Judgement

Appeal (No.23 of 1944) from a judgment and order of the High Court (Kania J.) (October 15, 1942), as modified by an order of that judge (October 16, 1942).

The question in this appeal was whether the appellant had in all the circumstances committed the offence of contempt of court in making the following two statements in open court before Kania J. on October 9, 1942, in the course of argument on a summons for a review of taxation of costs (a) "I do not "keep anything back at all. My fault is that I disclose everything, unlike members of the Bar, who are in the habit of not doing so and misleading the court.” (b) "It is "customary for the taxing masters to write what is written at the end of the paragraph, but is it considered at all?"

Kania J. found the appellant guilty of contempt of court in respect of both matters, and sentenced him to imprisonment for eight days and ordered him to pay a fine of Rs.1.000. On November 18, 1942, the High Court (Beaumont C. J. and Sen J.) granted the appellant leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against the order of Kania J.

1945. Apr. 12. W. W. K. Page for the appellant. The appellant was not, in making either of the statements in question, in contempt of the court. Neither R. v. Davison ((1821) 4 B. & Aid. 329.) nor French v. French ((1824) 1 Hogan 138.) mentioned in the judgment of Kania J. is authority on this case. It would not seem that authority is needed. It is not a matter of the dignity of the court at all, or of any question of any interference with the administration of justice. It was never suggested that the words regarding the Bar were in reference to the opposing counsel, Mr. Desai, personally.

[He was stopped after reading the judgment of the Bombay High Court giving the appellant leave to appeal to the Board.]

Tucker K.C. and B. MacKenna for the respondent. The appellant was guilty of contempt of court under both heads as alleged. There is a question of principle underlying this appeal, and the first question, as in all cases of criminal contempt, is, can the conduct on its facts amount to contempt in law? It depends on what was said, how it was said and the circumstance in which it was said—on trying to recreate the atmosphere in which the observations were made. The test, looking at the course of conduct, is, does it, or might it tend, to obstruct the administration of justice Oswald on Contempt, 3rd ed., pp. 48, 52; Halsburys Laws of England, 2nd ed., vol. VII., p. 2; R. v. Davison (4

B. & Aid. 329.), and Anantalal Singha v. Watson (( 1930) I. L. R. 58 C. 884, 889.), which last-mentioned case gives a true enunciation of the principles applicable. In re Abdul Hasan Jauhar

Law. Rep. 72 Ind. App. 189 ( 1944- 1945) Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani V. King-Emperor

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(( 1926) I. L. R. 48 A. 711, 714, 719.) appears to show that insults to counsel during the course of a case may amount to contempt of court, and Beaumont C.J. in his judgment giving leave to appeal in this case said " I do " not doubt for a moment that insults to counsel engaged in " a case can be dealt with in contempt.” Looking at the words that were spoken here, the inference is that the appellant was referring to Mr. Desai personally and insulting him—including him first and anybody else after. [Reference was made to Ex parte Pater (( 1864) 5 B. & S. 299, 303.).] An apology is merely to prevent punishment. With regard to the words relating to the taxing masters, it is not known exactly in what circumstances they were said, or how they were said, but they must have upset the judge considerably, and must have been something more than an unguarded remark. They could in law be contempt, and if they were, this Board would not interfere with the decision as to punishment.

W. W. K. Page replied, and asked for costs.

Tucker K.C. referred to McLeod v. St. Aubyn ([ 1899] A. C. 549), as the only case in which the Board had given costs in such a case.

May 29. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by L