1918 Supreme(SC) 53
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD ATKINSON, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND SIR WALTER PHILLIMORE, BART.
SURYANARAYANA - Appellant
Versus
PATANNA - Respondents
On Appeal Prom The High Court At Madras.
Decided On : July 1, 1918.
Solicitor for appellants: Douglas Grant.
Solicitors for respondents: Barrow, Rogers & Nevill.
There is no general presumption of law that an inam grant is limited to land revenue alone; the ruling power could grant proprietary rights to the soil. If the grant includes the soil, the land is not an "estate" under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908.
Headnote:(A) Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 - Section 3(2)(d) - Definition of "Estate" - Section 189 - Jurisdiction of Revenue Court - Madras Regulation XXXI of 1802 - Proprietary rights of the ruling power - Whether an inam grant is presumed to be a grant of revenue only or includes the soil.
(B) Presumption of Law - No general presumption exists that a grant to an inamdar is limited to the royal share of revenue; the ruling power was competent to grant all rights in the land, including the soil, subject to any existing occupancy rights of tenants.
(C) Jurisdiction - If a grant includes the soil of the village, it does not fall within the definition of an "estate" under Section 3(2)(d) of the Act, and consequently, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not excluded.
Facts of the case:
The appellants held an inam village and leased parcels of land to the respondents. The lease agreements explicitly stated that the tenants had no occupancy rights and would surrender possession upon the expiration of the term. The appellants filed suits for ejectment. The respondents contended that the village was an "estate" under the relevant Act, which would vest jurisdiction exclusively in the Revenue Court.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the grant of the village included both the revenue and the soil. This was supported by entries in the inam registers and the fact that the tenants had expressly recognized the lack of occupancy rights in their lease agreements.
Issues: Whether the inam village constituted an "estate" under Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and whether there is a legal presumption that inam grants are limited to land revenue.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that there is no presumption of law that an inam grant is only for revenue. The ruling power exercised actual proprietary rights over the land and could grant the soil. Since the grant in this case included the soil, the village was not an "estate" under the Act, and the civil court had jurisdiction to order ejectment.
Result: Appeal allowed; decrees of the District Judge and High Court set aside; decrees of the Munsif restored and affirmed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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land law
-
land tenure
- inam grants
- kudivaram and melvaram
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land tenure
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practice and procedure
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jurisdiction
- civil vs revenue court
-
jurisdiction
Judgement
Consolidated Appeals from a judgment and three decrees of the High Court (October 9, 1913) affirming decrees of the District Court of Kistna, which set aside decrees of a District Munsif s Court.
The appellants held about two-thirds of the inam village of Korragunta in the Northern Circars. The respondents severally held from them parcels of land therein under leases entered into at recent dates but prior to 1908. Bach lease contained the following or a similar clause "As I have taken the land temporarily for cultivation, and as I have no zeroyati thereto, you shall take possession thereof at the end of the term without need of relinquishment by me." It appeared from the evidence that at, or shortly before, the date of each lease the parcel leased had been vacant.
The appellants brought three suits in the Court of the District Munsif of Masulipatam to eject the respondents, each of whom pleaded that the parcel leased to him constituted an "estate," or part of an "estate," within s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and that consequently under
s. 189 the Revenue Court alone had jurisdiction. The suits were tried together throughout.
The terms of the inam grant under which the appellants held could not be proved. The earliest history of the village appeared from the back of a dumbala dated 1789. It was there stated to have been granted by a Reddi king in 1373 to Brahmins as a " sarva " agraharam, paying nothing to the circar, and to have been confirmed by succeeding rulers at various dates. Dumbalas dated 1785, 1796, and 1797 allowing the inamdars to remove the crops were produced. The village was entered in inam registers, the earliest being dated 1797, as a sarva agraharam, the original grant being stated to have been as above mentioned. There was no evidence that at the date when the grant was made or confirmed any person other than the inamdars was in occupation of the lands under any claim of permanent right, or at all.
A considerable body of evidence was adduced by the plaintiffs to show that for a period of about twenty years the inamdars had dealt with the land and the tenants upon the basis of being owners of the soil. Some evidence to the contrary was adduced by the defendants, and it was also proved that in 1846 the inamdars, who prior to that date had not resided in the village, came to live there in order to facilitate the collection of the rent.
The District Munsif made decrees for ejectment. He held that there was no presumption that the grantees did not own the kudivaram, and that the respondents, upon whom the onus lay to show that the Court had not jurisdiction, had failed to prove the necessary facts.
The District Judge upon appeal set aside the decrees, holding that the village was an estate within s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Act. He said that it had been laid down in a series of judgments and in the Fifth Report that the ancient Indian rulers had no ownership in the soil, but only a share in its produce ; it was therefore to be inferred that the grant was only of the royal revenue. That view was supported by the fact that the grant was to Brahmins, and by the evidence that prior to 1846 the inamdars had not resided in the village. He considered that the evidence did not prove that the appellants owned the kudivaram, so as to displace the presumption of law which he held arose. He further held that the exception in s. 8 of the Act applied only when an inamdar, who had not previously the kudivaram, acquired it in the whole of the inam lands.
The decision of the District Judge was affirmed by the High Court; the appeal is reported at I. L. R. 38 M. 608. The learned judges (Sadasiva Aiyar and Spencer JJ.) upon their view of the authorities agreed with the view of the District Judge that there was a presumption of law that the grant had been only of the royal revenue from the land ; they concurred in his finding that that presumption was not displaced by the evidence. They further he