PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD THANKERTON, SIR GEORGE RANKIN, AND MR. M. R. JAYAKAR.
SECRETARY OF STATE, REPRESENTED BY THE COLLECTOR OF SOUTH ARCOT - Appellant
Versus
MASK AND COMPANY - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : Mar. 15. 1940.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the civil courts' jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging customs decisions is excluded when there is an express statutory provision establishing a comprehensive and self-contained appellate and revision process. Specifically, when the statute provides a clear and final appellate procedure that covers the determination of the rights and obligations involved, the courts are barred from intervening in the merits of such disputes. The key consideration is whether the statutory scheme explicitly or by clear implication excludes the jurisdiction of the civil courts; in this case, the court held that the provisions of the relevant customs act, which include appeals and revisions that are final and binding, effectively ousted the jurisdiction of civil courts to review the substantive merits of customs assessments and decisions. Therefore, the finality clause within the statutory framework signifies that parties must adhere to the prescribed statutory remedies, and resorting to civil courts for adjudication of the same issues is barred.
Judgement
Appeal (No. 23 of 1939) from a judgment and order of the High Court (February 2, 1938), which set aside a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Cuddalore (March 30, 1937).
The respondents, Mask & Co., a firm of merchants, imported a quantity of betel-nuts into British India. The Assistant Collector of Customs assessed them for the purposes of duty on a tariff value as " boiled". The respondents, contending that they were raw sliced betel-nuts subject to duty ad valorem, appealed from the decision of the Assistant Collector to the Collector of Customs, who dismissed the appeal, and on the matter being taken in revision to the Government of India the Collectors decision was affirmed.
In the suit out of which this appeal arose the respondents sought to recover the excess amount collected from them, under protest, by levying duty upon a tariff and not an ad valorem basis. The main question for determination in the appeal was whether the order passed by the Collector of Customs on the appeal under the provisions of s. 188 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, against the assessment of duty by the officer of Customs, and which was subsequently affirmed on revision under the provisions of s. 191 of the Act, constituted a final adjudication, or whether the civil courts had jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the respondents.
The facts and the relevant statutory provisions appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The Subordinate Judge held that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
An appeal to the High Court (Varadachariar and Pandrang Row JJ.) was allowed, and the Subordinate Judge was directed to proceed to dispose of the suit on its merits. The appeal is reported at I. L. R. [ 1938] M. 1040.
1939., Dec. 4, 5. H. U. Willink K.C. and W. W. K. Page for the appellant. The question in this appeal concerns the effect on the jurisdiction of the civil courts of the legislation with regard to customs in India. There is a statutory procedure under s. 188 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, for appeal and revision, and under that procedure the respondents appealed from the decision of the Assistant Collector to the Collector of Customs, who dismissed the appeal. The respondents further applied for revision as provided by s. 191, and again failed. They then launched the present action, not claiming that there was any irregularity or lack of jurisdiction, but alleging that the decision was wrong on the facts—that the betel-nuts were not in fact boiled. The only issue in the Trial Court with which the Board is concerned is "Has this Court [the Trial Court] no jurisdiction to entertain "this suit, and is the suit barred by the provisions of the " Sea Customs Act ? " The matter is one of general importance, and there are a number of similar cases awaiting decision as to the jurisdiction of the courts. The matter falls under two main heads (a) Does the statute provide for a complete ouster of the jurisdiction of the courts—is this statutory procedure exclusive ? (b) Is it alternative, so that a party who has resorted to it has made his election and cannot adjudicate the matter again, having worked through the statutory procedure. [Reference was made to the Sea Customs Act (VIII. of 1878), ss. 30, 31, 32, 167, 182, 188,189, 191, 195, 197, 198; the Indian Tariff Act (VIII. of 1894), s. 3; and the Land Customs Act (XIX. of 1924), ss. 2, 5 and 9.] In the last resort the question is one of construction. Though the precise point in this case has not arisen for decision, the English authorities which are nearest to this case are Doe v. Bridges ((1831) 1 B. & Ad. 847, 859.), which was approved in Pasmore v. Oswaldtwistle Urban Council ([ 1898] A. C, 387, 395, 397); Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford (( 1859) 6 C. B. (N S.) 336, 355-6.), which was cited in Neville v. London " Express " Newspaper, Ld. ([ 1919] A. C. 368, 391, 405.); and Wake v. Mayor, Etc., of Sheffield. (( 1883) 12 Q. B. D. 142, 145.) With regard to the Indi
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