Judgement

Consolidated Appeal (No. 105 of 1931) from a decree of the High Court (March 19 and 25, 1929) modifying a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Cocanada.

In 1921 the appellant instituted a suit for possession of the properties of Tirupayya, who died in 1880; he claimed as heir upon the death of the widow of Tirupayya, which occurred earlier in 1921. In 1888 the widow had conveyed half the property of her husband to Ammanna, and the other half (less 6.42 acres which she reserved for her own maintenance) to her daughter Nagamma, who was reversionary heir to Tirupayya. Nagamma died in 1894. The defendants were in possession of the properties, some through the conveyance to Ammanna, some through the conveyance to Nagamma.

The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.

The trial judge made a decree for the properties which had been conveyed to Nagamma holding that they were merely a gift from the widow; otherwise he dismissed the suit.

Both the plaintiff and the defendants appealed to the High Court, which dismissed the plaintiffs appeal but allowed the defendants appeal as to the properties conveyed by the widow to her daughter. The learned judges (Phillips and Reilly JJ.), following Sartaji v. Ramjas (( 1923) I. L. R. 46 A. 59.), held that there had been a surrender of the estate which operated as an acceleration of Nagammas reversion, and that consequently the suit as to those properties was barred by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I., art. 141. They gave the plaintiff a decree for the 6.42 acres which Venkamma had retained for her maintenance.

1933. Nov. 30; Dec. 1, 4. Sidney Smith for the appellant. The alienations effected in 1888 were invalid against the plaintiff as reversionary heir. Both Courts held that it was not proved that Ammanna was an illatom son-in-law of Dorayya. [Reference was made to Maynes Hindu Law, para. 207.] His claim was not bona fide and was therefore not one which the widow had authority to compromise Obala Kondama Naicker Ayyan v. Kandasami Goundar. (( 1923) L. R. 51. I. A. 145.) The conveyance to him in 1888 did not purport to be made under the award of l$80 but for different reasons ; both conveyances were gifts, and valid only during the widows life. The two conveyances should be read together, as in Ramgouda Annagouda v. Bhausaheb (( 1927) L. R. 54 I. A. 396.) ; so read the transaction was a division of the estate between Ammanna and Nagamma. Read as separate transactions the alienation to Ammanna was an invalid gift, and consequently the conveyance to Nagamma was not a surrender of the whole estate. The deed did not purport to be a surrender of the estate. In any case there is no decision of the Board that there is an acceleration of the reversion upon surrender to a female heir. The daughter was not a reversioner but merely personal heir to her father upon her mothers death. It has been held that a widow does not accelerate the succession by relinquishing to a co-widow Chengappa v. Buradagunta. (( 1920) I. L. R. 43 M. 855.) For the validation of an alienation by the consent of reversioners a distinction has been drawn between male and female heirs Raja Dei v. Umed Singh. (( 1912) I. L. R. 34 A. 207.)

De Gruyther K.C. and Subba Row for the respondents. The widow could bind the reversioners by a compromise of a claim against the estate Ramsumran Prasad v. Shy am Kumari (( 1922) L. R. 49 I.

A. 342.), Hiran Bibi v. Sohan Bibi (( 1914) 18 C. W. N. 929 (P. C).) ; Raoji Rupa v. Kunjalal Hiralal. (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 177.) There is no ground for supposing that the award of 1880 was not honestly made ; it shows that Ammannas claim was bona fide and that half the property was a reasonable compromise. The conveyance to him was pursuant to the title which he had already obtained under the award, and it left only half the property of the deceased subject to the reversionary rights. If Nagamma had been a male the conveyance to her would have accelerated her succession