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1924 Supreme(SC) 55
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD SUMNER, LORD PHILLIMORE, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS.
RANODIP SINGH - Appellant
Versus
PARMESHWAR PERSHAD - Respondents
On Appeal from the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh.
Decided On : Nov. 17. 1924.
Solicitor for appellants: H. S. L. Polak.
The extension of the limitation period for persons under disability under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, applies only to those entitled to sue at the time the limitation period began. The subsequent birth of a family member does not create a new cause of action or extend limitation.
Headnote:(A) Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - Article 126, Sections 6, 7, and 8 - Suit to set aside father's alienation of ancestral property - Period of limitation - Disability of a minor - Extension of time - The extended period of limitation provided under sections 6 and 7 can only be claimed by a person who was entitled to institute the suit at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned - The subsequent birth of a member of a joint family does not create a fresh cause of action or a new starting point from which limitation should be reckoned.
Facts of the case:
A suit was instituted by four sons of a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law to set aside the sale of an ancestral village made by their father without legal necessity. The sale occurred in 1893, and the purchaser took possession on the same date. Two of the sons were born before the sale, while the third and fourth sons were born in 1897 and 1900, respectively. The suit was filed in 1920. Under the applicable law, the limitation period for such a suit is twelve years from the date the alienee takes possession. The plaintiffs argued that the suit was within time based on the minority of the fourth son, invoking the disability extensions provided in the limitation statute.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the cause of action arose on the date of the sale and possession in 1893. The subsequent birth of the fourth son did not create a new cause of action. The extension of time for disability is only available to a person who was entitled to institute the suit at the time the limitation period began to run. Since the fourth son was not in existence at that time, he could not claim the extension.
Issues: Whether the period of limitation for setting aside a father's alienation of ancestral property is extended by the subsequent birth and minority of a son who was not in existence when the cause of action first arose.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the express terms of the sections providing for extensions due to disability apply only to a person "entitled to institute a suit" at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned. A person born after the cause of action has accrued does not fall within this description and is therefore not entitled to the extension of the limitation period.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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civil law
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property law
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hindu law
- mitakshara
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hindu law
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limitation law
- disability
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property law
Judgement
Appeal (No. 24 of 1923) from a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner (July 18, 1921) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bahraich (March 22, 1921).
The appellants and their father (respondent No. 6) formed a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara. The suit was brought by the appellants on June 23, 1920, to set aside a sale, made by their father on June 3, 1893, of an ancestral village; they alleged that the sale was made without necessity. The respondent-defendants Nos. 2 to 5 were descendants of the purchaser, who with them had been in possession since the date of the sale.
The defendants, while denying the facts alleged, pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation.
82 Law. Rep. 52 Ind. App. 69 ( 1924- 1925)
Ranodip Singh V. Parmeshwar Pershad 183
The plaintiff-appellants Nos. 1 and 2 were born before the date of the sale, but Nos. 3 and 4 were born later—namely, No. 3 in 1897 and No. 4 in 1900.
By the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I., art. 126, the period of limitation for a suit by a Hindu to set aside his fathers alienation of ancestral property is twelve years, which run from the date when the alienee takes possession of the property.
Both Courts in India held that the suit was barred by limitation.
1924. Oct. 27. Dube for the appellants. Having regard to ss. 6 and 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the suit was brought within time so far as plaintiff No. 4 was concerned; no valid discharge could be given by the other plaintiffs Zamir Hasan v. Sundar (( 1899) I. L. R. 22 A. 199.), following Govindram v. Tatia (( 1895) I. L. R. 20 B. 383.) ; Ganga Dayal v. Manx Ram (( 1908) I. L. R. 31 A. 156.),differing from Vigneshwara v. Bapayya . (( 1893) I. L. R. 16 M. 436.) The cases cited were decided under the Limitation Act, 1877, in which s. 8 corresponds with s. 7 in the Act of 1908. The elder brothers could not ratify their fathers alienation so as to affect the rights of plaintiff No. 4 Kandasami Asari v. Somaskanda Ela Nidhi . (( 1910) I. L. R. 35 M. 177.) No suit was necessary to set aside the sale; the suit should be regarded as one for possession governed by art. 144. The decision in Ram Tewary v. Luchmun Pershad (( 1867) 8 Suth. W. R. 15.) relied on below was under the Limitation Act of 1859 and was therefore not applicable. So far as it was held in that case that no new cause of action arose upon the birth of another member of the joint family, it was erroneously decided. [Reference on that point was made to Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachhpal (( 1913) L.
R. 40 I. A. 213, 221.) ; Venkata Row v. Tuljaram Row (( 1921) L. R. 49 I. A. 91, 98.); and Maynes Hindu Law, para. 342.]
The respondents did not appear.
Nov. 17. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by
SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS. This is an appeal from a decree dated July 18, 1921, of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, affirming a decree dated March 22, 1921, of the Subordinate Judge of Bahraich.
The suit out of which the appeal arises was instituted on June 23, 1920, by the four sons of the sixth defendant, Thakur Prithi Singh, claiming possession of the village described in the plaint. The plaintiffs and their father are a joint Hindu family governed by the law of the Mitakshara, and it is the plaintiffs case that the village is the ancestral property of the joint family.
On June 3, 1893, the plaintiffs father purported to sell the village to Manjee Ram, who is represented in this suit by his descendants, defendants Nos. 1 to 5. The seventh defendant claims as a mortgagee from defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 5.
The plaintiffs contend that the sale is not binding on them, as it was not made for legal necessity, and on this ground they claim a decree for possession.
Of the many issues framed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge it is only necessary to consider whether the suit is barred by limitation, and for this purpose the dates at which the several plaintiffs were born become important.
Ranodip
