Judgement

Appeal (No. 91 of 1931) from a decree of the High Court (August 27, 1925) modifying a decree of the District Judge of Tinnevelly (November 10, 1919), which affirmed a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin (January 3, 1917).

Law. Rep. 61 Ind. App. 163 ( 1933- 1934) Secretary of State v. Rameswa Ram Devasthanam Trustee 5

The suit raised a question as to the respective rights of the inamdar of the Sethukkuvoithan estate (plaintiff-respondent No. 1) and the ryots of Attur, a Government ryotwari village (appellants Nos. 2 to 4, and pro-forma respondents Nos. 2 to 23), in the distribution of the water of the river Tamparaparni by a Government scheme of irrigation ; both the inam estate and the ryotwari village were situate upon the right or south bank of the river, the former being higher up than the latter.

The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

The Subordinate Judge dismissed the first respondents suit, and his decree was affirmed by the District Judge upon grounds which appear in the present judgment. Upon a second appeal to the High Court the learned judges (Ramesam and Venkata-subba Rao JJ.), modifying the decree, made a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to low water to the extent adequate to irrigate 228 acres of single crop land and 178 acres of double crop land, provided that at least this quantity of water was available in the channel J—K.

1933. Dec.7, 8, 11. De Gruyther K.C. and Pringle for appellant No. 1.

Dunne K.C. and Narasimham for respondent No. 1.

1934. Jan. 16.The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by

SIR JOHN WALLIS. This is an appeal from the concurrent judgments of a Bench of the Madras High Court modifying, on second appeal, the decree of the lower Appellate Court which had dismissed the suit, and giving the plaintiff a decree for the principal relief claimed in the plaint. The question is mainly one of fact, and it is well settled that under s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court has no jurisdiction to reverse the findings of fact arrived at by the lower Appellate Court, however erroneous, unless they are vitiated by some error of law. Subsequently to the date of the judgments under appeal, the Board has had occasion to emphasize the fact that this rule is equally applicable to cases, such as this, in which the findings of the lower Appellate Court are based on inferences drawn from the documents exhibited in evidence. (See Anup Mahto v. Mita Dusadh ( 1933) L. R, 61 I. A. 93.) This question is dealt with in the third and fourth propositions laid down in the judgment delivered by Sir Binod Mitter in Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad Baksh (( 1929) L. R. 57 I. A. 86, 92.) as follows —

" (3.) Where the question to be decided is one of fact, it does not involve an issue of law merely because documents which were not instruments of title or otherwise the direct foundations of rights, but were really historical materials, have to be construed for the purpose of deciding the question see Midnapur Zamindary Co. v. Uma Char an Mandal. (( 1923) 29 Cal. W. N. 131.)

In the last cited case the question the Board had to decide was the date of the origin of an under-tenure. The first Appellate Court fixed the date from the contents of some documents. No oral evidence had been called in this case.

(4.) A second appeal would not lie because some portion of the evidence might be contained in a document or documents, and the first Appellate Court had made a mistake as to its meaning see Nowbut Singh v. Chutter Dharee Singh. (( 1873) 19 Suth. W. R. 222.) "

The first question, therefore, for their Lordships consideration is whether in the light of the above ruling the High Court had any jurisdiction to reverse the judgment of the lower Appellate Court.

Law. Rep. 61 Ind. App. 163 ( 1933- 1934) Secretary of State v. Rameswa Ram Devasthanam Trustee 6

The Rameswaram temple in the narrow straits between India and Ceylon, which is regarded by Hindus as one of their most impo