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1934 Supreme(SC) 6
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD THANKERTON, LORD ALNESS, AND SIR GEORGE LOWNDES.
POPURI RAMAYYA - Appellant
Versus
PUTCHA LAKSHMINARAYANA - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : Jan. 30. 1934.
Solicitors for appellant:Hy. S. L. Polak & Co. Solicitors for respondent: Douglas Grant & Dold.
The burden of proof to establish the exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction rests on the party asserting the exception. Furthermore, the existence of cultivating tenants does not create a presumption that a grant was limited to revenue rights (melvaram) to the exclusion of occupancy rights (kudivaram).
Headnote:(A) Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 - Section 3(2)(d) and Section 189 - Jurisdiction of Civil Courts - Whether a village is an "estate" depends on whether the grant was of land-revenue alone (melvaram) or included occupancy rights (kudivaram) - There is no presumption of fact or law that a grantor possessed only melvaram rights simply because cultivating tenants existed in the village at the time of the grant.
(B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 9 - General rule in favor of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts - The burden of proof lies on the party asserting an exception to the general rule to prove that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded.
(C) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 114, illustration (g) - Presumption regarding non-production of documents - Such a presumption does not arise if there is no evidence that the document could have been produced by the party.
Facts of the case:
The respondent instituted suits to recover rent or damages for use and occupation of agricultural holdings in an enfranchised inam village. The appellants contended that the village was an "estate" under the relevant Act, which would exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. The village had been granted as an agraharam to a non-resident in 1810, and evidence showed that cultivating tenants were present in the village at the time of the grant. The original grant document was not produced during the proceedings.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the evidence was inconclusive as to whether the grant of 1810 conveyed the occupancy right (kudivaram) or only the revenue right (melvaram). It held that the existence of cultivating tenants prior to the grant did not raise a presumption that the grantor lacked the kudivaram right.
Issues: Whether the village in question constituted an "estate" under Section 3, sub-section 2(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and consequently, whether the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts was excluded by Section 189 of the said Act.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there is a general rule in favor of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. The burden of proof rests on the party who maintains an exception to this general rule. Since the appellants failed to prove that the grant was of melvaram only, they failed to establish that the inam was an "estate" within the statutory definition, and thus failed to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Result: Consolidated appeal dismissed with costs.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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practice and procedure
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jurisdiction
- civil court jurisdiction
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evidence
- burden of proof
- presumptions
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jurisdiction
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property law
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land tenure
- inam grants
- kudivaram and melvaram rights
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land tenure
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administrative law
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madras estates land act, 1908
- definition of estate
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madras estates land act, 1908
Judgement
Consolidated Appeal (No. 66 of 1931) from thirteen orders of the High Court (October 11, 1927) setting aside thirteen orders of the District Munsif of Tenali (August 9, 1922).
The respondent instituted original and small cause suits in the Court of the District Munsif to recover rent for, or damages for use and occupation of, agricultural lands in his agraharam village. The question arising upon the appeal was whether the inam was an " estate " within the definition in s. 3, sub-s. 2, of Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 ; if it was the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was excluded by s. 189 of the Act.
The District Munsif dismissed the suits, holding that the village was an estate under s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d)f of the Act.
The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge in twelve original suits; he also applied to the High Court for revision in one small cause case. The High Court transferred the appeals to its own file, and heard them with the application for revision.
Upon the hearing the High Court made orders reversing the orders of the trial judge and directing him to dispose of the cases.
Wallace J. said that the onus of proving that the suit inam was not cognizable by the ordinary Civil Courts rested with the defendants, and therefore was upon them to prove that the inam was an " estate " within the definition in s. 3, sub-s. 2, of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. They had contended that the inam was within cl. (d) of that subsection on the ground that upon the evidence the zamindar had only the melvaram. The evidence appeared to show that before the grant there were tenants on the land, which was part of a permanently settled zamindari. But the defendants had to show that they were occupancy ryots. They had produced no evidence of that, but relied upon Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Dandamudi Kotayya (( 1897) I. L. R. 20 Mad. 299.) and Cheekati Zamindar v. Ranasooru Dhora (( 1899) I. L. R. 23 Mad. 318.), in which it was held that there was a legal presumption that zamindari tenants had occupancy rights. The learned judge was of opinion that the above cases had been overruled by Suryanarayana v. Patanna (3), and later decisions of the Privy Council. The effect of the Privy Council decisions was that there was no presumption either of fact or of law that the zamindar possessed the melvaram right only.
Tiruvenkata Achariyar J. delivered a judgment substantially to the same effect. He pointed out that having regard to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 9, and Order vn., r. 1, the onus was upon the defendants to show that the Civil Court had not jurisdiction.
1933. Dec. 14, 15, J8. Parikh for the appellants. The inam village was an “estate " within the definition in s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was therefore excluded by s. 189. Having regard to the judgments of the Board in Suryanarayana v. Patanna (( 1918) L. R. 45 I. A. 209.) and Chidambara Sivaprakasa v. Veerama Reddi (4) it is not contended that apart from the evidence there is a presumption of law that the grant was of the land-revenue only. That fact however is to be inferred from the evidence, as it shows that the grant was of a revenue-paying village in which there were cultivating tenants, and was made to Brahmans residing elsewhere. The facts are the same as in Seethaya v. Subramanya Somoyajulu (( 1929) L. R. 56 I. A. 146.), in which the Board held that the grant was of the land-revenue only. The evidence corresponds also to Chidambara Sivaprakasas case (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 286.), where it was held to establish a prescriptive right of occupancy. Further, as the plaintiffs failed to produce or account for the original grant, a presumption arises under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 114, illustration (g), that its terms were unfavourable to their case, and showed that the
grant was of the melvaram only.
De Gruyther K.C and Narasimham for the respondent were not called upon.
1934. Jan. 30.
