ORDER

1. The appellant is an Income Tax Officer. A charge-sheet dated 9-3-1999 was issued to him for alleged misconduct. An enquiry was held into the charges and the enquiry officer submitted a report dated 22-11-2000 holding that the charges were not proved. The disciplinary authority disagreed with the enquiry report, and after giving notice to the appellant made an order dated 25-11-2003 imposing the punishment of reduction of pay by four stages for a period of four years with a direction that the appellant will not earn increments during the period of reduction.

2. Feeling aggrieved by the imposition of punishment the appellant approached the Central Administrative Tribunal. Before directing notice, the Tribunal considered the question of maintainability, as the appellant had filed original application without exhausting the remedy by way of appeal. The Tribunal received the application as maintainable by the following order:

"It transpires from the record that the order of the disciplinary authority is being challenged by the applicant without resorting to the remedy of appeal. However, Mr. Kureshi points out that this is the case whereof the disciplinary authority is rather forced to impose the penalty which also suggests that the appellate authority also will be forced to reject the appeal, even if it is preferred eve has taken a particular view in spite of findings of the enquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority being inclined to agree with the findings of the enquiry officer. It has been overruled by CVC. Considering the grievance made and considering the nature of OA, we direct the issuance of notice to the respondent, returnable on 13-2-2004."

3. Thereafter, the application was heard. The Tribunal by its order dated 12-4-2005 allowed the application and quashed the order of the disciplinary authority reserving liberty to the respondents herein to pass an order in accordance with the opinion formed by the disciplinary authority before I referring the matter to CVC for reconsideration of its advice. The respondents challenged the said order before the High Court.

4. The High Court allowed the writ petition tiled by the respondents by order dated 29-3-2006 and set aside the order of the Tribunal merely on the ground that the appellant had not exhausted the remedy by way of appeal before approaching the Tribunal. The said order is challenged by the appellant.

5. Section 20(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 ("the Act", for short) provides that the Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the appellant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. The use of words "Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satistied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules" in Section 20(1) of the Act makes it evident that in exceptional circumstances for reasons to be recorded the Tribunal can entertain applications filed without exhausting the remedy by way of appeal.

6. The Tribunal referred to Section 20 of the Act and rightly held that the matter involved substantial and important point of law about the binding nature of CVC's advice. The Tribunal was better suited to consider that issue as the appellate authority would also feel bound by the directions of CVC. Therefore, it was one of the exceptional cases where the appellant could approach the Tribunal without exhausting a departmental remedy of appeal. The High Court ignored that aspect. We are of the view that the High Court ought not to have allowed the writ petition on this technical ground. The order of the High Court cannot be sustained.

7. In view of the above, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of the writ petition on merits in accordance with law.