1934 Supreme(SC) 20
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD THANKERTON, SIR JOHN WALLIS, AND SIR LANCELOT SANDERSON.
RAJA BIRENDRA BIKRAM SINGH - Appellant
Versus
BRIJ MOHAN PANDE - Respondents
On appeal from the Chief Court of Oudh.
Decided On : Apr. 30. 1934.
Solicitors for appellant: Watkins & Hunter.
Solicitors for respondents in second appeal: Douglas Grant & Dold.
The Oudh Laws Act, 1876 does not provide for pre-emption of part of the property proposed to be sold, and the Act does not entitle the plaintiffs to notice under section 10.
Headnote:
Pre-emption - Oudh Laws Act - 1876 - 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
Fact of the Case:
The appellant purchased a taluqdari mahal consisting of 163 villages. The plaintiffs, under-proprietors in two villages, claimed pre-emption under the Oudh Laws Act, 1876. The Chief Court allowed the appeals and made decrees in favor of the plaintiffs for pre-emption. The appellant appealed to His Majesty in Council.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the claims of the plaintiffs were not within the Oudh Laws Act, as the Act did not provide for pre-emption of part of the property proposed to be sold. The Court also found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to notice under section 10 of the Act.
Issues: The issues revolved around the applicability of the Oudh Laws Act, 1876 to the sale of the taluqdari mahal, the extent of the plaintiffs' right of pre-emption, and the entitlement to notice under section 10.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court concluded that the claims of the plaintiffs were not maintainable under the Act as it did not provide for pre-emption of part of the property proposed to be sold. Additionally, the plaintiffs were not entitled to notice under section 10 of the Act.
Final Decision: The Court set aside the decrees of the Chief Court and restored the decrees of the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiffs were ordered to pay the costs of the defendant in the Chief Court and of the appeals.
Judgme nt
Consolidated Appeal (No. 87 of 1931) from two decrees of the Chief Court of Oudh (July 21 and 28, 1930) which reversed two decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Gonda (July 15, 1929).
In 1927 the appellant purchased an estate in Oudh consisting of 163 villages constituting a single proprietary mahal for which the proprietor paid the land revenue although the villages were separately assessed. The plaintiff-respondent in the first appeal had under-proprietary rights in one of the villages, and the three plaintiff-respondents in the second appeal had under-proprietary rights in another of the villages. In each of the two suits under appeal the claim was made under the Oudh Laws Act, 1876, to pre-empt the superior rights in the village in which the plaintiff or plaintiffs respectively had under-proprietary rights.
The facts, and the material provisions of the above Act, appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The Chief Court (Hasan C.J. and Pullan J.), reversing the decision of the trial judge, held that the plaintiffs had the right to pre-emption claimed, and decrees were made accordingly. The joint judgment of the learned judges is reported at 1. L. R. 6 Luck. 257.
1934, March 8, 9, 12. Dunne K.C. and J opting for the appellant. The Act does not provide for a right of preemption upon the sale of a taluqdari mahal consisting of villages field under a single engagement to pay the revenue. The expression village community" as used in the Act has nothing to do with residence Munnu Lal v. Muhammad Ismail (( 1904) L. R. 31 I. A. 212.) ; it connotes a group of persons who as co-sharers have a common interest in the village. There cannot be a village community consisting in part of proprietors and in part of under-proprietors. Sect. 7 (a) recognizes that a village community must consist wholly of proprietors or of under-proprietors. On that point the Court below was bound by the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Drigbijai Singh v. Court of Wards, Ramnagar Estate. (( 1901) 5 Oudh Cases 266.) It is submitted that that decision was wrong, and that the judgment of Spankie A.J.C. when the case was before the Chief Court was right; he followed the judgment of Young J.C. in Ashmf-un-nisa v. Parbhu Narain. (( 1883) Oudh Select Cases, 1874-98, No. 140.) As was pointed out by Chamier C.J. in Narendra Bahadur Singh v. Balkaran Singh (( 1904) 7 Oudh Cases 275, 281.) the construction of s. 7 adopted by Spankie A.J.C. is the only one which prevents the fourth head of s. 9 from being redundant. But even if the plaintiffs had respectively a right of pre-emption it was a right to preempt not their particular villages but the whole subject of the sale. A right to pre-empt part was not recognized by the above decision of the Allahabad High Court, and has never been recognized. The view that upon the sale in question every under-proprietor in each of the villages sold was entitled to notice and had a right of pre-emption is not consistent with ss. 10 to 13 of the Act and would be unworkable. [Reference was made also to Raghoindra Pratab Sahai v. Abu Jafar (( 1919) 22 Oudh Cases 353.) ; Rai Gay a Prasad v. Faiyaz Husain (( 1929) I. L. R. 5 Luck . 12.) ; Nawab Khan v. Achhaibar Dubby (Ibid. 539.) ; Oudh Land-revenue Act, 1876, s. 121 and other sections ; Thomason’s Directions for Revenue Officers, 1858 ; and Bennets Introduction to the Oudh Gazetteer, pp. 55, 58, 59.]
J. E. Godfrey for the respondents Basdeo, Ram Ujagar and Ram Samujh. These respondents as under-proprietors were members of the village community of their respective villages, and as such had a right of pre-emption under s. 7 of the Act. The village was an under-proprietary village. Difficulties in giving effect to the right cannot deprive them of the right. The introduction to Sykes Compendium (see Behari Lal edition) shows that it was the policy of the Government at the time of the annexation to encourage and protect the actual occupants that policy was carried out