ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

( 1 ) CHALLENGE in this appeal is to the order of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High court directing acquittal of the respondent who faced trial for alleged commission of murder of his wife and minor son in the intervening night of 14/15. 11. 1996.

( 2 ) LEARNED Sessions Judge, Nizamabad, had found him guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short IPC) and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life.

( 3 ) THE whole prosecution case rested on the alleged extra judicial confession purported to have been made by the accused before the village Administrative Officer (PW. 1) around 8. 00 a. m. The First Information Report was given to the police at 11. 30 a. m. on 15. 11. 1996. It was indicated in the FIR that the accused had made a confession before Village administrative Officer to have killed the wife and son because of the quarrel over family affairs.

( 4 ) THE trial Court found the evidence of PW. 1 so far as alleged extra judicial confession is concerned to be reliable and directed the conviction. In appeal, the primary stand taken by the accused respondent was that the evidence of PW. 1 is not believable. It contradicts the evidence of PW. 2, and the Investigating officer. The High Court analaysed the evidence and came to the conclusion that the so-called extra judicial confession has not been established.

( 5 ) THE High Court analysed the position in law relating to extra judicial confession, namely, that the Court has to be satisfied that the so-called extra-judicial confession is voluntary and not as a result of any inductment, threat or promise as envisaged in Section 24 of the indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'evidence act') or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.

( 6 ) IN Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of vindhya Pradesh [air 1954 SC 322], and maghar Singh v. State of Punjab [air 1975 sc 1. 320], this Court held that the evidence in the form of extra-judicial confession made by the accused to witnesses cannot be always termed to be a tainted evidence. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. If the court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that the confession was true and voluntarily made, then conviction can be found on such evidence alone. In Narayan singh v. State of M. P. [air 1985 SC 1678] this Court cautioned that it is not open to the court trying the criminal case to start with a presumption that extra judicial confession is always a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. The retraction of extra judicial confession which is a usual phenomenon in criminal cases would by itself not weaken the case of the prosecution based upon such a confession. In Kishore Chand v. State of H. P. [jt 1990 (3) SC 662 : AIR 1990 SC 2140] this court held that an unambiguous extra judicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of any falsity. However, before relying on the alleged confession, the court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and is not the result of inductment, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26. The Court is required to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of law suggesting that it may not be true. All relevant circumstances such as the person to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made have to be scrutinized. To the same effect