JUDGMENT

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court directing that the conviction of the respondent shall remain stayed during the pendency of Criminal Appeal No. 809 of 2005

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Respondent who was working as Patwari Halqa and was convicted by learned Special Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short `P.C. Act') and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `IPC') and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year, 2 years and one year respectivley and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/- with default stipulation. Against the judgment in question respondent filed the aforesaid Criminal appeal which was admitted. After admission of the appeal, respondent filed an application in terms of Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code') read with Section 482 of the Code for suspension of the judgment of learned Special Judge.

The High Court by order dated 10.8.2006 stayed the conviction. According to the appellant, the view expressed by this Court in K.C. Sareen v. CBI, Chandigarh [2001(6) SCC 584] was not kept in view. The High Court dismissed that application.

4. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the suspension of the conviction is clearly unsustainable. It is pointed out that the High Court noted that the employer had given a notice for dispensing his services as Peon.

5. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the High Court took note of the fact that this was a case where the prayer for suspension of the conviction was to be granted. Unless the order of conviction was suspended, the respondent would have lost his job.

6. In State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan and Another [2003 (12) SCC 432], it was noted as follows:

"Having perused the impugned order as also the judgment of this Court in K.C. Sareen's case [2001(6) SCC 584] we find the High Court had no room for distinguishing the law laid down by this Court in K.C. Sareen case supra even on facts. This Court in the said case held: (SCC p. 589, para 11)

"11. The legal position, therefore, is this: though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, dehors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter."

(emphasis supplied)

In the said judgment of K.C. Sareen's case (supra) this Court has held that it is only in very exceptional cases that the court should exercise such power of stay in matters arising out of the Act. The High Court has in the impugned order nowhere pointed out what is the exceptional fact which in its opinion required it to stay the conviction. The High Court also failed to note the direction of this Court that it has a duty to look at all aspects including ramification of keeping such conviction in abeyanc