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1922 Supreme(SC) 36
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD PHILLIMORE, LORD CARSON, AND SIR JOHN EDGE.
RAMSUMRAN PRASAD - Appellant
Versus
SHYAM KUMARI - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Patna.
Decided On : May 31, 1922.
Important Points
Subject
Hindu Law - Women's Estate and Alienation
Headnote
(B) Necessity in Alienation - The term "necessity" in the context of a Hindu woman's power to alienate immovable property has a technical meaning, encompassing obligatory ceremonies for the repose of the husband's soul, payment of the last owner's debts, or the maintenance of the woman or her infant children when no other means are available. (Para 11)
(C) Reasonableness of Compromise - A compromise resulting in the surrender of land is justifiable if it is reasonable, prudent, and in the interest of the estate. Refusing the power to compromise would lead to extreme consequences, forcing parties to litigate to the highest court even over minor disputes. (Para 12)
Facts of the case:
Reversionary heirs challenged a compromise entered into by a widow in possession of her deceased husband's estate. The widow had obtained a decree for the enforcement of mortgage bonds and purchased certain properties at auction. Following objections to the sale by the judgment debtors, the widow entered into a compromise where the sale was set aside, the debtors were permitted to sell the properties to third parties for a specified sum to be paid to her, and a portion of the remaining debt was remitted. The reversioners sought a declaration of their rights, arguing that the compromise was an unauthorized alienation of the estate lacking legal necessity.
Findings of Court:
The court found that there was no fraud or collusion in the transaction. It was determined that the amount conceded by the widow to the judgment debtors was small relative to the total value of the properties and was a reasonable concession to avoid further protracted litigation.
Issues: Whether a holder of a Hindu woman's estate has the power to enter into a compromise involving the alienation of immovable property, and whether such a compromise, if reasonable and for the benefit of the estate, is binding upon the reversionary heirs.
Ratio Decidendi: A compromise made bona fide for the benefit of the estate and not for the personal advantage of the limited owner binds the reversioners. Such a transaction is permissible if it is prudent and reasonable, and it does not need to satisfy the strict technical definition of "necessity" required for a direct sale of immovable property.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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hindu law
-
women's estate
-
power of alienation
- compromise
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power of alienation
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women's estate
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property law
-
immovable property
- alienation
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immovable property
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practice and procedure
- compromise of suit
Solicitors for appellants:Watkins & Hunter. Solicitors for first respondent:Truefitt &Francis. Solicitors for fourth respondent: Pugh & Co.
Judgement
Appeal (No. 8 of 1921) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (August 9, 1918) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga.
The suit was brought by the appellants, who were the reversionary heirs to the estate of the late husband of the first respondent, for a declaration of their rights in certain property which formed part of his estate. The appellants asserted the invalidity of a transaction in the nature of a compromise entered into by the first respondent in 1912. The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, and his decree was affirmed by the High Court (Roe and Jwala Prasad JJ.) The learned judges were of opinion that there was no fraud, and that the plaintiffs had not shown that the compromise had been entered into by the widow (the first respondent) collusively for the purpose of conferring upon herself a benefit at the expense of the estate.
1922. May 8, 9. De Gruyther K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the appellants. The transaction was not within the powers possessed by a widow in possession of her husbands estate under the Mitakshara law. Upon the facts it was not a provident transaction in the interest of the estate, and the estate was in no way benefited ; it was made for the benefit of the widows relations. A Hindu widow has no power to alienate any part of the estate by way of compromise Imrit Kunwar v. Roop Narain Singh . (( 1880) 6 Cal. L. R. 76.) Without prejudice to that contention, it is submitted that a compromise by a widow involving an alienation of part of the estate does not bind the reversioners unless it is shown that it was for such purposes as would justify a sale by her Kanhaiya Lal v. Kishori Lai . (( 1916) I. L.
R. 38 A. 679.) Further, the widow had purchased the villages, and they were immovable property belonging to the estate; her alienation of them could only be justified upon strict proof of necessity. In Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain (( 1911) L. R. 381. A. 87.) it was held that the transaction did not amount to an alienation. In Mohendra Nath Biswas v. Shansunnessa Khatum (( 1914) 21 Cal. L.J. 157.), which was also relied on in the High Court, the real ground of the decision was res judicata. [Reference was also made to Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga (( 1864) 9 Moo. I. A. 539, 604.), and Tarinee Churn Gangooly v. Watson & Co. (( 1869) 12 Suth. W. R. (Civ.) 413.)]
Dunne K.C. and H. N. Sen for fourth respondent, one of the purchasers from the judgment debtors, after referring to Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., paras. 624, 625, were stopped.
Abdul Majid for the first respondent, the widow.
May 31. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
LORD PHILLIMORE. The question raised on this appeal is whether the reversionary heirs of one Brij Mohan Lal can recover possession of certain property which is said to have been alienated by his widow as one of the terms of a compromise of litigation originally brought by Brij Mohan Lal and continued by his widow after his death. He had begun the suit on July 18, 1895, and died on December
22. The suit was brought to enforce two mortgage bonds. There was a claim by a prior mortgagee which eventually came up before this Board (( 1904) L.R. 311. A. 176.), and resulted in a decree which was generally favourable to the widow, but required her to pay into Court a considerable sum to the credit of this first mortgagee. She paid this, and then proceeded to execute a decree for recovery of what was due to her on the mortgage bonds, which was ascertained by the decree to be the sum of Rs.141,959. Six of the properties were then put up for auction on June 20, 1912, the widow having leave to bid, and she bought them for the sum of Rs.65,075. Thereupon the judgment debtors filed a petition in objection to the sale, and the widow came to the compromise which is now impeached.
By this compromise she agreed that the sale of the six properties should be set aside, and that t
