Judgement

Appeal (No. 6 of 1939) from a decree of the High Court (March 31, 1937), which had affirmed a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Allahabad (May 14, 1934).

This appeal was concerned with the validity of a declaration, dated March 7, 1930, made by the Local Government of the United Provinces under s. 8 of the United Provinces Court of Wards Act (IV. of 1912), declaring, upon the grounds of extravagance, and failure, without sufficient reason, to discharge his debts, that the appellant, Raja Bhagwan Baksh Singh, was incapable of managing his property. In his suit, instituted on March 19, 1932, the appellant prayed for a declaration that the declaration of the Local Government was ultra vires and void.

The facts, and the relevant statutory provisions, appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

The trial judge dismissed the suit, and an appeal from his decision was dismissed by the High Court (Harries and Rachhpal Singh JJ.). The appeal is reported at I. L. R. [ 1937] A. 736.

The only two questions raised in the present appeal were (1.) whether land revenue was or was not to be deducted before ascertaining what were “the gross annual profits" in proviso (a) to sub-clauses (iii.) and (iv.) of sub-s. 1 of s. 8 of the Courts of Wards Act; and (2.) whether the appellant was prohibited from challenging the action taken by the Local Government under s. 8 of the Act by reason of the provisions of s. 11 of the Act.

1940. Feb. 1, 2. 7. D. Caswell K.C., R. R. Handoo and J. L. Roy for the appellant. With regard to s. 11 of the Act, the limits of the Local Governments jurisdiction must be found in the statute which delegated their authority to them; there are four propositions in that respect (a) If the words have a clear and well-recognized meaning, then the interpretation based on that ordinary meaning must be followed. It is submitted, however, that in respect of this statute the words are not so unequivocal that they must be given some ordinary general meaning, (b) In cases where a statute takes away an individuals important right to manage his own property, and, further, his right of access to the Courts, any provisions to the latter effect will be particularly and jealously watched by the Courts Oldaker v. Hunt (( 1854) 19 Beav. 485.), and In re Vexatious Actions Act, 1896. In re Boaler. ([ 1914] 1 K. B. 21, 36.) (c) Where a Court takes upon itself to exercise jurisdiction which it does not possess, its decision is a nullity Attorney-General v. Hotham (Lord). (( 1827) 3 Russell, 415.) (d) No tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can by its own decision finally decide the question of the existence or the extent of its jurisdiction it must always be a matter of appeal. There is a strong presumption in English law that a subordinate court cannot be its own judge as to its jurisdiction. If, therefore, s. n, which limits the jurisdiction given to the Court, were intended to apply to the proviso to

s. 8 it should have said in plain language not only that " no declaration ". . . . shall be questioned in any civil court," but that the jurisdiction to make a declaration shall not be questioned Wingrove v. Morgan ([ 1934] 1 ch 423.) and Rex v. Board of Education. ([ 1910] 2 K. B. 165, 173, 184, 187.) Sect. 11 does not go on to say " nor shall the proprietor be "entitled to question their jurisdiction." [Reference was also made to Estwick v. City of London. ((1671) 82 E. R. 515.)] At the best it can be said on behalf of the Local Government that they had discharged a discretion in coming to the conclusion whether " gross annual profits " had to be assessed on a certain basis or another; if it appeared that that decision was wrong, then it is submitted that they have not used their discretion judicially, and on that ground that Court would go behind the word " satisfied." [Reference was made to Rex v. Moreley ((1760) 2 Burrows, 1041.) and Dartford Brewery Co. v. County of London Quarter Sessions. ([ 1906] 1 K. B. 695, 699.)]

The King