Judgement

Appeal (No. 75 of 1945), by special leave, from an order of the High Court (Varma and Imam JJ.) (February 21, 1945) accepting a reference made by the Sessions Judge of Patna on August 30, 1944, under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and finding the appellant guilty of the offence of murder under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to transportation for life.

The jury had found the appellant not guilty of the murder charged by a majority of five to two, and the question in this appeal related to the scope of the powers of the High Court acting under s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the petition for special leave to appeal stating that the main question was whether the High Court was empowered by s. 307 to reverse a majority verdict of the jury on a question of fact without finding that the verdict was perverse and unreasonable.

The relevant facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. By s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure " 307-(1) If in such case [viz., of trial by jury] the judge " disagrees with the verdict of the jurors, or of a majority of the jurors, on all or any of the charges on which any accused " person has been tried, and is clearly of opinion that it is " necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case in respect " of such accused person to the High Court, he shall submit " the case accordingly, recording the grounds of his opinion, " and, when the verdict is one of acquittal, stating the offence u which he considers to have been committed, and in such case, " if the accused is further charged under the provisions of s. 310, " shall proceed to try him on such charge as if such verdict had been one of conviction.

“ (2.) Whenever the judge submits a case under this section, " he shall not record judgment of acquittal or of conviction on " any of the charges on which such accused has been tried, but " he may either remand such accused to custody or admit him " to bail.

" (3.) In dealing with the case so submitted the High Court " may exercise any of the powers which it may exercise on an M appeal, and subject thereto it shall, after considering the entire " evidence and after giving due weight to the opinions of the " Sessions Judge and the jury, acquit or convict such accused " of any offence of which the jury could have convicted him " upon the charge framed and placed before it ; and, if it " convicts him, may pass such sentence as might have been” passed by the Court of Session.”

1946. April 30, May 1. Casswell K.C., Pullan and Khaleel Ahmad for the appellant. There are three main questions. First, can the High Court reverse the finding of the jury on a reference under s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code unless that finding be unreasonable or perverse ? This question has been considered in India on many occasions, and there have been conflicting opinions Queen v. Sham Bagdi (( 1874) 13 Beng. L. R.(appdx.) 19.), Queen-Empress v. Dada Ana (( 1889) I. L. R. 15 B. 452, 486.), Emperor v. Har Mohan Das (( 1927) I. L. R. 54 C. 708, 713.), In re Veerappa Goundan (( 1928) I. L. R. 51 M. 956, 959- 60.), Emperor v. Bat Lali (( 1932) 34 Bom. L. R. 896.) and Emperor v. Ram Chandra Roy (( 1927) I. L.R. 55 C. 879, 885.). The High Court had no power to alter the verdict of the jury on a question of fact unless the verdict was perverse or unreasonable, and in this case the High Court has not found that the verdict is perverse or unreasonable. The verdict was such as might be given by reasonable men after hearing the evidence and the judges summing-up, and it cannot be set aside merely because the High Court would have taken a different view of the evidence. There being evidence to support the verdict, and no misdirection by the Sessions judge, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the verdict. The second question is, can the High Court reverse the decision when the trial judge has agreed with the jury and, as a subheading, is the finding of the judge that