RAS BEHARI LAL vs THE KING-EMPEROR

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1933 Supreme(SC) 45

PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD ATKIN, LORD THANKERTON, AND SIR GEORGE LOWNDES.
RAS BEHARI LAL - Appellant
Versus
THE KING-EMPEROR - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Patna.
Decided On : July 27, 1933.

Important Points

A juror's inability to understand the trial language constitutes a miscarriage of justice. Evidence of such incompetence is admissible after the verdict because it concerns the juror's capacity to understand proceedings, not the private deliberations of the jury.

Subject

Criminal Law - Trial Procedure

Act Referred

Indian Penal Code: S.302, S.148
Code of Criminal Procedure: S.274(2), S.278, S.306(1), S.423

Headnote

(A) Indian Penal Code - Sections 302 and 148 - Code of Criminal Procedure - Sections 274(2), 278(g), 306(1) and 423 - Conviction for murder and rioting - Incompetence of a juror due to language barrier - Miscarriage of justice.

(B) Competence of a juror - The inability of a juror to understand the language in which evidence is given or the judge's charge is delivered denies the accused an essential part of the protection accorded by law, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

(C) Admissibility of evidence - The question of whether a juror is competent to understand proceedings for physical or linguistic reasons does not invade the privacy of discussions in the jury box or retiring room. Evidence of such incompetence, including evidence from the juror themselves, is admissible after the verdict to establish a mis-trial.

(D) Finality vs. Justice - While finality of legal proceedings is desirable, it cannot prevail over the requirement of justice. If a juror's disqualification was unknown to the accused, the court must interfere to prevent a perversion of justice.

Facts of the case:
The appellants were convicted of murder and rioting by a jury of seven. It was subsequently found that one of the jurors did not have sufficient knowledge of the language used during the evidence and the judge's charge. The appellate court had initially dismissed the appeal, but a subsequent inquiry confirmed the juror's inability to understand the proceedings.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the incompetence of a juror to understand the trial proceedings constitutes a clear miscarriage of justice, rendering the conviction and sentence unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the inability of a juror to understand the language of the trial is a ground for setting aside a conviction after the verdict, and whether evidence regarding a juror's competence is admissible post-verdict.

Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that a juror's competence to understand the trial is distinct from the private deliberations of the jury. Therefore, evidence of a juror's inability to understand the proceedings does not violate jury privacy. Such incompetence prevents a juror from giving a true verdict based on evidence, thereby denying the accused a fair trial.

Result: Appeal allowed, dismissal of the appeal by the lower appellate court reversed, and convictions and sentences set aside.

Legal Category Hierarchy

Advocates:
Solicitors for appellants :Hy. S. L. Polak & Co. Solicitor for respondent: Solicitor, India Office.

Judgement

Appeal (No. 21 of 1933) by special leave from an order of the High Court (June 28, 1932) confirming an order of the Sessions Judge of Patna whereby the appellants were convicted of penal offences and sentenced.

The appellants were convicted under s. 302 (murder) and s. 148 (rioting armed with deadly weapons) of the Indian Penal Code. Appellants Nos. 1 to 7 were sentenced to death, and appellant No. 8 to transportation for life. Appeals to the High Court were dismissed. The sentences of death on appellants Nos. 2, 3, 6 and 7 had been commuted to transportation for life.

The facts relevant to the present appeal, which was based upon the alleged inability of one of the jury of seven to understand the English language, are stated in the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

The following provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were material —

By s. 274, sub-s. 2, the jury, in the case of the trial in question, was to " consist of not less than seven persons and, if practicable, of nine persons."

By s. 278 " Any objection taken to a juror on any of the following grounds, if made out to the satisfaction of the Court, shall be allowed . . . . (g) his inability to understand the language in which the evidence is given, or when such evidence is interpreted, the language in which it is interpreted."

By s. 306, sub-s. 1 " When in a case tried before the Court of Session the Judge does not think it necessary to express disagreement with the verdict of the jurors or of a majority of the jurors, he shall give judgment accordingly."

1933. July 3. Pritt K.C. and Sidney Smith for the appellants. It has been intimated that in view of the report of the High Court the Crown concedes that the convictions and sentences should not stand. It is submitted that the order on appeal should merely set them aside and should not provide for a new trial. The appellants cannot be proceeded against again, there having already been a trial.

[LORD THANKERTON. The statutory jury being seven, was there in the circumstances a jury or a trial ?]

The juror in question was qualified to sit, the error was in not ascertaining and providing for his ignorance of English.

[LORD ATKIN. The result of what you say is that the men have been committed and charged, but have not been tried in accordance with the ordinary procedure. The present view of the Board is that there has been a trial coram non judice. We might leave it to the Court in India to decide what the proper relief is.]

Counsel for the Crown were called on.

Dunne K.C. and Wallach for the respondent. It is conceded that the convictions and sentences should not stand. The true view is that the appellants have not been tried. The High Court should be put back into the position in which it was under s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and left to make such order as they think right. That is much what was done in Sayyapureddi Chinayya v. The King-Emperor (( 1920) L. R. 48 I. A. 35.), a case in which the sentence exceeded the legal maximum ; it was there contended unsuccessfully that the High Court was functus officio.

[LORD ATKIN. Setting aside a conviction on the ground of irregularity does not give rise to a plea of res judicata. But if the conviction is set aside, can the High Court be reinvested with jurisdiction to deal with the matter ?]

It is submitted that the order of the High Court could be set aside, and the case remitted to that Court to make the order which it ought to have made.

[LORD THANKERTON. If the convictions are set aside, is there anything to prevent a fresh trial upon the commitment ?]

It is submitted not. But we ask merely that there should be substituted for the order of the High Court an order setting aside the convictions and sending the cases back to that Court to deal with according to the law in India.

[LORD ATKIN. I am doubtful about the powers of this Board itself to advise an order for a new trial.]

In Jannokee Doss v. The King (( 1836) 1 Moo. I. A. 67.) a new tria