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1936 Supreme(SC) 44
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD MAUGHAM, LORD ROCHE, AND SIR GEORGE RANKIN.
MURUGESAM PILLAI - Appellant
Versus
MINAKSHISUNDARA AMMAL - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : July 21, 1936.
Solicitor for appellant: G. K. Kannepalli.
A requirement to execute a receipt upon attaining majority is not a condition precedent. Under the Limitation Act, the limitation period for a deceased minor's representative begins when the minor would have attained majority, not from the date of death, as the law does not accelerate a right of action.
Headnote:(A) Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - Section 17(1) and Article 182, Clause 7 of Schedule I - Execution of compromise decree - Death of minor plaintiff before attaining majority - Limitation period - Whether the period of limitation begins to run from the date of death of the minor or from the date on which the minor would have attained majority - Section 17(1) is intended to limit the time during which an action may be brought and not to accelerate any right of action against a defendant - Where the right to sue had not accrued at the time of death, the limitation period is computed from the date the deceased would have attained majority.
(B) Construction of Decree - Condition Precedent - Requirement for a minor to execute an acquittance receipt upon attaining majority - Whether such a requirement constitutes a condition precedent for the right to recover sums under a compromise decree - Provision for execution of a receipt is often a direction inserted ex abundanti cautela to prevent subsequent challenges to the compromise and does not render the right purely personal or contingent upon attaining majority.
Facts of the case:
A compromise decree provided that a minor plaintiff would receive a specific sum and interest, provided that within six months of attaining majority, the plaintiff executed a registered receipt. The minor died before attaining majority. The legal representative filed a petition to recover the amount within three years of the date the minor would have attained majority. The appellant contended that the right was personal, contingent on attaining majority, and that the application was barred by limitation as the period should run from the date of death.
Findings of Court:
The requirement to execute a receipt was not a condition precedent but a cautionary direction. The right to recover the sum was not a purely personal right and survived the minor's death. Regarding limitation, the right to sue had not accrued until the date the minor would have attained majority; therefore, the limitation period began from that date, not the date of death.
Issues: Whether the requirement to execute a receipt upon attaining majority was a condition precedent making the right personal, and whether the limitation period for recovery began from the date of the minor's death or the date he would have attained majority.
Ratio Decidendi: A provision requiring a receipt upon majority is generally a direction to ensure the finality of a compromise rather than a condition precedent. Under the Limitation Act, Section 17(1) does not accelerate a right of action; if the right to sue had not accrued before death, the limitation period runs from the time the right would have accrued, which is the date the minor would have attained majority.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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practice and procedure
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limitation
- accrual of right
- limitation period for minors
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limitation
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civil law
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compromise decrees
- construction of conditions
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compromise decrees
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family law
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hindu law
- legal representation
- joint family partition
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hindu law
Judgement
Appeal (No. 81 of 1935) from an order of the High Court (August 22, 1934) affirming an order of the Subordinate Judge of Cuddalore (August 22, 1930), made in proceedings for the execution of a compromise decree (March 20, 1919).
The respondent, the mother of the plaintiff in the suit which was compromised, sought by petition after her sons death while a minor, to be brought on the record as her sons legal representative and to recover the sum which would have been payable to him on his attaining majority by the appellant under the compromise decree. Her petition was filed within three years of the date when her son would have attained majority, and the questions for determination were whether she was entitled to maintain her application, and if so, whether the application was barred by limitation.
The facts and the provisions of the compromise decree appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The Subordinate Judge made an order that the period of three years limitation began to run on and from September 30, 1926, when the minor plaintiff would have attained his majority, and not from the date of his death as contended by the appellant.
On appeal, the High Court (Madhavan Nair and Pandrang Row JJ.) held that though in law the right of the plaintiff accrued to the respondent on his death, enforcement of it could not be had till the date on which he would have attained his majority, September 30, 1926, and that the case fell within art. 182,
cl. 7, of Sch. I of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and that inasmuch as the respondents application was filed within three years from that date it was not barred by time.
1936. July 21. Parikh for the appellant. The respondent did not appear.
July 21. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
LORD MAUGHAM. This is an appeal from an order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated August 22, 1934, affirming the order of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cuddalore, dated August 22, 1930. The orders were made in proceedings for the execution of a compromise decree, dated March 20, 1919, on a petition presented by the legal representative of one Muthukumara Pillai, deceased, which was dated November 20, 1928. The respondent does not appear, and Mr. Parikh, for the appellant, has said everything that can properly be said in support of the appeal; but their Lordships are unable to accept the view that the judgments of the Courts in India are incorrect.
The facts are comparatively simple. In or about the year 1912, one Narayana Pillai and his two minor sons, whose first names were Murugesam and Muthukumara, formed a Hindu joint family. On February 26, 1912, the father, Narayana, partitioned the joint family properties amongst the three coparceners—namely, himself and his two infant sons, and he executed a deed of partition which was registered. Shortly afterwards, namely, on March 15, 1912, he made a will disposing of his share of those properties and two days later he died. He left surviving him his two minor sons and two widows. The mother of the younger son, Muthukumara, was named Minakshisundara Ammal, and she is the respondent to the present appeal. On April 27, 1915, the minor and younger son, Muthukumara, by his next friend, his mother, just mentioned, instituted a suit in the Temporary Sub ordinate Judges Court at Cuddalore, which was afterwards transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Cuddalore. There were six defendants to that suit, including the present appellant, the elder of the two sons. In the suit a declaration was sought that the partition deed and the will were invalid and not binding upon the plaintiff. The suit was contested, but was eventually compromised, and the Subordinate Judge in his decree stated that it was in his opinion a fit and proper compromise and was for the benefit of the minor plaintiff. This decree, dated March 20, 1913, is the decree on the true construction of which the present question arises. The material te
