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1914 Supreme(SC) 30

PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD DUNEDIN, LORD MOULTON, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND MR. AMEER ALI.
PAUL - Appellant
Versus
ROBSON - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court in Bengal.
Decided On : Apr. 20; May. 11. 1914.

Advocates:
Solicitors for appellants:Westbury, Preston & Stavridi. Solicitors for respondents: Watkins & Hunter.

Prescriptive rights to light do not guarantee the same amount of light previously enjoyed; rather, they entitle the owner to sufficient light for the ordinary purposes of inhabitancy or business according to ordinary notions of mankind. Infringement occurs only if the obstruction constitutes an actionable nuisance.

Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 110 - Rights to light and air - Prescriptive rights - Measure of infringement - Whether the amount of light previously enjoyed is the decisive measure of unlawful hurt or annoyance - Right to light is limited to what is required for the ordinary purposes of inhabitancy or business according to the ordinary notions of mankind - No infringement unless the obstruction amounts to an actionable nuisance.

(B) Concurrent findings of fact - Scope of appeal - Where there are concurrent findings of fact by the courts below, the appellate court will not interfere unless the courts proceeded upon a wrong principle of law.

Facts of the case:
The appellants, owners of a freehold property, sought an injunction or damages for the obstruction of light and air to the eastern windows of their premises caused by a new building erected by the respondents. It was admitted that prescriptive rights to light had been acquired. The lower courts found that while light was obstructed, sufficient light remained for the business and residential use of the premises.

Findings of Court:
The trial court found that the light remaining on the ground and middle floors was sufficient for the purpose of carrying on the business of a shop or office, and that no nuisance was caused to the top floor or by the obstruction of air. The appellate court affirmed these findings of fact.

Issues: Whether the legal test for infringement of prescriptive rights to light is based on the quantity of light previously enjoyed or whether the remaining light is sufficient for the ordinary purposes of inhabitancy or business.

Ratio Decidendi: The right to light acquired by prescription is not a right to all the light previously enjoyed. The dominant tenement is entitled to a quantity of light required for the ordinary purposes of inhabitancy or business according to the ordinary notions of mankind. An obstruction is only actionable if it constitutes a nuisance. While previous enjoyment is a necessary standard for comparison, it does not furnish the decisive measure of the unlawful hurt or annoyance.

Result: Appeal dismissed with costs.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • property law
    • easements
      • prescriptive rights
        • rights of light and air
  • tort
    • nuisance
      • private nuisance

Judgement

Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court; (August 1, 1911) affirming a judgment and decree of that Court in its ordinary original jurisdiction (March 29, 1911).

The suit was brought by the appellants claiming an injunction or damages for an alleged interference with their rights to access of light and air in respect of a freehold house and premises known as 7, Esplanade East, in Calcutta. The house, of which the plaintiffs were life tenants, had been used as business premises in its two lower floors, and the top floor as a residential flat. It was admitted that the appellants had acquired by pre scription rights to air and light in respect of the windows on the east side of the house, and it was alleged by them that those rights were interfered with by a new building which the respondents were erecting.

The trial took place before Stephen J. and lasted from February 9, 1911, until March 16, 1911, much evidence being adduced upon either side. On March 29, 1911, the learned judge delivered judgment dismissing the suit. He found that the light coming to the appellants premises from the east had been obstructed by the respondents new building, but that, as far as the ground floor and middle floor were concerned, a sufficient quantity of light formerly enjoyed was left for the purpose of carrying on the business of a shop or office. As regards the top flo6r, he found that no nuisance was caused by the obstruction of light. He also found that no nuisance was caused by the obstruction of air, and that the plaintiffs had failed to prove any depreciation in the value of the premises.

The appellants appealed to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction. That Court (Jenkins C.J. arid Woodroffe J.) delivered judgment on August 1, 1911, dismissing the appeal. The learned Chief Justice, with whose judgment Woodroffe J. agreed, affirmed the findings of fact of the trial judge.

In reference to the divergence of judicial opinion, which had been argued existed as to whether the quantity of light previously enjoyed was, since the decision in Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores ([ 1904] A C. 179.), to be considered, the learned Chief Justice said " I doubt whether there is any real conflict and it appears to me that the difference of expression on which the argument rests may be fairly referred to the difference in the facts or conditions under review, and the considerations that particularly engaged the attention of those by whom these divergent expressions were severally used. No one, I imagine, would suggest that in a suit for disturbance of light the character of the previous enjoyment could be wholly disregarded nuisance implies comparison, and the previous state of affairs is a necessary standard for that comparison. And this must be so, as a general rule, though, after an investigation of a particular case, it may appear that the conditions of a nuisance have not been established. In every case, therefore, that comes before the Court the previous enjoyment is proved or sought to be proved, and that is an element which must, from the nature of things, be present in the mind of the Court. But this is a very different thing from saying that the previous enjoyment furnishes the decisive measure of the unlawful hurt or annoyance. "The case in the High Court is reported at I. L. R. 89 Calc. 59.

De Gruyther, K.C., and Dunne, for the respondents. As a preliminary point, there are concurrent findings of fact that no nuisance was caused by the obstruction complained of. That finding disposes of the case Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores . ([ 1904] A. C. 179.) Both under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 110, and according to the practice of the Board, the appeal should be dismissed Karuppanam Servai v. Srinavasan Chetti (( 1901) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 38.); Sajjad Husain v. Wazir All Khan . (( 1912) L. R. 39 Ind. Ap. 156.)

Upjohn, K.C., Hudson, K.C., and Vernon, for the appellants. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 110, a


















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