2009 Supreme(SC) 240

2009(2) Supreme 304
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Delhi High Court)
S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph, JJ.
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation — Appellant
versus
Assistant Comnr. of Police (Traffic) Delhi — Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 950 of 2009
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.2359 of 2006)
With
Civil Appeal No. 951 of 2009
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.2408 of 2006)
Decided on : 12-02-2009

IMPORTANT POINT
No statutory authority, whether empowered by the Supreme Court or otherwise, can act de hors the statute.

Headnote:(a)Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 86 and 207 – The State of NCT Delhi and the State Transport Authority having delegated power to the respondent, he had the requisite jurisdiction to suspend the operation of permit. (Paras 14, 27 and 28)

       (b)Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 86 and 207 – Directions issued by the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India must be held to be in addition to the conditions contained in the permit and/or the provisions of the Act. (Para 16)

       (c)Interpretation of Statutes – Where a person, including a juristic person, is conferred a right to carry on business, regulation thereof should ordinarily be governed by the statute under which the permit has been granted – Although even if additional regulatory measures are laid down, the same should be construed strictly. (Para 17)

       (1997) 6 SCC 241 – Relied upon.

       (d)Interpretation of Judgment – The direction upon the authorities to ensure that the transport vehicles are not permitted to overtake any four wheels motorized vehicle was issued as the scheme of the Act necessarily implied an obligation to use the vehicle in a manner which does not imperil public safety – Clause (e) of the order must be construed in the light of the purpose and object for which the Act was enacted – The direction that any breach will be considered to be in contravention of the conditions of the permit which could entail suspension/cancellation of the permit and impounding of the vehicle must be read in the light of the provisions of the Act and not de hors the same. (Paras 19 and 20)

       (1997) 8 SCC 770 – Relied upon.

        (e)Judicial Review – Supreme Court could not and did not confer a statutory authority upon a person who did not have any such authority under the statute – Trite that an order passed by an authority without jurisdiction would be a nullity – It would, therefore, be preposterous to presume that this Court would confer jurisdiction upon an authority whose order would be a nullity and, thus, non est in the eye of law. (Para 20)

       (f)Judicial Review – The judge made law in an area covered by the Parliamentary Act should not be applied in an expansive manner – Nothing should be deduced therefrom. (Paras 22 and 25)

       (g)Interpretation of Judgment – A judgment is not to be construed as a statute – It must be construed upon reading the same as a whole taking into consideration the attending circumstances for the purpose. (Para 23)

       (2005) 4 SCC 772 – Relied upon.

       (h)Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 86 – High Court misread the provisions of Section 86 to hold that respondent was clothed with the jurisdiction of suspension and/or cancellation of the permit and impounding of the vehicle in terms of the order of the Supreme Court – Such directions, if read with the provisions of the Act, would mean that the procedure for suspension/cancellation of the permit and impounding of the vehicle must be followed as contained in the Act – Jurisdiction for the said purpose must be exercised by the authority under the statute – No statutory authority, whether empowered by this Court or otherwise, can act de hors the statute. (Para 24)

       (i)Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 86 – In terms of the Agreement between the two States, in case of any violation by any driver of any vehicle for which such carriage permit had been granted, action would be taken by authorities of the State of U.P. under the Rules made by that State – Delhi Rules would not apply – Even otherwise, the countersigning State would not be entitled to suspend or cancel the permit of a vehicle wherefor a stage carriage permit has been granted by the State of U.P. (Para 30)

       AIR 1962 MADRAS 173; AIR 1962 AP 148 – Cited with approval.

       Facts of the case :

       1.For the purpose of plying of buses on various routes falling within the State of Uttar Pradesh and National Capital Territory of Delhi several agreements as envisaged under sub-section (5) of Section 88 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 were executed by the appellant.

       2.In a Public Interest Litigation in regard to observance of the norms of safety on the roads the Supreme Court issued some directions.

       3.A bus of the appellant Corporation was found overtaking another four wheel vehicle and, thus, purported to have violated the conditions as enshrined in the directions of Supreme Court. A proceeding under Sections 3/181, 66(i)/92A of the Act was initiated whereupon fine of Rs.300/- was imposed.

       4.Respondent, as a purported consequence of the penalty imposed upon the driver of the said vehicle, initiated a proceeding against the appellant under Section 86 of the Act and by reason of an order dated 20.12.2002, the permit was suspended.

       5.A writ petition was filed thereagainst by the appellant. A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, having regard to the directions issued by the Supreme Court, refused to interfere with the said order.

       6.The Letters Patent Appeal was filed against the said order which was also dismissed.

       Finding of the Court :

       Impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

       Result : Appeals allowed.