2010 Supreme(SC) 97

2010 (1) Supreme
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R V Raveendran and K S Radhakrishnan,JJ.
Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors. — Appellants
Versus
A.G.Syed Mohideen & Ors. — Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 852 of 2010
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.22962 of 2008)
Decided on : 22-01-2010

IMPORTANT POINTS :
1. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words.
2. Section 92 of Code of Civil Procedure,1908 is a self contained provision, and conferment of jurisdiction in regard to suits under that section does not depend upon the value of the subject matter of the suit.

Headnote:Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Section 92- Suit filed by respondents on the file of Principal District Judge, Cuddalore against appellants under Section 92 of Code, seeking a direction to appellant 2 to repay all the amounts spent by him after 20.6.2005 contrary to the terms of supplementary deed of Trust, and also to convene Trust meeting for approval of the income and expenditure and other consequential reliefs- Memo filed by Appellants 2 to 4 before the District Court stating that having regard to the decision in P.S. Subramanian v. K. L. Lakshmanan court did not have jurisdiction to entertain any suit under section 92 of Code and therefore the suit may be transferred to the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore- District Judge rejected said memo holding that he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as the value of the suit was Rs.10 lakhs- Revision-Dismissed by High Court -Appeal -It is clear from section 92of the Code that the legislature did not want to go by the general rule contained in section 15 of the Code that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it, in regard to suits relating to public Trusts- The intention of the law makers was that such suits should be tried by the District Court- At the same time, the law makers contemplated that if there was heavy work load on the District Court, State Government should be enabled to empower any other court (within local limits of whose jurisdiction, the whole or any part of the subject matter is situate), also to entertain such suits- Therefore, the word “or” is used in the ordinary and normal sense, that is to denote an alternative, giving a choice- The provisions of section 92 do not give room for interpreting the word “or” as a substitutive, so as to lead to an interpretation that when the Government notified any other court, such notified court alone will have jurisdiction and not the District Court- The provisions of section 12 of the Civil Courts Act specifying the pecuniary limits of District Courts and Sub-ordinate Courts, is subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure- In view of the express provisions of section 92 specifying the courts which will have jurisdiction to entertain suits under that section, neither the provisions of sections 15 to 20 of the Code nor the provisions of section 12 of the Civil Courts Act will apply to such suits- Section 92 is a self contained provision, and conferment of jurisdiction in regard to suits under that section does not depend upon the value of the subject matter of the suit- Therefore, insofar as the suits under section 92 are concerned, District Courts and Sub-ordinate Courts will have concurrent jurisdiction without reference to any pecuniary limits-Pecuniary limits mentioned in section 12 of the Civil Courts Act, do not apply to suits under section 92 of the Code-Appeal dismissed (Paras 8 to 11)

        Code of Civil Procedure,1908- Section 92-Scope-Section 92 relates to public charities-It enables a suit being filed in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive Trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, ‘in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the Trust is situate’ (Para 4)

        Code of Civil Procedure,1908- Section 92- Interpretation of -Section 92 provides that a suit under that section can be instituted “in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government”-. When it is read in a normal manner, it means that the suits under section 92 should be filed in the district court or in the sub-ordinate court-When the language is clear and unambiguous and when there is no need to apply the tools of interpretation, there is no need to interpret the word ‘or’, nor any need to read it as a substitutive word, instead of its plain and simple meaning denoting an ‘alternative’ (Paras 7)

        Interpretation of statutes-It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words-While doing so, the words used in provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning- Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision- While using tools of interpretation, court should remember that it is not author of Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents-A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law- It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity- The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be. (Para 6)

       Facts of the Case :

       Suit was filed by respondents on the file of Principal District Judge, Cuddalore against appellants under Section 92 of Code,herein in the instant case seeking a direction to appellant 2 to repay all the amounts spent by him after 20.6.2005 contrary to the terms of supplementary deed of Trust, and also to convene Trust meeting for approval of the income and expenditure and other consequential reliefs. Memo was filed by Appellants 2 to 4 before the District Court stating that having regard to the decision in P.S. Subramanian v. K. L. Lakshmanan court did not have jurisdiction to entertain any suit under section 92 of Code and therefore the suit may be transferred to the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. District Judge rejected said memo holding that he had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as the value of the suit was Rs.10 lakhs. Revision thereagainst was Dismissed by High Court.

        2.Present appeal has been filed against said order of High Court.

       Findings of the Court :

       It is clear from section 92of the Code that the legislature did not want to go by the general rule contained in section 15 of the Code that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it, in regard to suits relating to public Trusts. The intention of the law makers was that such suits should be tried by the District Court. At the same time, the law makers contemplated that if there was heavy work load on the District Court, State Government should be enabled to empower any other court (within local limits of whose jurisdiction, the whole or any part of the subject matter is situate), also to entertain such suits. Therefore, the word “or” is used in the ordinary and normal sense, that is to denote an alternative,giving a choice. The provisions of section 92 do not give room for interpreting the word “or” as a substitutive, so as to lead to an interpretation that when the Government notified any other court, such notified court alone will have jurisdiction and not the District Court. The provisions of section 12 of the Civil Courts Act specifying pecuniary limits of District Courts and Sub-ordinate Courts, is subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.In view of the express provisions of section 92 specifying the courts which will have jurisdiction to entertain suits under that section, neither the provisions of sections 15 to 20 of the Code nor the provisions of section 12 of the Civil Courts Act will apply to such suits- Section 92 is a self contained provision, and conferment of jurisdiction in regard to suits under that section does not depend upon the value of the subject matter of the suit. Therefore, insofar as the suits under section 92 are concerned, District Courts and Sub-ordinate Courts will have concurrent jurisdiction without reference to any pecuniary limits.Pecuniary limits mentioned in section 12 of the Civil Courts Act, do not apply to suits under section 92 of the Code. Appeal was dismissed.