Judgement

Petition for special leave to appeal from a decree of the Chief Court of Oudh (April 27, 1926) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh (April 22, 1924).

In 1922 Jagdeo Singh, the father of the petitioners, instituted a suit against the respondents, claiming title to a large estate in Oudh. The plaintiff claimed under the will of Raja Ajit Bahadur Singh, upon the death in 1921 of Raja Partab Bahadur Singh, whom the plaintiff contended took only a life estate under the will. The defendants represented transferees and devisees of Raja Partab, whom they contended took an absolute interest under the will.

The Subordinate Judge held that the will conferred an absolute interest on Raja Partab, and dismissed the suit.

On appeal the Chief Court affirmed the decision. The learned judges in their judgments discussed at length the legal effect of the dispositions made by the will, considering the principles laid down in various decisions.

The plaintiff applied to the Chief Court for a certificate to enable him to appeal to the Privy Council.

Law. Rep. 54 Ind. App. 126 ( 1926- 1927) Raghunath Prasad Singh V. Deputy Commissioner of Partabgarh 13

As the Chief Court had affirmed the lower Court, it was necessary under s. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the appeal should involve "some substantial question of law."

During the pendency of the application the plaintiff died, and the present petitioners were substituted for him.

The application was dismissed. The learned judges, after pointing out that the only question of law arising was as to the true construction of the will, said "That, to our minds, is not a substantial question of law, though it is a question of law. It is not alleged that any recognized principle applicable to the construction of a document of the nature of the present will has been misunderstood or misused by this Court, nor does our decision lay down any general principle of construction. The construction which we have placed upon the will in question is of no interest to any person outside the parties to this litigation. The old Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, to which this Court has succeeded, consistently adhered to the view that the words 1 substantial question of law means a question of general importance, and do not include the construction of a document in which the parties alone are interested." The learned judges referred to Udairaj Singh v. Bhagwan Baksh Singh ({ 1907) 10 Oudh Cases, 308.), which they stated was supported by two decisions of the Board —namely, a decision merely noted at 11 Cal. W. N. ccxviii., and Moti Chand v. Ganga Prosad (( 1901) L. R. 291. A. 40.), which however was in relation to the grant of leave under the prerogative not to the meaning of the words in the Code. (The distinction appears to have been recognized in Thillai Chetty v. Shanmuganathan Pillai [ 1922] W. N. 7, and has been given effect on many unreported applica tions for special leave.—A. M. T.) The learned judges added that the same view had been adopted by the High Court at Allahabad in Bishambhar Nath v. Muhammad Ubaidullah Khan. (( 1923) I. L. R. 46 A. 227.)

The petition was for special leave to appeal, that being, according to the practice of the Judicial Committee, the proper procedure, although it was contended that the Court in India had wrongly refused a statutory right to appeal to the Privy Council.

1927. Feb. 17. Dunne K.C. and Jopling for the petitioners.

De Gruyther K.C. and Wallach for the respondents.

The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by

VISCOUNT DUNEDIN. This petition for special leave to appeal really turns on whether the matter falls within the last clause of s. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section provides that where, as here, the stake is over Rs. 10,000, then " where the decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing such decree or final order, the appeal must involve some subst