The paramount public interest in maintaining discipline in the police force should overweigh private considerations, and repeated absence from duty can reasonably lead to the conclusion of incorrigibility in misconduct.

ORDER

1. Leave granted.

2. The order under challenge was passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on a writ petition filed by the respondent.

3. The respondent had been recruited by the appellants as a constable on 30-6-1990. He was charged on 3-6-1994 for absence from duty for a period of 65 days and 14 hours. A disciplinary enquiry was held and he was found guilty of the charge. He was served with a notice to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. His reply was considered. The Senior Superintendent of Police then imposed the punishment of dismissal from service, finding that the respondent "cannot become a good employee and he is not fit for the Department". The respondent's appeal therefrom was rejected.

4. The respondent filed the writ petition impugning the aforesaid orders.

The High Court said: "It is undoubtedly correct that the petitioner is alleged to have remained absent from duty. It is also true that even on certain earlier occasions, he had been accused of absence." However, the High Court took into account certain facts. The first of these was that the respondent "belongs to a weaker section of the society. He is a member of the Scheduled Castes." Secondly, the respondent "had gone to his village to give his pay to his mother who is a widow. He was detained on account of her illness." The High Court also noted that Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules provided that dismissal would be awarded only "for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility". It found that in the order dismissing the respondent it had not been recorded that his absence from duty was a grave act of misconduct or that the cumulative effect of his acts of absence was incorrigible conduct. The High Court, therefore, held that the provisions of the Rule had not been complied with. The High Court noted: "Undeniably, the petitioner was a member of a disciplined force. Absence from duty is undoubtedly unbecoming of a member of the disciplined force." But it found that the respondent's absence from duty was not wilful. It, therefore, set aside the orders of his dismissal and of rejection of his appeal therefrom and ordered the appellant to reinstate him in service but without back wages for the period from 1-12-1994 till the date of its order dated 28-11-1997, which period was to be treated as leave.

5. The High Court was right in noting that the respondent was a member of a disciplined force and that absence from duty was unbecoming of a member of such force. It was in that light that the High Court should have looked at the repeated acts of the respondent's absence from duty. The fact that the respondent is a member of the Scheduled Castes is neither here nor there for the purposes of considering whether or not he is guilty of misconduct and breach of discipline, nor the fact that he had gone to give his pay to his mother and was detained on account of her illness. It is necessary that members of the police forces should attend the duties which they have been allocated and not absent themselves. This is a paramount public interest that must overweigh private considerations. The High Court was, therefore, in patent error in looking benignly at the numerous acts of absence of the respondent.

6. That the order of dismissal did not use the "mantra" of "gravest act of misconduct" is not determinative. The substance of that conclusion is to be found in that order. When a policeman is repeatedly absent from duty, it cannot but be reasonably concluded that there is incorrigibility in his continued misconduct.

7. We are unable to accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that we should also take a lenient view of the matter in view of the circumstances that impelled the High Court to pass the order under challenge.

8. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. There shall b