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1921 Supreme(SC) 55
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD BUCKMASTER, LORD DUNEDIN, LORD SHAW, AND MR. AMEER ALI.
VIDYA VARUTHI THIRTHA - Appellant
Versus
BALUSAMI AYYAR - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : July. 5. 1921.
Solicitors for appellant:T. L. Wilson & Co. Solicitor for respondents: H. S. L. Polak.
The head of a religious institution is a manager/custodian, not a "trustee" in the technical English sense, unless a specific trust is created. Consequently, Article 134 of the Indian Limitation Act does not apply to general endowments managed by such heads.
Headnote:(A) Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - Schedule I, Articles 134 and 144, Section 10 and 28 - Indian Trusts Act, 1882 - Section 1 and 3 - Religious Endowment Act, 1863 - Section 14 - Recovery of possession of land forming part of religious endowments - Whether the head of a religious institution is a "trustee" for the purpose of limitation - Article 134 applies to immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust and subsequently transferred by the trustee for valuable consideration - The head of a religious institution is a manager and custodian, not a "trustee" in the technical sense of English law, as property is not "conveyed" to him but dedicated to the institution - In the absence of a specific trust, the head of such an institution does not fall within the ambit of Article 134.
(B) Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - Article 144 - Adverse possession - Permanent lease granted by the head of a religious institution - Such a lease is valid only for the lifetime of the grantor - If the successor in office permits continued possession and accepts rent, it is deemed a new tenancy for the successor's lifetime - Possession does not become adverse until the death of the successor.
Facts of the case:
A suit was filed for possession of land forming part of the general endowments of a religious institution. The plaintiffs claimed title based on a permanent lease granted by a former head of the institution and argued that they had acquired title under the law of limitation. The lower courts differed on whether the head of the institution was a "trustee" under the Limitation Act and whether the possession was adverse.
Findings of Court:
The head of the religious institution is not a "trustee" in the technical sense required by Article 134 of the Limitation Act, as the property was part of a general endowment and not subject to a specific trust. Furthermore, the possession of the lessees was not adverse during the lifetimes of the successive heads of the institution.
Issues: Whether the head of a religious institution is a "trustee" within the meaning of Article 134 of the Indian Limitation Act, and whether a permanent lease granted by such a head creates a title by adverse possession under Article 144.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the term "trustee" in Article 134 refers to a specific trust where property is conveyed to a trustee. In religious endowments, the manager is not a trustee in the English legal sense because the property vests in the deity or the institution, not the manager. Regarding adverse possession, a head of a religious institution cannot create an interest beyond his life; thus, continued possession with the consent of the successor constitutes a tenancy and not adverse possession.
Result: Judgment and decree of the High Court reversed; order of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the suit restored.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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property law
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religious endowments
- hindu math
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religious endowments
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limitation law
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possession
- adverse possession
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trust property
- article 134 limitation act
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possession
Judgement
Appeal (No. 48 of 1919) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (October 19, 1916) reversing a decree of the temporary Subordinate Judge of Ramnad.
The suit was instituted in 1913 by the present respondents for possession of land in Madura forming part of the endowments of a math situated in Mysore State. The defendants were the present appellant, the head of the math (referred to as the pandara sannadhi or matathipathi), certain lessees from him, who were in possession, and others. The plaintiffs claimed under a permanent lease granted to them in 1891 by a former head of the math. They also claimed that they had acquired a good title under the Indian Limitation Act they relied on arts. 134 and 144 of the Schedule and s. 28. (Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I., art. 134, provides that for a suit “to recover possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards transferred by the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration,” the period of limitation shall be 12 years from “the date of the transfer.” By s. 28 “At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.”)
The facts are stated at the beginning of the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
Both Courts in India held that the lease of 1891 was not made for necessity, and that the land in suit was part of the general endowment of the math, not being subject to any specific trust. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. He held that the head of the math was not a " trustee " of its endowed property, and that consequently art. 134 of Sch. I. did not apply ; he was also of opinion that there had not been adverse possession so as to bring art. 144 into operation. The High Court allowed an appeal. A decree was made declaring that the first plaintiff was a permanent lessee of the land in suit and for possession and mesne profits. The judgment was delivered by Burn J. (Sudasiva Ayyar J. agreeing). The learned judge was of opinion that expressions in the judgment of the Board in Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 73, 76, 90.) constrained the Court to hold that the head of the math was a trustee of the properties, and that consequently art. 134 applied. The appeal to the High Court is reported at I. L. R. 40 M. 745.
1921. Feb. 18, 21. Clauson K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the appellant. Both Courts in India found that the permanent lease was not made for necessity, and that the property in suit was not subject to any specific trust, but formed part of the general endowment of the math. Art. 134 does not apply. The head of a math is not a "trustee" of its general endowments Kailasam Pillai
v. Nataraja Thambiran. (I. L. R. 33 M. 265.) The Board gave no decision to the contrary in Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das . (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. R. 73, 76, 90.) The expressions in the judgment upon which the High Court based its decision were intended to convey merely that the head of a math was in a fiduciary position with regard to its property, not that he was a " trustee " in the full sense in which that word is used in English law. The terms of art. 134 show that the word is there used in the latter sense ; and s. 10 of the Act makes that clear. The case in the course of which the judgment of the Full Bench in Kailasam Pillai v. Nataraja Thambiran (I. L. R. 33 M. 265.) was rendered, came before the Board on appeal in Nataraja Thambiran v. Kailasam Pillai . (( 1920) L. R. 48 I. A. 1.) Although the decision of the Full Bench was not approved in terms, the decree based upon that decision was affirmed. The respondents acquired no title under art. 144 by adverse possession. When the head of a math grants a permanent lease there is no adverse possession during his life Muthusamier v. Sreemethanithi. (I. L. R. 38 M. 356.) Consent to the lessees possession by the succeeding head must be referred to a new lease
