judge raised two issues which are material—" (1.) Whether the compensation awarded is “adequate? If not, what is the proper compensation? " (2.) Whether the rate of compensation was fixed with, the " consent of the applicants and the acquiring body ? If so, “how does it affect the case ?”

The District Judge, in the result, held that the appellant was entitled to Rs.29,202, 6 annas 10 pies in respect of both properties, and on appeal to the High Court (Collister and Bajpai JJ.) that award was increased by Rs.2,775, 12 annas 3 pies. The appellant now asked that the amount of compensation should be increased.

1945. Nov. 26, 27. Rewcastle K.C. and Dingle Foot for the appellant. The main question in these appeals is whether, in deciding the amount of compensation to be awarded to the appellant for the compulsory acquisition of his land, the High Cour











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