Judgement

Consolidated Appeals (No. 75 of 1934) from a common judgment and eleven decrees of the High Court (September 2, 1931) reversing a common judgment and eleven decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura (February 25, 1924), who reversed a common judgment and eleven decrees of the District Munsif of Devakottai (December 20, 1920).

The suits out of which these consolidated appeals arose were brought on November 25, 1918, by a Receiver on behalf of Sri Subrahmanyaswami temple at Kunnakudi for the possession of various plots of land in a hamlet called Murugan Endal, in the village of Uyyakondan, belonging to the temple, which had been alienated by a permanent cowle, dated April 1, 1865, by the then dharmakarta in favour of the managers of two Chetti temples. The suits were against various defendants who had obtained transfers of their several plots from the managers of the Chetti temples in or about 1897.

The main question in the appeal was whether the plaintiffs suits were barred by limitation and adverse possession. The appellants were the present managers and trustees of the temple, and, the Receiver having gone out, they now represented the temple. The respondents (defendants) were persons who had taken title by sub-leases under the cowle of 1865.

The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

The District Munsif of Devakottai held (inter alia) that the suits were barred by limitation and adverse possession.

On appeal by the plaintiff the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura reversed that decision, and held that they were not so barred.

On second appeal the High Court (Waller and Krishnan Pandalai JJ.) held that adverse possession began from before 1902, and that the suits were therefore barred by limitation under art. 144 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.

1936. Feb. 18, 20 and 21. Upjohn K.C. and Durai for the appellants. The question of limitation is the only issue left in the case. The ground on which the actions were brought was that the cowle of 1865 was void in that the manager was not competent to grant such a^ lease ; that it was beyond his powers because it was not for the benefit of the temple, but was in fact injurious thereto as being a perpetual lease at a low fixed rent which was incapable of being raised Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara.(( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 147.) The question of limitation, which the High Court dealt with under art. 144 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 does not turn on the language of any article; no question of limitation can be raised by persons in the position of the managers of the Chetti temples.

[LORD THANKERTON The question is whether they were in adverse possession.]

That matter is amply covered by decisions of this Board— there are two lines of decisions—and the High Court, according to their own language, have really cut down decisions of this Board. No question of adverse possession arises here, and therefore art.144 does not apply. The defendants claimed throughout that they held, and were entitled to hold, under a permanent lease reserving a rent, which rent was paid. That is the crucial fact with regard to the question of adverse possession and limitation. The decisions of this Board as regards adverse possession come under two heads (1.) That a person claiming a permanent tenancy under a lease at a rent, being in possession and paying the rent, cannot thereby acquire title by adverse possession against the owner; (2.) that a lease granted by the manager of a religious institution, not for the benefit of the institution, followed by entry and possession and payment of rent, is not void ab initio, but is good for the life or during the office of the manager who granted the lease, and also during the life or office of any succeeding manager who, by accepting rent, creates a new tenancy on the terms of the lease, and there is no adverse possession during that time. Madhavrao Waman Saundalgeka