1919 Supreme(SC) 17
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
VISCOUNT HALDANE, VISCOUNT CAVE, LORD PHILLIMORE, AND SIR JOHN EDGE.
UPADRASHTA VENKATA SASTRULU - Appellant
Versus
DIVI SEETHARAMUDU - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : Mar. 17. 1919
Solicitor for appellant: Douglas Grant.
No presumption of law exists that an inam grant excludes the kudivaram (permanent occupancy) interest. Whether a property is an "estate" under the Estates Land Act, 1908, depends on whether the grant was for land revenue alone or the entire proprietary interest.
Headnote:(A) Estates Land Act, 1908 - Section 3(2)(d) - Definition of "estate" - Grant of land revenue in inam - Kudivaram interest - Whether a village where the land revenue alone was granted to a person not owning the kudivaram interest constitutes an "estate" - No presumption of law that an inam grant is prima facie a grant of the melvaram right only and excludes the kudivaram interest - Each case must be decided on its own facts based on the terms of the grant and surrounding circumstances.
(B) Jurisdiction of Civil Courts - Section 189 of the Estates Land Act, 1908 - If the property is not an "estate" under the Act, the restriction on civil court jurisdiction does not apply.
Facts of the case:
An inamdar filed suits for ejectment against tenants whose one-year tenancy agreements had expired. The tenants contended they had permanent occupancy rights and that the village was an "estate" under the Estates Land Act, 1908, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court in favor of the revenue court. It was established that the land in question was waste at the time of the original grant and that the grantee was entitled to cultivate and enjoy the produce.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the inam grant conveyed the whole proprietary interest in the property, not merely the land revenue. Consequently, the property did not satisfy the definition of an "estate" under Section 3(2)(d) of the Act.
Issues: Whether the property in question constituted an "estate" within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, 1908, and whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suits for ejectment.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that there is no legal presumption that an inam grant excludes the kudivaram (permanent occupancy) interest. Where the terms of the grant and the facts—such as the land being waste at the time of the grant and the grantee being entitled to cultivate and enjoy the produce—indicate that the whole proprietary interest was transferred, the grant is not one of land revenue alone. Therefore, the property is not an "estate" under the Act, and the civil court retains jurisdiction.
Result: Appeal allowed; decrees of the lower appellate courts set aside and decrees of the Munsif restored.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
property law
-
land tenure
- inam grants
- occupancy rights
-
land tenure
-
practice and procedure
-
jurisdiction
- civil vs revenue court
-
jurisdiction
Judgement
Consolidated Appeals from a judgment and decrees of the High Court (March 18, 1914), affirming decrees of the District Judge of Kistna, which reversed decrees of the District Munsif.
Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 123 ( 1918- 1919) Upadrashta Venkata Sastrulu V. Divi Seetharamudu
10
The appellant brought suits in the Court of the District Munsif to eject persons to whom in 1907 he had let several parcels of land amounting to about sixty acres and forming part of an inam village. The tenancy agreements expired in 1908, and each contained a declaration that the tenant had no right except that of cultivating for a year under the agreement. The defendants by their written statements alleged that they had rights of permanent occupancy, and that the village was an " estate " within the meaning of s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of Madras Estate Land Act, 1908, so that (by s. 189 of that Act) the revenue Court alone had jurisdiction. The suits were tried together throughout.
The facts appear from the judgment of their Lordships.
The following issues were framed together with others which are not material to this report (1.) Whether the plaint agraharam is an " estate" coming within s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Estates Land Act; (2.) whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit; (3.) whether the plaintiff has the inherent right to eject the defendants, or he acquired such right under the exception to s. 8, or whether the defendants have occupancy rights.
The District Munsif delivered judgment for the plaintiff. He held that the village and the lands in question were not an " estate," or part of an " estate," within the Act ; and that both according to the express contract between the parties and by virtue of the general custom of the agraharam the plaintiff was entitled to eject the defendants. He also thought that the plaintiff had that right under the exceptions to s. 8 of the Act.
The District Judge, on appeal, reversed the decisions. He relied upon certain decisions of the Bombay and Madras High Courts as establishing that there was a presumption of law that an inam grant did not carry the " kudivaram " interest, and that the burden was upon the agraharamdar to show that the tenants had no occupancy rights. In his view the terms of the sanad of 1783 and the use of the word " mouje " indicated that the village had been occupied. He therefore held that the village was an " estate " within s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Act, and that consequently the civil Court had no jurisdiction. He accordingly ordered that the plaints be returned for presentation in the revenue Court.
Upon appeal to the High Court, that Court called for precise findings on two questions, and the findings thereon were as follows (1.) That the lands were waste, as claimed by the plaintiff, at the time of the grant; (2.) that the tenants who had surrendered the lands in fasli 1313 ( 1904) had not occupancy rights.
The cases coming on for final disposal, the High Court affirmed the decrees of the District Judge.
The learned judges (Sadashiva Aiyar and Seshagiri Aiyar JJ.) were of opinion that there was a presumption of law as held by the District Judge, and that the fact that the land in question was waste at the date of the grant was immaterial ; they considered that whatever inhabitants there then were had rights of occupancy in the further 240 acres forming part of the village included in the inam grant, those 240 acres not being shown to have been waste. Their conclusion was that the lands were an " estate " within, the Act. They also held that the exception in s. 8 of the Act was not applicable. The appeal to the High Court is reported at I. L. R. 38 M. 891.
1919. Feb. 21. Kenworthy Brown for the appellant. The judgments of the District Judge and of the High Court were based upon there being a presumption of law that an inam grant did not include the kudivaram interest. That view has since been rejected by the Board in Suryanarayana v. Patanna, (L. R. 45 I. A. 20