Back
1921 Supreme(SC) 79
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD BUCKMASTER, LORD CARSON, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS.
PANDURANG KRISHANAJI - Appellant
Versus
MARKANDEYA TUKARAM - Respondents
On Appeal from the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Central Provinces.
Decided On : October 28, 1921.
Solicitors for appellant:Barrow, Rogers and Nevill. Solicitor for respondents: E. Dalgado.
Attestation of a deed only proves the witness saw its execution; it does not imply knowledge of the contents or consent to the transaction, and thus does not create an estoppel under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act unless independent evidence proves intentional representation.
Headnote:(A) Registration Act - Admissibility of unregistered documents - A document that does not effect a transfer of title but serves as evidence that a condition precedent in a registered agreement has been fulfilled is not inadmissible for want of registration.
(B) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 115 - Estoppel - Attestation of a deed - Mere attestation of a deed by a person claiming an interest in the property does not estop them from denying the title of the executants or the validity of the transaction - Attestation only proves the witness saw the execution and does not imply knowledge of the contents or consent to the transaction unless established by independent evidence.
Facts of the case:
A dispute arose regarding shares in a village. A registered settlement agreement stipulated that if certain losses were not paid by the co-sharers, their shares would be forfeited to the manager. A subsequent unregistered letter from the co-sharers admitted their inability to pay the losses. Later, the co-sharers sold the property to a third party, who then sold it to the respondent. The manager, claiming title via the settlement and the letter, had attested the first sale deed. The respondent sought partition and possession of a share in the property.
Findings of Court:
The unregistered letter was admissible as it served as evidence of the fulfillment of a condition in a registered document rather than being a conveyance itself. The manager was not estopped from challenging the sale despite attesting the deed, as there was no evidence that the signature was intended to represent the title as true or to signify consent to the transaction.
Issues: Whether an unregistered letter admitting inability to pay losses under a registered settlement is admissible to prove title, and whether the act of attesting a sale deed creates an estoppel against the witness.
Ratio Decidendi: Attestation of a deed only confirms the execution of the document; it does not convey knowledge of the contents or consent to the transaction. For estoppel to arise under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, there must be an intentional representation that induces another to act. Mere attestation does not constitute such a representation, and no knowledge of the contents should be inferred from the mere fact of attestation.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
property law
-
transfer of property
- registration
-
joint hindu family
- partition
-
transfer of property
-
evidence law
-
estoppel
- section 115, indian evidence act
- attestation
-
estoppel
Judgement
Appeal (No. 62 of 1920) from a judgment and decree (April 28, 1917) of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Central Provinces, reversing a decree (October 21, 1915) of the second Additional District Judge, Amraoti, East Berar.
The suit was brought by the first respondent against the appellant and others to recover an 8-anna share in a village, in circumstances which appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The trial judge dismissed the suit, but on appeal to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner a decree was made for partition and possession.
1921. Oct. 27, 28. Dube for the appellant. The letter of April 11, 1910, was not inadmissible under s. 49 of the Registration Act. It did not affect title; the appellants title was established by the registered document with proof that the terms had been accepted by his uncles and that the event referred to in the document had occurred. The letter was admissible as evidence upon those points, and as showing the circumstances in which the appellant was in possession Baid Rain v. Tika Ram . (( 1917)1. L. R. 39 A. 300.) Further, the appellant and his uncles having acted for many years on the compromise contained in the registered document of 1906, effect should be given to it apart from technicalities Mahomed Musa v. Aghore Kumar Ganguli . (( 1914) L. R. 42 I. A. 1.) The fact that the appellant attested the deed of 1914 did not estop him from denying that he knew its contents or assented to its effect.
De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the respondents. It is not contended that attestation of the deed of itself estopped the appellant. The evidence shows that the appellant attested knowing the contents of the deed, and that his attestation would cause the transferee to believe that he consented. The transferee was a bona fide purchaser, and from the register had notice of the arrangement between the appellant and his uncle. In these circumstances the attestation was a representation by which the appellant was estopped Sarat Chunder Dev v. Gopal Chunder Laha . (( 1892) L. R. 9 I. A. 203.) The appellants title was defective in the absence of registration of the letter of 1910. Apart from that letter it could not be shown that the uncles had relinquished their shares. It was therefore an instrument necessary to show title and not admissible without registration. Further the arrangement of 1906 did not provide for a transfer of one only of the villages; it referred to the villages as a whole. Dube replied.
Oct. 28. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
LORD BUCKMASTER. The plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal has arisen is the first respondent. His plaint asked that a joint estate in certain property known as Mauza Khandal should be partitioned, and that it might be declared that he was entitled to an 8-anna share in the property. The suit was dismissed by the District Judge of East Berar, but was granted in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner.
The respondents title rested on two deeds, the first, dated February 2, 1914, by which two grantors, Kanhoba and Vishwanath, the sons of Raghu, purported to convey the property in question to one Hari Govind Damle for Rs.9100, and the second dated June 26, 1914, by which Hari Govind Damle conveyed the same parcels to the said respondent for Rs.15,000. So far as the documentary title is concerned, it is complete, and if in fact Vishwanath and Kanhoba had the right to convey the two shares covered by the deed of February 2, 1914, there could be no answer to the respondents claim.
6 Law Rep. 49 Ind. App. 16 ( 1921- 1922) Pandurang Krishanaji V. Markandeya Tukaram
308
The first question that arose in the suit and remains for decision upon this appeal is whether those two signatories possessed that right or no, and the second whether, if no such right existed, the appellant was estopped from setting up the defect.
The dispute arises in these circumstances. The village in question was originally part of the joint e
