IMPORTANT POINT
Decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom.

Headnote:(a) Air Corporations (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 1994 ¯ Section 9 ¯ Dispute between female cabin crew comprising Air Hostesses and male cabin crew comprising Assistant Flight pursuers ¯ Earlier two decisions of the Supreme Court in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, (1981) 4 SCC 335 and Air India Cabin Crew Ass. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant & Others, (2003) 6 SCC 277 ¯ According to appellants the respondent No.2, in total disregard of the Record Notes, Memorandum of Settlement and the judgments of the Supreme Court in Nergesh Meerza’s case (supra) and in Yeshaswinee Merchant’s case (supra), issued an administrative order bringing female Cabin Crew and the male Cabin Crew at par in respect of age of retirement. Accordingly, Air Hostesses were also permitted to fly up to the age of 58 years ¯ In the said order it was also indicated that after the promulgation of the order, the Executive Female Cabin Crew would be eligible to be considered for the position of In-Flight Supervisor along with the Executive Male Cabin Crew ¯ Aggrieved by the orders appellants filed writ petition before the Delhi High Court complaining that the orders passed were arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the various decisions of the Supreme Court ¯ Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition, rejected the challenge of the appellant Association to the constitutional validity of Section 9 of the Air Corporations (Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1994 ¯ The High Court also held that the expression “In-Flight Supervisor” is, in fact, a description of a job function and is not a post exclusively reserved for the male Cabin Crew ¯ Hence these appeals ¯ Held, it is, in fact, the prerogative of the Management to place an employee in a position where he would be able to contribute the most to the Company ¯ Hence, notwithstanding the decision in Nergesh Meerza’s case and in Yeshaswinee Merchant’s case, the Air India was at liberty to adopt the revised promotion policy which was intended to benefit all the employees ¯ Prior to 1997, there was a category of Cabin Crew referred to as In-Flight Supervisors, which was confined to In-Flight Pursers alone and did not concern the Air Hostesses, but the “In-Flight Supervisor” was not a separate post ¯ Duties discharged by persons designated as In-Flight Supervisors did not create any separate post and the post remained that of In-Flight Pursers ¯ Appellants had not been discriminated against in any way on account of the decision in Nergesh Meerza’s case and Yeshaswinee Merchant’s case ¯ The position since the decisions rendered in Nergesh Meerza’s case and in Yeshaswinee Merchant’s case, underwent a change with the adoption of the revised promotion policy agreed to between the parties and which replaced all the earlier agreements ¯ The Management of Air India was always entitled to alter its policies with regard to their workmen, subject to the consensus arrived at between the parties in supersession of all previous agreements ¯ Those workmen who had been promoted to the Executive category would not continue to be governed by the Settlements arrived at when they were workmen and were represented by the Association ¯ Once an employee is placed in the Executive cadre, he ceases to be a workman and also ceases to be governed by Settlements arrived at between the Management and the workmen through the concerned Trade Union ¯ It is not a question of an attempt made by such employees to wriggle out of the Settlements which had been arrived at prior to their elevation to the Executive cadre, which, by operation of law, cease to have any binding force on the employee so promoted by the Management ¯ Appeals dismissed.
        b) Precedents ¯ Ratio decidendi ¯ Decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom ¯ Further, it is also well-settled that the ratio of a case must be understood having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. (Para 50)
       Facts of the case
        Dispute between female cabin crew comprising Air Hostesses and male cabin crew comprising Assistant Flight pursuers ¯ Earlier two decisions of the Supreme Court in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, (1981) 4 SCC 335 and Air India Cabin Crew Ass. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant & Others, (2003) 6 SCC 277 ¯ According to appellants the respondent No.2, in total disregard of the Record Notes, Memorandum of Settlement and the judgments of the Supreme Court in Nergesh Meerza’s case (supra) and in Yeshaswinee Merchant’s case (supra), issued an administrative order bringing female Cabin crew and the male Cabin Crew at par in respect of age of retirement. Accordingly, Air Hostesses were also permitted to fly up to the age of 58 years ¯ In the said order it was also indicated that after the promulgation of the order, the Executive Female Cabin Crew would be eligible to be considered for the position of In-Flight Supervisor along with the Executive Male Cabin Crew ¯ Aggrieved by the orders appellants filed writ petition before the Delhi High Court complaining that the orders passed were arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the various decisions of the Supreme Court ¯ Delhi High Court dismsised the writ petition, rejected the challenge of the appellant Association to the constitutional validity of Section 9 of the Air Corporations (Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1994 ¯ The High Court also held that the expression “In-Flight Supervisor” is, in fact, a description of a job function and is not a post exclusively reserved for the male Cabin crew ¯ Hence these appeals.
       Findings
        It is, in fact, the prerogative of the Management to place an employee in a position where he would be able to contribute the most to the Company. Hence, notwithstanding the decision in Nergesh Meerza’s case and in Yeshaswinee Merchant’s case, the Air India was at liberty to adopt the revised promotion policy which was intended to benefit all the employees.

JUDGMENT

Altamas Kabir, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Special Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos.20668-20672 of 2007, Special Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos.20679- 20682 of 2007 and Special Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos.20773-20778 of 2007, have been taken up together for hearing and final disposal, inasmuch as, the facts in the several matters are the same, and the law involved is also the same. For the sake of convenience, we shall narrate the facts from Special Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos.20668-20672 of 2007, which have been filed by the Air India Cabin Crew Association and two others.

3. The common issue in all these matters is whether the promotional avenues and other terms of service of the pre-1997 cadre of Assistant Flight Pursers could be changed to their prejudice despite the provisions of the Air Corporation (Transfer of Undertakings and Repeal) Act, 1994 and, in particular, Section 8 thereof and also in view of the judgments of this Court in Air India Vs. Nergesh Meerza & Ors.1 [(1981) 4 SCC 335], and Air India Cabin Crew Assn. Vs. Yeshaswinee Merchant & Ors.2 [(2003) 6 SCC 277], along with the various agreements and settlement arrived at between the parties. The further question that arises is whether in the circumstances indicated, a policy decision of gender neutralization, which was prospective in nature, could be applied retrospectively to the pre-1997 cadre of Pursers and whether such application would be arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution, as it upsets certain rights relating to promotion which had vested in Assistant Flight Pursers belonging to the pre-1997 cadre.

4. In order to appreciate the case made out by the appellants in these appeals, it is necessary to set out briefly some of the facts leading to the filing of the several writ petitions before the Delhi High Court.

5. According to the appellants, for several decades two distinct cadres have been existing in Air India Corporation, comprising male Air Flight Pursers and female Air Hostesses, each with their own terms and conditions of service, including promotional avenues. In 1980, one Nergesh Meerza and four other Air Hostesses filed Writ Petition No.1186 of 1980 in the Bombay High Court, questioning the constitutional validity of Regulation 46(i)(c) of the Air India Employees’ Service Regulations and raising certain other questions of law. Air India, being the Respondent No.1 therein, moved a transfer petition, being Transfer Case No.3 of 1981, for transfer of the writ petitions from the Bombay High Court to this Court on the ground that several writ petitions filed by Air India were pending before this Court and also on account of the fact that other writ petitions had also been filed by the Air Hostesses employed by the Indian Airlines Corporation, hereinafter referred to as “IAC”, which were also pending in this Court involving almost identical reliefs. Even in the said case, which was transferred to this Court, it was observed that from a comparison of the method of recruitment and the promotional avenues available, Air Hostesses formed an absolutely separate category from that of Assistant Flight Pursers in many respects, having different grades, different promotional avenues and different service conditions.

6. At this stage, it may be necessary to give a little further background regarding Indian Airlines Corporation and Air India Limited established under Section 6 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953. Subsequently, Indian Airlines Limited and Air India Limited were formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956. In 1994, the Air Corporations (Transfer of Undertakings and Repeal) Act, 1994, hereinafter referred to as “1994 Act”, was enacted to provide for the transfer and vesting of the undertakings of Indian Airlines and Air India respectively to and in the companies formed and registered as Indian Airlines Limited and Air India Limited and also to repeal the Air Corporations Act, 1953. Section 3 of t

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2011 Supreme(SC) 1083

IMPORTANT POINT Decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom.

Cases Referred (2)

IMPORTANT POINT
Decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom.