1934 Supreme(SC) 43
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD TOMLIN, LORD MACMILLAN, AND SIR JOHN WALLIS.
MUNDANCHERI KOMAN - Appellant
Versus
ACHUTHAN NAIR - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : July. 26. 1934.
Solicitor for appellant: Harold Shephard.
Solicitor for respondent No. 4: Solicitor, India Office.
In determining if a temple is a public religious trust under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court examines revenue records, the nature of the manager's role (trustee vs. owner), and evidence of public user, especially where no regional presumption of public trust exists.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure - Section 92 - Public religious trusts - Determination of whether temples and endowments are public or private - In certain districts, there is no presumption that temples are public trusts; the issue must be determined based on evidence of the particular case.
(B) Interpretation of terms - Meaning of "uralan" - Whether the term implies ownership or the role of a guardian/manager/trustee - Use of the term in conjunction with properties belonging to the temple indicates a negation of ownership in the manager.
(C) Evidence of dedication - Revenue records showing separate property for temples and the joint family, and the manager describing himself as a trustee, indicate that properties were dedicated for the support of the temples.
Facts of the case:
Habitual worshippers filed suits under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure to remove the managing member of a joint family from the trusteeship of seven temples, alleging mismanagement. The managing member contended that the temples were private family institutions and that public worship was permitted only by sufferance. The lower court dismissed the suits, but the High Court reversed the decision, holding the temples to be public religious trusts.
Findings of Court:
The court found that documentary evidence, including revenue surveys and previous litigation, showed that temple properties were distinct from family properties. The term used for the manager indicated a role of trusteeship rather than ownership. Evidence of public user further supported the public character of the trusts.
Issues: Whether the properties of the temples in question were public religious trusts within the meaning of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Ratio Decidendi: Where evidence shows that temple properties are recorded separately from family properties and the manager acts as a trustee rather than an owner, and where there is evidence of public user, the temples and their endowments are considered public religious trusts.
Result: Appeals fail and should be dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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practice and procedure
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civil procedure
- section 92 code of civil procedure
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civil procedure
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property law
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trusts
- public religious trusts
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land tenure
- malabar land law
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trusts
Judgement
Consolidated Appeal (No. 3 of 1933) by special leave from a judgment and seven orders of the High Court (March 30, 1928) which reversed seven decrees of the Sub ordinate Judge of Ottapalam.
The seven suits which gave rise to the appeal related to seven temples in Malabar, and were instituted by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the consent of the Advocate General, who was joined as respondent No. 4 to the present appeal. On the death of the original defendant the appellant was brought upon the record in his place. The plaints claimed decrees removing the defendant from the trusteeship of the temples, the appointment of new trustees, and other incidental relief.
Several issues were framed, but the only issue material to the present appeal was No. 2 " whether the properties in question are public religious trusts."
The Subordinate Judge, who tried the suits together, found that it was not established that the properties were public religious trusts; accordingly he dismissed the suits.
An appeal to the High Court was heard by Phillips and Odgers JJ. and was allowed ; the suits were remanded for disposal. The present appeal was from that order.
The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
1934. June 19, 21, 22, 25. Narasimham for the appellant.
Dunne K.C. and Wallach for respondent No. 4, the Advocate General.
[Reference was made to Rupa Jagshet v. Krishnaji Govind (( 1884) I. L. R. 9B. 169, 171.); Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev (( 1888) I. L. R. 15 B. 612, 622.); Jugalkishore v. Lakshmandas (( 1899) I. L. R. 23 B. 659, 664.) ; Subramania Ayyar v. Vencatachala Vadhyar (( 1916) 37 I. C. 688.) ; Subramania Ayar v. Lakshmana Goundan (( 1919) 54 I. C. 177.), affirmed by P. C. under title Pujari Lakshmana Goundan v. Subramania Ayyar (( 1923) 29 C. W. N. 112.) ; Puraviya Goundan v. Poonachi Goundan (( 1921) 40 Mad. L. J. 289.) ; Ananda Chandra Chuckerbutty v. Braja Lal Singh (( 1922) I. L. R. 50 C. 292, 304.) ; Kelu Achan v. Sivarama Pattar Karikar (( 1928) 113 I. C. 636.)]
July 26. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
SIR JOHN WALLIS. In this case the three plaintiffs, who described themselves as Hindu Nairs residing within half a mile of the seven plaint temples and as habitual worshippers at the said temples, instituted seven suits, which have been tried together, under s. 92, Civil Procedure Code, with the consent of the Advocate General of Madras, against the first defendant, who is described in the plaint as a Hindu Nair residing in Peringod amsam and desam of the Palghat Taluq, but is admittedly the karnavan or managing member of a Malabar tar wad or joint family. The plaint alleged that the defendants predecessors, who were originally sanudayis, or committee members, of the aforesaid temples, had been, in that capacity, in management of the affairs of the devasom ; that they had been for some time improperly styling themselves the uralans of the aforesaid devasom ; and that recently the defendant and the members of his family had^ further begun to claim that the devasom and its endowments belonged to the family, thereby repudiating the public character of the trust. After alleging various acts of mismanagement, they prayed for the removal of the defendant and the appointment of a new trustee, an order vesting the devasom properties in such trustee, accounts and inquiries as to the alleged misappropriation by the defendant and his predecessor, and the settling of a scheme of management.
The defendant, in his written statement, alleged that the plaint temples were founded, owned and maintained by the defendants ancestors. Seeing that the worship of God is a holy and meritorious act, the defendant and his ancestors had allowed those who came to the temples to worship there, not as a matter of right, but by the sufferance of the defendants tarwad. By an understanding between the members of the tarwad, the income of certain tarwad properties was