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1923 Supreme(SC) 54
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD SHAW, LORD CARSON, SIR JOHN EDGE, MR. AMEER ALI, AND SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS.
NAINAPILLAI MARAKAYAR - Appellant
Versus
RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : December 14, 1923.
Solicitors for appellants :Douglas Grant. Solicitors for respondent: T. L. Wilson & Co.
Permanent occupancy rights cannot be presumed for tenants of endowed lands, as trustees lack authority to impair the endowment. Such rights cannot be acquired by prescription, and statutory "estate" status requires the grantee not to own the cultivator's interest (kudivaram).
Headnote:(A) Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 - Section 3(2)(d) and Section 6 - Definition of "estate" - Permanent right of occupancy - Onus of proof - The burden of proving a right of permanent occupancy in land lies upon the tenant who alleges it as a defence to a suit for ejectment; proof of long occupation at a fixed rent is insufficient to satisfy this onus. (Paras 11-12)
(B) Religious Endowments - Power of Trustees - Trustees or managers of a religious institution, acting as juridical persons, have no authority to impair endowed property by granting rights of permanent occupancy to tenants, as such an act would be a breach of duty and is not binding upon successors. (Paras 23-24)
(C) Presumption of Tenancy - A presumption in favour of permanent tenancy is inapplicable to endowed lands, as creating a fixed rent for all time in lieu of variable rent would offend legal principles governing the management of endowments. (Paras 25-26)
(D) Prescription - No tenant of land can obtain a right to a permanent tenancy by prescription against the landlord from whom the land is held. (Para 28)
Facts of the case:
Trustees of a temple brought suits to eject tenants from endowed lands. The tenants claimed permanent occupancy rights under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and independently of the Act. The lands were granted as a religious endowment, and evidence indicated the temple held both the landlord's interest (melvaram) and the cultivator's interest (kudivaram), characterizing the village as one where the sole occupancy right was vested in one proprietor.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the temple owned both the melvaram and kudivaram interests, meaning the lands did not constitute an "estate" under Section 3(2)(d) of the Act. Consequently, the tenants could not claim rights under Section 6. No evidence of grant or custom was provided to establish permanent occupancy, and vernacular descriptive terms used in receipts were found to be of uncertain meaning.
Issues: Whether the endowed lands constituted an "estate" under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and whether the tenants had acquired permanent occupancy rights through grant, custom, or prescription.
Ratio Decidendi: The lands were not an "estate" because the temple owned both the melvaram and kudivaram interests. Permanent occupancy rights cannot be presumed for endowed lands because trustees cannot legally impair the endowment by granting such rights. Furthermore, permanent tenancy cannot be acquired by prescription, and the use of ambiguous vernacular terms is insufficient to override the lack of direct proof of grant or custom.
Result: Consolidated appeals dismissed with costs.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
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land tenure
- permanent occupancy rights
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endowments
- temple property
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land tenure
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statutory law
- madras estates land act
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civil procedure
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evidence
- onus of proof
- ejectment
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evidence
Judgement
Consolidated Appeal (No. 46 of 1922) by special leave from two decrees (December 22, 1916) of the High Court, affirming two decrees (April 24, 1914) of the Subordinate Judge of Tanjore.
The respondents, who were trustees of a Hindu temple in Tanjore, brought two suits to eject, after notice, the respondents, tenants in the inam village of Mangal, which formed part of the endowed property of the temple. The defences of the appellants were on two grounds. First, that the village was an "estate" within the meaning of s. B, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Madras Estates Land Act (Mad. Act I. of 1908), and that accordingly they had a permanent right of occupancy by s. 6 of that Act. Secondly, that they had that right apart from the Act.
The decision of the issues relating to both defences depended to a great extent upon documents in which occurred vernacular terms the meaning of which, as used in Tanjore, was obscure.
The facts and the terms of the sanad of 1723, by which the Mahratta King of Tanjore, in confirmation of an earlier inam grant, had granted the village to the temple at a favourable assessment (rokkaguthakai), appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee, as also the terms of an official memorandum of 1724 with regard to the grant, and of a register of rokkaguthakai lands made in 1809.
In addition to the documents above referred to there was in evidence a paimash account for fasli 1238 (1829) of the village. This document stated as follows " Rokkaguthakai miras of the said village, Kovilur Sri Manthrapuriswarasami "—i.e., the temple—" ekabhogam, person 1.
Kudimiras-palabhogam persons 11." It referred to the tenants (or some of them) as " ullur parakudis" and " ulavadai miras." The tenants in signing described themselves, in some cases, as " ulavadai kudi-miras," in other cases as "kudimiras."
The muchalka of 1831 (referred to in the judgment of the Board) stated that it was executed " by us the undersigned kudimirasidars of the rokkaguthakai village of Mangal belonging to " the temple. By it the signatories agreed to cultivate " from next fasli 1241 on lease," and to make payments, described as " swamibhogam," to the temple at certain rates so long as the land should continue in their possession.
There was also an agreement between all the villagers in fasli 1241, which stated that " having made ourselves responsible to sirkar for the guthakai of our village .... we shall impose upon ourselves vari according to the current fasli 1241 " ; they were to sell the melvaram of other lands which were being cultivated by parakudis and out of the proceeds and " the collections made by imposition of vari under this karai arrangement " pay the vari to the sirkar; " .... we shall act as stated above for fasli 1241, and for fasli 1242 we shall make aruathikari (karai with definite shares) of the entire lands."
The Subordinate Judge of Tanjore who tried the case found that the temple owned both the melvaram and the kudivaram interest in the village, and that accordingly it was not an " estate" within Mad. Act
I. of 1908. After considering at length the authorities and the facts of the ease, he found also that the defendants had not acquired permanent rights of occupancy by prescription, and that the suits were not barred by limitation. Decrees for ejectment accordingly were made.
On appeal to the High Court (Sadasiva Iyer and Napier JJ.) the decrees were affirmed.
Sadasiva Iyer J., with whose judgment Napier J. agreed, stated that without going into the question of the burden of proof he was clearly satisfied that the evidence supported the contentions of the plaintiffs. In the course of his judgment the learned judge said that the words " parakudi" or " asalur parakudi" and " kasavargam " implied no permanent connection with the village ; " ullur parakudis " might have permanent residential rights in the houses where they lived, and in respect of them they might be called " kudimirasidars." He stated that he did not think that
