1915 Supreme(SC) 16
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD DUNEDIN, LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE, SIR GEORGE FARWELL, SIR JOHN EDGE, AND MR. AMEER ALI
V. VENKATANARAYANA PILLAI - Appellant
Versus
V. SUBBAMMAL - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : Feb. 3; March 15, 1915.
Solicitor for petitioner:John Josselyn. Solicitor for respondents: Douglas Grant.
A suit brought by a presumptive reversioner to challenge a Hindu widow's adoption is representative of all reversioners. Therefore, the right to sue survives the plaintiff's death, allowing the next presumptive reversioner to be substituted and continue the action.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XXII, Rule 1 and 3; Order I, Rule 1; Section 2(11) - Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - Articles 118 and 125 - Substitution of legal representative - Suit by presumptive reversioner to challenge adoption by Hindu widow - Right to sue survives death of plaintiff - A suit brought by a presumptive reversioner to challenge the validity of an adoption or alienation by a Hindu female is brought in a representative capacity for the common benefit of all reversioners, both presumptive and contingent, as the right to sue is based on a common injury to the inheritance.
(B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order I, Rule 1 - Joinder of plaintiffs - Where a common question of law or fact arises from the same transaction, contingent reversioners may be joined as plaintiffs in a suit brought by the presumptive reversioner. Consequently, upon the death of the presumptive reversioner, the next presumptive reversioner is entitled to continue the action as the right to sue survives.
Facts of the case:
A presumptive reversioner instituted a suit for a declaration that an adoption made by a Hindu widow was invalid. After the suit was dismissed by the lower courts, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the highest court but died during the pendency of the appeal. The next presumptive reversioner, being the sole heir, applied for substitution and revivor of the appeal, which was opposed on the ground that the right to sue did not survive the death of the original plaintiff.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the right to sue survives the death of the presumptive reversioner because the suit is brought in a representative capacity to protect the common interests of all reversioners, near and remote.
Issues: Whether the right to sue survives the death of a presumptive reversioner in a suit challenging an adoption by a Hindu widow, and whether the next presumptive reversioner is entitled to be substituted as a legal representative to continue the proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that since the injury caused by an invalid adoption is common to all reversioners, the suit is representative in nature. Because contingent reversioners could have been joined as plaintiffs under Order I, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure due to the common question of law regarding the validity of the act, the right to sue survives, allowing the next presumptive reversioner to prosecute the action.
Result: Petitioner is entitled to the order for substitution and revivor of the appeal.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
practice and procedure
-
civil procedure
- substitution and revivor
- joinder of parties
-
civil procedure
-
hindu law
-
inheritance
- reversionary interests
- adoption by widow
-
inheritance
Judgement
Petition for an order substituting the petitioner for the deceased appellant, and for an order for revivor of the appeal.
The deceased appellant, on August 1, 1907, instituted a suit in the High Court claiming a declaration that the adoption of the second respondent by the first respondent, a Hindu widow, was invalid and did not affect his reversionary interest. The circumstances appear fully from their Lordships judgment.
The first respondent pleaded that she had authority to adopt under her deceased husbands will; the
Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 125 ( 1914- 1915)
V. Venkatanarayana Pillai V. V. Subbammal 29
appellants case was that a later will had the effect in law of revoking this authority.
The trial judge held that the authority to adopt was not revoked, and dismissed the suit. The High Court in its appellate jurisdiction affirmed this decision and granted leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. The appeal was entered on November 6, 1913, and on November 19, 1913, the appellant died.
The present petitioner, Kuppusami Pillai, a grandson of the deceased appellant, was his sole heir and representative, and upon his (the appellants) decease became the next presumptive reversioner.
Sir R. Finlay, K.C. and Dube, for the petitioner. If the appeal is not revived and prosecuted the petitioner and all other reversioners will be bound by the decree of the High Court as res judicata against them Chirovolu Punnamma v. Chirovolu Perrazu . (( 1905) L L. R. 29 Madr. 390.). That decision of the Full Bench is right and the later decision in Arunachalam Pillai Minor v. Vellaya Pillai (( 1912) 23 Madr. L. J. 719.) is erroneous.
De Gruyther, K.C.9a,n&Kenworthy Brown, for the respondents. The decision reported 23 Madr. L. J. 719 is right. The earlier case reported I. L. E. 29 Madr. 390 was decided upon its special facts; the learned judges who decided it were parties to the decision in the former case. Upon the death of the appellant the suit and proceedings abated; the decree is not res judicata against the petitioner. In Hindu law a reversioner has only a spes successionis; he claims as direct heir and not as successor to any other reversioner. Under s. 43 of the Specific Belief Act, 1877, the decree is only binding upon the parties and persons claiming through them. [Sect. 42 and illustrations (e) and (/) under that section were also referred to.] Order xxii, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not apply, as the right of the plaintiff to sue does not survive; the petitioners right is a different right. The petitioner is not the " legal representative " within the meaning of s. 2, sub-s. 11, of the Code so far as relates to the claim in the suit. It is well established that a suit by a reversioner for a declaration that an alienation by a Hindu widow is invalid abates upon the death of the plaintiff and that a decree in a suit of that character is not res judicata against the other reversioners Sakyahani Ingle Rao Sahib v. Bhavani Bozi Sahib (( 1904) I. L. R. 27 Madr. 588. Bhagwanta v. Sukhi (( 1899) I. L. R. 22 Allah. 33.); Govinda Pillai v. Thayammal (( 1904) I. L. R. 28 Madr. 57.) ; China Veerayya v. Lakshminarasamma . (( 1914) I. L. R. 37 Madr. 406.) This view is supported by dicta of the Board Tekait Doorga Persad Singh v. Tekaitri Doorga Konwari (( 1878) L. R. 5 Ind. Ap. 149, at p 163.); Isri Dutt Koer v. Mussamat Hansbutti Koerain . (( 1883) L. R 10 Ind. Ap. 150, at p. 157.) The same principles apply to a reversioners suit to set aside an adoption. The petitioner could not have been joined as a plaintiff Rani Anund Koer v. Court of Wards (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 14, at p.22.); there was no just cause of action within Order n., r. 3, of the Code of 1908.
Sir R. Finlay, K.C., in reply. The Court has a discretion to allow a reversioner other than the next reversioner to be joined; Order n., r. 3, does not prevent that course. There is a distinc tion between suits to set aside an adoption and suits to declare a w