IMPORTANT POINT
It is not open to High Court to summarily strip the tenant of the statutory protection and enhance the existing rent in a completely unguided and subjective manner.

ORDER

Application for deletion of the name of Respondent No.4 is allowed.

Leave granted

1. The respondents (Landlord) instituted proceedings for eviction of the appellants (Tenant) from three different premises let out to them at different times. One of the proceedings was in respect of a go-down let out to the appellants at the monthly rental of Rs.50/-. The other was in regard to a shop with the monthly rental of Rs.35/- and the third was for a kothari on the monthly rental of Rs.15/-.

2. The Prescribed Authority/Munsif, Deoband, Saharanpur, consolidated the three proceedings and by a common judgment and order dated 8 November, 1983 dismissed all the three eviction/release petitions filed by the respondents.

3. Against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority the respondents preferred appeals before the Additional Judge, Saharanpur. The appellate authority allowed the appeal relating to the go-down and ordered its release/eviction of the appellants by judgment and order dated 30 May, 1989. By the same judgment, however, it rejected the respondents’ appeals in regard to the other two premises, namely, the shop and the kothari.

4. The respondents filed two writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court challenging the orders rejecting his eviction/release petitions in respect of the shop and the kothari. The appellants too approached the High Court in a writ petition against the judgment of the appellate authority in so far as it allowed release of the go-down in favour of the respondents. The High Court, like the two courts below, heard all the three writ petitions together and disposed them of by a common judgment and order dated 19 August, 2008. The High Court held that the judgment and order passed by the lower appellate court was eminently just and in accordance with law. It therefore, dismissed all the three writ petitions.

5. But the High Court did not stop there. It felt that the existing rent of the shop and the kothari (in regard to which the landlord’s eviction/release petitions were finally rejected) was very low and was liable to be increased. It, accordingly, passed the following order:

“The existing rent of Rs.50/- per month for two accommodations, kothari and shop left in the occupation of the ten ant, is extremely inadequate. Accordingly, it is directed that w.e.f. August 2008 onwards tenants shall pay rent for the portion left in their occupation, i.e. kothari and shop at the total rate of Rs.500/- per month”.

6. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court increasing the rent of the shop and the kothari from Rs.50/- pm to Rs.500/- pm, the appellants have come in appeal.

7. In a recent judgment dated 27 August, 2009 in C.A. No. 5835 of 2009 (State of Maharashtra and Anr. VS. M/s Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. & Ors)1 a three-Judge Bench of this Court examined the question of the Court’s authority to increase the existing rent or to direct the tenant to pay/deposit in court an amount in excess of the existing monthly rent. The Court upheld the court’s power and authority to make such a direction in cases where the tenant goes to the superior court in appeal or revision against a decree or order of eviction. But at the same time it made clear that in a case where the landlord goes to the superior court against an order rejecting his application for eviction/release, it is not open to the Court to direct any increase in the monthly contractual/statutory rent of the premises. In this regard the decision in the M/s super Max International referred to an earlier decision of this court in Niyas Ahmed Khan VS. Mahmood Rahmat Ullah Khan,2 (2008) 7 SCC 539 and made the following observations:

“7. In Niyas Ahmed Khan, the position was quite different. The landlord’s application for eviction of the tenant on grounds of personal necessity was turned down by the prescribed authority. The order of the prescribed authority was confirmed by the appellate authority. The landlord challenged the orders passed by the two author