Judgement

Consolidated Appeal (No. 66 of 1931) from thirteen orders of the High Court (October 11, 1927) setting aside thirteen orders of the District Munsif of Tenali (August 9, 1922).

The respondent instituted original and small cause suits in the Court of the District Munsif to recover rent for, or damages for use and occupation of, agricultural lands in his agraharam village. The question arising upon the appeal was whether the inam was an " estate " within the definition in s. 3, sub-s. 2, of Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 ; if it was the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was excluded by s. 189 of the Act.

The District Munsif dismissed the suits, holding that the village was an estate under s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d)f of the Act.

The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge in twelve original suits; he also applied to the High Court for revision in one small cause case. The High Court transferred the appeals to its own file, and heard them with the application for revision.

Upon the hearing the High Court made orders reversing the orders of the trial judge and directing him to dispose of the cases.

Wallace J. said that the onus of proving that the suit inam was not cognizable by the ordinary Civil Courts rested with the defendants, and therefore was upon them to prove that the inam was an " estate " within the definition in s. 3, sub-s. 2, of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. They had contended that the inam was within cl. (d) of that subsection on the ground that upon the evidence the zamindar had only the melvaram. The evidence appeared to show that before the grant there were tenants on the land, which was part of a permanently settled zamindari. But the defendants had to show that they were occupancy ryots. They had produced no evidence of that, but relied upon Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Dandamudi Kotayya (( 1897) I. L. R. 20 Mad. 299.) and Cheekati Zamindar v. Ranasooru Dhora (( 1899) I. L. R. 23 Mad. 318.), in which it was held that there was a legal presumption that zamindari tenants had occupancy rights. The learned judge was of opinion that the above cases had been overruled by Suryanarayana v. Patanna (3), and later decisions of the Privy Council. The effect of the Privy Council decisions was that there was no presumption either of fact or of law that the zamindar possessed the melvaram right only.

Tiruvenkata Achariyar J. delivered a judgment substantially to the same effect. He pointed out that having regard to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 9, and Order vn., r. 1, the onus was upon the defendants to show that the Civil Court had not jurisdiction.

1933. Dec. 14, 15, J8. Parikh for the appellants. The inam village was an “estate " within the definition in s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was therefore excluded by s. 189. Having regard to the judgments of the Board in Suryanarayana v. Patanna (( 1918) L. R. 45 I. A. 209.) and Chidambara Sivaprakasa v. Veerama Reddi (4) it is not contended that apart from the evidence there is a presumption of law that the grant was of the land-revenue only. That fact however is to be inferred from the evidence, as it shows that the grant was of a revenue-paying village in which there were cultivating tenants, and was made to Brahmans residing elsewhere. The facts are the same as in Seethaya v. Subramanya Somoyajulu (( 1929) L. R. 56 I. A. 146.), in which the Board held that the grant was of the land-revenue only. The evidence corresponds also to Chidambara Sivaprakasas case (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 286.), where it was held to establish a prescriptive right of occupancy. Further, as the plaintiffs failed to produce or account for the original grant, a presumption arises under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 114, illustration (g), that its terms were unfavourable to their case, and showed that the

grant was of the melvaram only.

De Gruyther K.C and Narasimham for the respondent were not called upon.

1934. Jan. 30. The