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1918 Supreme(SC) 95
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD BUCKMASTER, LORD DUNEDIN, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS.
RANGASAMI GOUNDEN - Appellant
Versus
NACHIAPPA GOUNDEN - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : Dec. 16. 1918.
A Hindu widow can only validly surrender her entire interest in the whole estate to the nearest reversioner. Partial alienations are only valid for necessity; consent of reversioners serves as evidence of necessity but does not independently validate the transfer.
Headnote:(A) Hindu Law - Power of a widow over her deceased husband's estate - Surrender vs. Alienation - A Hindu widow can renounce her entire interest in the whole estate in favor of the nearest reversioner(s), effectively accelerating the succession. Such surrender must be total; partial surrender is invalid as the widow's interest cannot be partially effaced. (Paras 201-202)
(B) Hindu Law - Alienation for necessity - Alienation of the estate by a widow is legitimate for religious or charitable purposes, spiritual welfare of the husband, or necessity. Necessity must be proved aliunde; mere recital in the deed is insufficient. Consent of reversioners does not validate the alienation proprio vigore but serves as presumptive evidence that the transaction was fair and proper. (Paras 202-203)
(C) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 115 - Estoppel - Estoppel arises when a person intentionally causes another to believe a thing to be true and act on such belief. Taking a mortgage of property from a person claiming title via an invalid alienation by a widow does not constitute estoppel or ratification by a reversionary heir, as the reversioner's right is a spes successionis until the widow's death. (Paras 204-205)
Facts of the case:
A widow succeeded to her son's estate for a woman's estate. She executed a deed of gift transferring parts of the estate to the nearest reversionary heir. After the widow's death, another reversionary heir claimed a share of the property. The respondents argued the gift was valid and that the appellant was estopped from challenging it because he had previously purchased some properties and taken a mortgage from the alienees.
Findings of Court:
The deed was a gift of only part of the estate and not a total surrender. As a gift, it could not be supported by necessity. The act of taking a mortgage did not amount to estoppel or ratification of the invalid gift.
Issues: Whether a partial alienation by a widow to the nearest reversioner is valid; whether the consent of reversioners validates such alienation; and whether taking a mortgage of the alienated property constitutes estoppel or ratification.
Ratio Decidendi: A widow's power to surrender is limited to the whole estate; partial surrender is legally impossible. Alienations for necessity may be supported by the consent of reversioners as evidence of necessity, but not by consent alone. A reversionary heir cannot be estopped from claiming their right upon the widow's death based on transactions entered into while they held only a spes successionis.
Result: Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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family law
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hindu law
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widow's estate
- surrender and renunciation
- alienation
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widow's estate
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hindu law
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property law
- estoppel and ratification
Judgement
Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (November 20, 1914), so far as it reversed a decree of the District Judge of Salem (October 4, 1909).
The suit was instituted by the appellant in 1908 against the respondent (a minor) and his father (since deceased) together with thirty other defendants. The plaintiff claimed a declaration that he was entitled to possession of a moiety of certain lands in the possession of the various defendants. The lands in dispute had formed part of the estate of one Ramasami Gounden, deceased. He died childless in 1890, and his mother, Marakammal, then succeeded to his properties for a womans estate. On November 24, 1893, she executed a deed of transfer in favour of her nephew, who at that time was the nearest reversionary heir to her deceased son. The deed is set out
96 Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 72 ( 1918- 1919) Rangasami Gounden V. Nachiappa Gounden
197
in the judgment of their Lordships. The defendants had taken, by inheritance or transfer, from the alienee.
The appellant in 1896 purchased from the respondents father and uncle two of the properties alienated, and had taken a mortgage (since discharged) of other alienated property, namely, a share in mitta lands in Konganapuram.
Marakammal died in 1907, the appellant being then a reversionary heir to Ramasami, entitled to half his estate.
Written statements of defence were filed by the respondent and his father, since deceased. They pleaded, so far as is material, that the deed of transfer of November, 1893, was valid, and contended further that by taking the conveyances and the mortgage above referred to, the appellant had acknowledged the alienation, and was precluded from disputing its validity.
The District Judge made a decree as prayed, save as to -certain properties no longer in dispute.
Upon appeal to the High Court, by the present respondent and his father, the other defendants not appealing, Miller J. agreed with the trial judge, but Sadasiva Aiyar J. was of opinion that the decision should be reversed. Upon a further appeal, under s. 15 of the Letters Patent, the decision of the trial judge was reversed as to the mitta lands, which had been the subject of the mortgage taken by the appellant, but was otherwise affirmed.
1918. Oct. 31. Dunne K. C., and Dube for the appellant. The deed of November 24, 1893, effected a gift and was not a transfer for consideration; further it did not relate to the whole estate. It consequently was not a valid alienation, although made to the then nearest reversioner Behari Lal v. Madho Lal Ahir Gyawal (( 1891) L. R. 19 I. A. 30.); Marudamuthu Nadan v. Srinivasa Pillai (( 1898) I. L. R. 21 M. 128.); Debi Prosad Chowdhury v. Golap Bhagat . (( 1913)I. L. R. 40 C. 721.)
That contention is not affected by the decision in Bajrangi Singh v. Manokarnika Bakhsh Singh. (L. R. 35 I. A. 1.) Had this been an alienation for consideration the consent of the. reversioners, had it been proved, would have raised a presumption that the transaction was for necessity. That principle has no application to the case of a gift Bakhtawar v. Bhagwana (( 1910) I. L. R. 32 A. 176.); Abdulla v. Ram Lal (( 1911) I. L. R. 34 A. 129.) ; Pilu v. Babaji . (( 1909) I. L. R. 34 B. 165.) Even if consent on the part of the reversioners was relevant, then was no evidence of it Jiwan Singh v. Misri Lal (( 1895)
L. R. 23 I. A. 1.); Hari Kishen Bliagat v. Kashi Pershad Singh , (( 1914) L. R, 42 I. A. 64.) The fact that the appellant had taken a mortgage of part of the alienated property does not preclude him, by estoppel or otherwise, from asserting his right as reversioner upon the succession opening.
De Gruyther K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the respondent. The deed, though called a deed of gift, was made in consideration of legal expenses incurred by the transferee in litigation connected with the property, as is recited. This therefore is not a case to which the decision of the Board in Behari Lal’s Case (I) applies. An aliena
