Back
1945 Supreme(SC) 20
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD MACMILLAN, LORD GODDARD AND SIR MADHAVAN NAIR.
PARASHURAM DETARAM SHAMDASANI - Appellant
Versus
KING-EMPEROR - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Bombay.
Decided On : May. 29. 1945.
Solicitors for appellant:Sanderson, Lee & Co. Solicitor for respondent: Solicitor, India Office.
Contempt of court requires words or actions that interfere, or tend to interfere, with the course of justice. Summary powers of punishment should be used sparingly and not to suppress offensive advocacy or punish tactless remarks that do not obstruct the administration of justice.
Headnote:(A) Contempt of Court - Summary powers of punishment - Test for contempt - For words or action used in the course of proceedings to be contempt, they must be such as would interfere, or tend to interfere, with the course of justice - An insult to opposing counsel or a litigant is distinct from an insult to the court itself or its tribunal - Foolish or tactless remarks made in the heat of argument, which do not obstruct the administration of justice, do not warrant the exercise of summary powers of punishment.
(B) Summary Power of Court - To be used sparingly and only in serious cases - Usefulness depends on wisdom and restraint in exercise - Power not intended to suppress methods of advocacy which are merely offensive - Dignity and prestige of the legal profession can be maintained without invoking contempt jurisdiction.
Facts of the case:
A litigant appearing in person during a review of taxation of costs made two statements in open court: first, that members of the legal profession are in the habit of not disclosing everything and misleading the court; and second, questioning whether the written statements of taxing masters are actually considered. The lower court found the litigant guilty of contempt of court on both counts, sentencing him to imprisonment and a fine.
Findings of Court:
The remarks regarding the legal profession were foolish and did not amount to contempt as they did not interfere with the administration of justice. The comments regarding the taxing masters were tactless suggestions regarding the summary nature of their work and did not suggest corruption or habitual failure of duty. Neither statement provided reasonable grounds for a finding of contempt.
Issues: Whether statements criticizing the general conduct of the legal profession and questioning the diligence of court officers, made by a litigant in person during arguments, amount to contempt of court.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that for words to constitute contempt, they must interfere, or tend to interfere, with the course of justice. Insults to opposing counsel are not equivalent to insults to the court. Summary powers of punishment for contempt must be exercised with restraint and only in serious cases, and should not be used to suppress offensive advocacy.
Result: Appeal allowed and the order set aside.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
practice and procedure
-
contempt of court
- criminal contempt
- summary powers of court
-
contempt of court
Judgement
Appeal (No.23 of 1944) from a judgment and order of the High Court (Kania J.) (October 15, 1942), as modified by an order of that judge (October 16, 1942).
The question in this appeal was whether the appellant had in all the circumstances committed the offence of contempt of court in making the following two statements in open court before Kania J. on October 9, 1942, in the course of argument on a summons for a review of taxation of costs (a) "I do not "keep anything back at all. My fault is that I disclose everything, unlike members of the Bar, who are in the habit of not doing so and misleading the court.” (b) "It is "customary for the taxing masters to write what is written at the end of the paragraph, but is it considered at all?"
Kania J. found the appellant guilty of contempt of court in respect of both matters, and sentenced him to imprisonment for eight days and ordered him to pay a fine of Rs.1.000. On November 18, 1942, the High Court (Beaumont C. J. and Sen J.) granted the appellant leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against the order of Kania J.
1945. Apr. 12. W. W. K. Page for the appellant. The appellant was not, in making either of the statements in question, in contempt of the court. Neither R. v. Davison ((1821) 4 B. & Aid. 329.) nor French v. French ((1824) 1 Hogan 138.) mentioned in the judgment of Kania J. is authority on this case. It would not seem that authority is needed. It is not a matter of the dignity of the court at all, or of any question of any interference with the administration of justice. It was never suggested that the words regarding the Bar were in reference to the opposing counsel, Mr. Desai, personally.
[He was stopped after reading the judgment of the Bombay High Court giving the appellant leave to appeal to the Board.]
Tucker K.C. and B. MacKenna for the respondent. The appellant was guilty of contempt of court under both heads as alleged. There is a question of principle underlying this appeal, and the first question, as in all cases of criminal contempt, is, can the conduct on its facts amount to contempt in law? It depends on what was said, how it was said and the circumstance in which it was said—on trying to recreate the atmosphere in which the observations were made. The test, looking at the course of conduct, is, does it, or might it tend, to obstruct the administration of justice Oswald on Contempt, 3rd ed., pp. 48, 52; Halsburys Laws of England, 2nd ed., vol. VII., p. 2; R. v. Davison (4
B. & Aid. 329.), and Anantalal Singha v. Watson (( 1930) I. L. R. 58 C. 884, 889.), which last-mentioned case gives a true enunciation of the principles applicable. In re Abdul Hasan Jauhar
Law. Rep. 72 Ind. App. 189 ( 1944- 1945) Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani V. King-Emperor
65
(( 1926) I. L. R. 48 A. 711, 714, 719.) appears to show that insults to counsel during the course of a case may amount to contempt of court, and Beaumont C.J. in his judgment giving leave to appeal in this case said " I do " not doubt for a moment that insults to counsel engaged in " a case can be dealt with in contempt.” Looking at the words that were spoken here, the inference is that the appellant was referring to Mr. Desai personally and insulting him—including him first and anybody else after. [Reference was made to Ex parte Pater (( 1864) 5 B. & S. 299, 303.).] An apology is merely to prevent punishment. With regard to the words relating to the taxing masters, it is not known exactly in what circumstances they were said, or how they were said, but they must have upset the judge considerably, and must have been something more than an unguarded remark. They could in law be contempt, and if they were, this Board would not interfere with the decision as to punishment.
W. W. K. Page replied, and asked for costs.
Tucker K.C. referred to McLeod v. St. Aubyn ([ 1899] A. C. 549), as the only case in which the Board had given costs in such a case.
May 29. The judgment of their Lordships was deliv
