A trustee of a religious institution cannot legally alter its fundamental character or customary usage through a compromise; such an action constitutes a breach of trust and is void under the law.

Judgement

Appeal from a decree of the High Court (February 14, 1902) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Madura (East) dated July 20, 1899.

The suit was brought by the Raj ah of Ranmad} as the hereditary trustee of the Hindu temple of Meenatchi Sundareswara, situate in the town of Kamudi, for a declaration that the members of the Shanar community are not en titled to enter the temple, and for an injunction restraining them from doing so and for a sum of Rs.2500 as damages. The defendants were Shanars and were sued as representing the whole community of Shanars, resident in or about Kamudi, under Civil Procedure Code, s. 30. The Defendants pleaded, inter alia, that the members of their community have a right to the use of the temple and to participate in the worship therein. The Subordinate Judge made the declaration and injunction prayed for and awarded Rs.500 as damages. On appeal the High Court affirmed the decree with costs.

The findings of the Subordinate Judge were as follows— (1.) That the Nadars were not a distinct and separate community from the Shanars, whose hereditary occupation was the cultivation of the palmyra tree and cocoanut palm, and the extraction and manufacture of their juice; (2.) that persons belonging to that class were prohibited from entering the plaint temple by the rules of worship therein observed; (8.) that a custom was proved excluding Shanars from entering the said temple; (4.) that the acts of sacrilege alleged to have been done by the appellants on May 14, 1897, were not done by them, and that the plaintiffs case was in this respect false; (5.) that the Civil Courts could take cognizance of the present suit; (6.) that in Consequence of the entry into the temple purification was necessary, and that the defendants ought to pay Rs.500 for this purpose.

While the appeal was pending before the High Court, and on July 23, 1901, a petition, signed by the plaintiff and the appellants, was preferred on behalf of the latter, stating that the parties had effected a compromise of the matters in suit, and praying that the compromise might be recorded and a decree passed in accordance therewith. The agreement of compromise, a copy of which was annexed to the petition, was to the following effect—" First, the plaintiff shall not exclude the defendants and their caste people from exercising their right of free access to and of worshipping in the said temple of Kamudi, but shall allow them to enjoy and exercise their said right of free access and worship in the same manner and to the same extent as such rights are enjoyed by Vellala, Chetty, and other Sudra sects of the Hindu community. Secondly, the defendants shall enjoy and exercise their said rights in the same manner and to the same extent as the aforesaid sects of the Hindu community enjoy them, and that they have no higher rights of access and worship in respect of the temple, and that the defendants are not liable to pay the plaintiff any sum of money by way of damages; and, thirdly, each party shall bear their own costs of the suit and the appeal. It is further agreed that the plaintiff and the defendants shall present a joint petition or petitions to the High Court, praying that the said decree on the file of the Subordinate Court of Madura (East) be reversed, and that a decree should be passed in accordance with the terms of this agreement."

Thereupon two of the worshippers of the temple in question, and also the infant son and heir apparent of the original plaintiff, by his mother and next friend, were joined as party respondents to the appeal, in order that they might oppose the petition of compromise, to which they took various objections which were stated in the evidence filed in support of their applications.

When the petition of compromise came on for hearing it was supported by the appellants alone, and opposed not only by the newly-joined plaintiffs, but also by the original plaintiff, who expressed the desire to withdraw from the