The main legal point established in the judgment is the liability of a son for his father's debts to the extent of the assets inherited from the father, as well as the pious duty and legal obligation of a son to pay his father's debts out of the inherited estate, except for debts contracted for immoral purposes.

Judgement

APPEAL from a decree of the High Court (March 3, 1880), which varied a decree of the District Court of Tinnevelly (Nov. 29, 1876).

The facts of the case were not in dispute, and they, together with the proceedings in this and a former suit, are stated in the judgment of their Lordships.

The questions raised in the appeal related to the nature of the interest which the late zemindar of Sivagiri (the Respondents father) possessed in the zemindary which he had inherited under Mitakshara law from his maternal grandfather; and to the extent of the Respondents liability for his fathers debts.

Leith, Q.C., and Mayne, for the Appellant, contended that the zemindary was not the ancestral property of his father in the sense of Hindu law (Mitakshara) so as to vest in the Respondent any

Law. Rep. 9 Ind. App. 128 ( 1881- 1882) Muttayan C hettiar V. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinnatambiar

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interest in the property during his fathers lifetime. It descended to the Respondents father as heir to his maternal grandfather. The son accordingly had not the same interest in it; nor was the father under the same restriction as to alienation as he would have been had the estate descended to him from his father or paternal grandfather. In the latter case the son would have had a vested interest and rights co-equal with his father. But that depends upon his being interested in his grandfathers estate. In the former case, that is in the case or an estate descending to a father from his maternal grandfather, the son has no interest in that grandfathers estate. This interest is contingent upon his surviving his father, for a daughters sons son is not an heir. Consequently he cannot rely upon blood relationship alone in making title, but must aver that his father, who was contingent reversionary heir expectant on his mothers death, survived his mother, and took possession of his maternal grandfathers estate. Wherever it is necessary for a son to make an averment of that nature, he has no power to contest his fathers alienation. His inheritance is one liable to obstruction, that is, liable to be defeated by something other than his own death. It has been held that a son cannot prevent alienation by his father of property which the latter inherited collaterally, and that the restriction upon the fathers alienation only applies to the grandfathers property see Baboo Nund Coomar Lall v. Moulvie Razeeooddeen Hossein ((1) 10 Beng. L. R. 183, 192.); Mitakshara, c. 1, s. 5, vv. 9, 10, and again c. 1, sect. 1, vv. 3, 27, 33. The whole of the passages in the Mitakshara on this subject must be read as referring to a grandson by male descent Mussumat Phoolbas Koer v. Lall Juggessur Sahoy ((2) 18 Suth. W. R. 48.) ; Pitam Singh v. Ujagur Singh ((3) Ind. L. R. 1 Allahabad, 651.).

Secondly, the whole zemindary, or at least the Respondents interest therein which he took by inheritance, was liable as assets by descent in the hands of the Respondent as heir of his father for payment of his fathers debts. There is a pious duty on the part of the son to pay his fathers debts, and a legal obligation so to do out of the estate which he inherits from his father, except as regards debts contracted for immoral purposes. See Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall and Others ((4) Law Rep. 1 Ind. Ap. 321.). [Sir Richard Couch —In Kantoo Lall’s Case the debt was contracted before the sons birth.]

The debt was contracted before and the security given after the sons birth. [Sir Richard Couch —The debt being contracted before the birth is part of the reasoning on which the judgment proceeds. Sir Barnes Peacock referred to Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Musst. Babooee Munraj Koonweree ((1) 6 Moore, Ind. Ap. Ca. 421.), judgment of Lord Justice Knight Bruce.] Reference was then made to Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh ((2) Law Rep. 6 Ind. Ap. 88.), where the ratio decidendi is given at p. 109. See also Muddengopal Lall v. Musst. Gowrunbutty ((3) 15 Beng. L. R. 265.) a judgment of Phear, J., ref