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1936 Supreme(SC) 17
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD THANKERTON, SIR SHADI LAL, AND SIR GEORGE RANKIN.
SRIMATH DAIVASIKHAMANI PONNAMBALA DESIKAR - Appellant
Versus
PERIYANAN CHETTI - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : March 24, 1936.
Solicitors for appellants:Hy. S. L. Polak & Co. Solicitors for respondents: Douglas Grant & Bold.
A permanent lease of debutter property is valid only for the tenure of the granting manager. While rent payment usually precludes adverse possession, if a successor manager knows the lease is invalid but accepts rent and permits ownership-like conduct, adverse possession may be established.
Headnote:(A) Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - Article 144 - Permanent lease of debutter property - Validity of lease granted by manager - A permanent lease or absolute alienation of debutter property is beyond the ordinary powers of management and can be justified only by proof of necessity - Such a transfer is not void ab initio but is valid for the period of the tenure of office of the manager making the transfer - Possession during the manager's tenure is not adverse, and the statute of limitations begins to run against the successor from the time they assume office.
(B) Adverse Possession - Payment of rent - Generally, a person claiming a permanent tenancy who is in possession and paying rent cannot acquire title by adverse possession against the owner - Payment of rent is typically an expression of tenancy, not adverse possession.
(C) Inference of Adverse Possession - Where a successor manager, knowing the infirmity of a permanent lease, accepts rent and allows the lessee to exercise ownership rights (such as erecting buildings) without challenge, it may be inferred that the manager accepted the lease as a permanent right, thereby allowing the period of adverse possession to run.
Facts of the case:
A manager of a religious institution granted a perpetual lease of temple lands. The lease was later challenged as void because the manager lacked the authority to grant a permanent interest. The defendants, who had obtained sub-leases, contended that the suits for possession were barred by limitation and adverse possession, as they had been in possession and paying rent.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the lease was valid only for the tenure of the manager who granted it. While the payment of rent usually precludes adverse possession, the conduct of a subsequent manager—who was aware of the lease's nature and the lessees' activities but failed to challenge the title—indicated that the possession had become adverse.
Issues: Whether a permanent lease granted by a manager of a religious institution is void ab initio or valid for the duration of the manager's tenure, and whether the subsequent conduct of managers and the payment of rent established adverse possession under Article 144 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: A permanent lease of debutter property is valid only for the tenure of the granting manager. While rent payment usually signifies tenancy, if a manager knows the lease is invalid yet accepts rent and permits the lessee to act as the owner, the possession is deemed adverse. In this instance, the manager's failure to challenge the lease from 1902 to 1917 established adverse possession.
Result: Appeals dismissed.
Consolidated Appeals (No. 75 of 1934) from a common judgment and eleven decrees of the High Court (September 2, 1931) reversing a common judgment and eleven decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura (February 25, 1924), who reversed a common judgment and eleven decrees of the District Munsif of Devakottai (December 20, 1920).
The suits out of which these consolidated appeals arose were brought on November 25, 1918, by a Receiver on behalf of Sri Subrahmanyaswami temple at Kunnakudi for the possession of various plots of land in a hamlet called Murugan Endal, in the village of Uyyakondan, belonging to the temple, which had been alienated by a permanent cowle, dated April 1, 1865, by the then dharmakarta in favour of the managers of two Chetti temples. The suits were against various defendants who had obtained transfers of their several plots from the managers of the Chetti temples in or about 1897.
The main question in the appeal was whether the plaintiffs suits were barred by limitation and adverse possession. The appellants were the present managers and trustees of the temple, and, the Receiver having gone out, they now represented the temple. The respondents (defendants) were persons who had taken title by sub-leases under the cowle of 1865.
The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The District Munsif of Devakottai held (inter alia) that the suits were barred by limitation and adverse possession.
On appeal by the plaintiff the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad at Madura reversed that decision, and held that they were not so barred.
On second appeal the High Court (Waller and Krishnan Pandalai JJ.) held that adverse possession began from before 1902, and that the suits were therefore barred by limitation under art. 144 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
1936. Feb. 18, 20 and 21. Upjohn K.C. and Durai for the appellants. The question of limitation is the only issue left in the case. The ground on which the actions were brought was that the cowle of 1865 was void in that the manager was not competent to grant such a^ lease ; that it was beyond his powers because it was not for the benefit of the temple, but was in fact injurious thereto as being a perpetual lease at a low fixed rent which was incapable of being raised Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara .(( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 147.) The question of limitation, which the High Court dealt with under art. 144 of the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 does not turn on the language of any article; no question of limitation can be raised by persons in the position of the managers of the Chetti temples.
[LORD THANKERTON The question is whether they were in adverse possession.]
That matter is amply covered by decisions of this Board— there are two lines of decisions—and the High Court, according to their own language, have really cut down decisions of this Board. No question of adverse possession arises here, and therefore art.144 does not apply. The defendants claimed throughout that they held, and were entitled to hold, under a permanent lease reserving a rent, which rent was paid. That is the crucial fact with regard to the question of adverse possession and limitation. The decisions of this Board as regards adverse possession come under two heads (1.) That a person claiming a permanent tenancy under a lease at a rent, being in possession and paying the rent, cannot thereby acquire title by adverse possession against the owner; (2.) that a lease granted by the manager of a religious institution, not for the benefit of the institution, followed by entry and possession and payment of rent, is not void ab initio, but is good for the life or during the office of the manager who granted the lease, and also during the life or office of any succeeding manager who, by accepting rent, creates a new tenancy on the terms of the lease, and there is no adverse possession during that time. Madhavrao Waman Saundalge
