ORDER

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is mainly to the award of sentence to the appellant on his conviction for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. On conviction, the Sessions Judge sentenced the appellant to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- with the default stipulation. By the impugned order, the High Court has affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.

3. Since in this appeal we propose to deal only with the legal proposition urged on behalf of the appellant, we deem it unnecessary to state, in detail, the case of the prosecution against the appellant which resulted in his conviction. It would suffice to note that the incident in which the appellant is stated to have participated, took place on 28th August, 2002.

4. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has challenged the conviction of the appellant mainly on the ground that on the date of occurrence, the appellant was a juvenile and therefore, he should have been tried under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 ("the Juvenile Justice Act" for short). Although it is conceded by learned Counsel for the appellant that this point was not specifically raised either before the Trial Court or the High Court but he submits that in the light of the provision contained in Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act, the question about juvenility of the appellant can be gone into even at this stage. Learned Counsel has also pointed out that in fact the High Court was aware of the fact that the appellant had not completed eighteen years of age as on the date of alleged commission of offence and was, thus, a "juvenile" inasmuch as the fact of his being confined in Borstal Jail, Ludhiana, meant for housing a juvenile in conflict with law was mentioned in the application filed for grant of bail. It was, therefore, obligatory for the High Court to hold an inquiry itself for determination of the question of age of the appellant or cause an inquiry to be conducted and seek a report regarding the same.

5. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the facts before us, we are of the opinion that the appeal commends acceptance.

6. Section 7A, inserted in the Juvenile Justice Act with effect from 22nd August, 2006 reads as follows:

7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised before any court-- (1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court or a court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be:

Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act.

(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under Sub-section (1), it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to have no effect.

7. It is manifest from a fair reading of proviso to Sub-section (1) that a claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage and even after the final disposal of the case. In that view of the matter, the appellant is entitled to raise before us claim of juvenility at the relevant time. It appears to us that in view of a recent decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal:JT (2009) 3 SC 87, the issue is no longer res-integra. In the said decision, taking note of the observations in the case of Gur