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1918 Supreme(SC) 93

PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE LORD PHILLIMORE, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND MR. AMEER ALI.
PRATAPSING SHIVSING - Appellant
Versus
AGARSINGJI RAISINGJI - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Bombay.
Decided On : Dec. 13. 1918.

Advocates:
Solicitors for appellants:Ranken Ford & Chester. Solicitors for respondent: Hickson, Moir & Jeakes.

The main legal point established in the judgment is the recognition of the rights of an adopted son under Hindu law, affirming that an adopted son has the same rights as a natural-born son and can succeed to the property of the adoptive father.

Headnote:

Jivai Grant - Land Dispute - Bombay Act VI. of 1862 - Custom of Reversion - Adoption - Widow's Right - Alienation - Devolution of Property

Fact of the Case:

The case involved a dispute over land forming part of a village in the Ahmedabad District, which was originally part of an impartible estate. The plaintiff claimed that the land reverted to the estate upon the failure of the male descendants of the grantee. The defendants, a widow and an adopted son, contested the claim, asserting their rights to the land.

Finding of the Court:

The Subordinate Judge initially dismissed the suit, finding in favor of the defendants on various grounds, including the validity of the adoption and the absence of proof for the alleged custom excluding widows from making an adoption. However, the High Court reversed the decision, holding that the estate reverted to the plaintiff and decreed in favor of the plaintiff.

Issues: The main issues included the existence of a custom of reversion, the validity of the adoption, the construction of the documents of 1871, and the effect of the alleged custom excluding widows from making an adoption.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish the alleged custom of reversion and the custom excluding widows from making an adoption. It also affirmed the validity of the adoption and the rights of the adopted son. The court further interpreted the documents of 1871 and considered the effect of the alleged alienation under Bombay Act VI. of 1862.

Final Decision: The Privy Council allowed the appeal, reversed the High Court's decree, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs in all courts.

Judgement

Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (April 9, 1914) reversing a decree of the first class Subordinate Judge of Ahmedabad.

The litigation related to land forming the greater part of the village of Piperia in the Ahmedabad District, The village was till some date prior to 1840 part of the taluqa of Gamph, a gadi or impartible estate of the Chudasama Girasias to which the rule of primogeniture was applicable. The village had then been granted by the thakur injivai—namely, for maintenance—to his younger son Rupsing.

Rupsing died about 1866, leaving two sons, Kesharising and Kaliansing. The thakur thereupon alleged that the sons were illegitimate, and claimed that by custom the village, upon failure of the grantees male descendants, had reverted to the gadi. The dispute was referred to arbitrators, who made an award to which effect was given by two documents dated September 6, 1871. It was thereby agreed that part of the village should be the absolute property of the thakur, and that of the rest Kesharising and Kaliansing and their " vansa varas" should be " maliks, muktyars, dhanis." At the time when that agreement was made the estate was under the management of the taluqdari settlement officer. Kesharising died in 1881 unmarried. Kaliansing died in October, 1903, childless, but having a widow Bai Devla, who on March 12, 1904, adopted the first appellant to her deceased husband. The second appellant was a mortgagee from Kaliansing.

The respondent, who had succeeded as thakur, instituted the present suit in July, 1907, against the widow (who died during the litigation), the adopted son (the first appellant), and the mortgagee (the second appellant) as defendants, claiming possession of the land in Piperia, which the widow claimed to hold on behalf of her adopted son.

The respondent by his plaint alleged that by family custom land granted in jivai reverted to the taluqa upon a failure of the male descendants of the grantee ; he also alleged that the adoption was invalid, and that in any case it carried no title to the land in suit. The appellants, by their written statements, denied the custom alleged. They contended that the lands in suit had been the absolute property of Kaliansing both by virtue of the documents of 1871 and independently of them, and that upon Kaliansings death the land passed to his widow, and to the first appellant upon his adoption. The respondent in reply alleged that by custom among the Chudasama Ghirasias widows were precluded from making an adoption, and from inheriting a jivai grant.

The Subordinate Judge rejected oral evidence on behalf of the respondent as to the custom of reverter as being tutored, and found that in all the proved instances of reversion of a jivai estate in Gamph the taluqdar would in any case have succeeded as heir. He, however, found the custom proved by evidence of the reversion of jivai estates among families in the Kathiawar states. He found that no custom had been proved excluding the right to adopt, and that the adoption was valid ; also that no custom had been proved excluding widows. He, however, thought that the onus was upon the appellants to prove a custom by which an adoption prevented a reversion of the estate, and found that no such custom had been proved. Finally he held that under the documents of 1871 Kesharising and Kaliansing obtained full proprietary rights, and that the transaction of 1871 was not an alienation of the taluqdari estate so as to be void under s. 12 of Bombay Act VI. of 1862. He accordingly dismissed the suit.

The High Court reversed the decision, and made a decree for possession and mesne profits. The learned judges (Sir Basil Scott C.J. and Bachelor J.) differed from the trial judge as to the effect of the documents of 1871 ; they said that the words "#vansa varas " literally meant " descendants who are heirs," not " descendants and heirs " as they had been ren dered by the official translator. As both daughters and widows






















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