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2010 Supreme(SC) 677

Supreme Court of India
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HARJIT SINGH BEDI & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.K. PRASAD
Mukeshbhai Gopalbhai Barot
Versus
State of Gujarat
Criminal Appeal No.15 of 2010
Decided on : 04-08-2010

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant:Maganbhai Barot, Senior Advocate, E.C. Agrawala, Nakul Mohta, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, Advocates.
For the Respondent:Ninad Laud, Ms. Jesal, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Advocates.
.

Headnote:(a) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 r/w section 161, CrPC – Three dying declarations recorded – First recorded by Executive Magistrate, second by police and third dying allegedly written by husband of deceased on her dictation – Statement recorded u/s 161 is treated as dying declaration of the victim – High Court falling in error to hold that first two statements had no evidentiary value – First statement to Magistrate would be FIR. (Para 5)

       (b) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – Dying declaration – Veracity – Third dying declaration – Written by husband allegedly on dictates of deceased – The manner in which it has been written, the clarity of the language used, the writing and spacing of the words being very symmetrical and the flow of words – This could not be the statement of a dying person. (Para 6)

       (c) Criminal trial – Circumstantial evidence – Presence of kerosene oil tin, open lid of oil receptacle of the primus stove, smell of kerosene from burnt saree and carpet – Medical report – All these contradicting Panchnama – Death accidental and not homicidal. (Para 11)

       (d) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal – Interference by High Court should be minimal – Only in cases where impugned judgment is perverse or not flow from the evidence. (Para 12)

       Facts of the case:

       The appellant is an advocate and the deceased was his client.

       He once asked her to have intercourse with him and on refusal tried to rape her. Failing in his attempt to rape her, he threw kerosene oil on her and set her on fire.

       When cries of the deceased attracted local people, the appellant doused the fire and took her to hospital.

       The deceased succumbed to the burn injuries.

       The trial court acquitted the appellant but the High Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.

       Finding of the Court:

       Impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

       Result:

       Appeal allowed.

Judgment :

The facts leading to this appeal are as under:

1. The appellant accused, a lawyer by profession, was residing in Kalol, District Mahesana whereas Kamlaben Ratilal Parmar, wife of Ratilal Hembhai Paramar PW-7, deceased was residing along with her family at Mahesana and was serving as a Midwife at the Primary Health Centre in village Vamaj, Taluka Kadi, District Mahesana. Kamlaben had also been allotted a residential quarter in village Vamaj. The appellant was known to the family of the deceased as she had appointed him as an advocate to represent her in a departmental enquiry. On the 14th September 1993 the deceased, as per her routine, left for village Vamaj to attend to her duties. At about 11 a.m. she went to her residential quarter. The appellant also reached that place and taking advantage of the fact that she was alone, asked her to have intercourse with him saying that he would not disclose the facts to anyone, but in case she refused his advances, he would disclose her illicit relationships with several other persons to her husband. The deceased, however, did not succumb to the pressure, which annoyed the appellant and he pushed her onto a cot and tried to rape her. The deceased resisted the attempt but the appellant picked up some kerosene oil and threw it on her and set her on fire. The cries of agony of the deceased attracted several persons residing in the locality and fearing that his guilt would be exposed, the appellant himself doused the flames and removed the deceased (who was by then unconscious) in a jeep to the Kalol Civil Hospital where she was admitted at about 12.45 p.m. PW1 the Medical Officer, who was on duty at the relevant time, informed the Kalol City Police Station and the Officer In-charge in turn informed the Kadi Police Station. On receiving the information PSI Trivedi PW14 of Kadi Police Station went to the place of incident and made the necessary enquiries and prepared the Panchnama and also picked up several incriminating articles. In the meanwhile, as the condition of the victim had deteriorated, she was shifted to the Ahmedabad Civil Hospital and the Officer In-Charge of Kadi Police Station was also told about the transfer. Necessary arrangements were made for recording the dying declaration of the victim which came to be recorded on the same day i.e. on 14th September 1993 by the Executive Magistrate. A second statement was recorded by the police two days thereafter and in both these two dying declarations she stated that she had been burnt accidentally and nobody was responsible for her injuries. Kamlaben succumbed to her injuries on the 18th September 1993 and on 26th September 1993 the husband of the deceased, Ratilal Hemabhai Parmar PW7, gave a complaint in the police station alleging inter-alia that shortly before her death she had informed him that the appellant was responsible for her injuries and he had thrown kerosene on her and set on fire, on her refusal to accept his sexual advances. It is in this background that the appellant was arrested, and after investigation a charge-sheet was filed against him and he was ultimately brought to trial for offences punishable under Section-302 etc. of the IPC.

2. The Additional Sessions Judge, in the course of an elaborate judgment, held that there were three dying declarations made by the deceased; the first Ex.44 dated 14th September 1993 recorded at 4 p.m. by the Executive Magistrate, a second Ex.48 by the police on the 16th of September 1993 and in both these statements she had completely exonerated the appellant whereas in the third dying declaration Ex.59 dated 17th September 1993 allegedly written by PW-7 her husband on her dictation she had made a complete departure from the earlier dying declarations and inculpated the appellant and as such there appeared to be great uncertainty in the veracity of the dying declarations. It also observed that the deceased had died on 18th September 1993 and it was on the basis of the dying









































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