IMPORTANT POINT
A person who tries a cause should be able to deal with the matter placed before him objectively, fairly and impartially. No one can act in a judicial capacity if his previous conduct gives ground for believing that he cannot act with an open mind or impartially. The broad principle evolved by the Court is that a person, trying a cause, not only act fairly but must be able to act above suspicion of unfairness and bias. (Para 5)

ORDER

H.L. Dattu, J.

Leave granted.

1) The present appeal, by way of special leave, is directed against the Judgement and Order dated 01.09.2010 of the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Revision No. 555 of 2003 whereby the High Court has dismissed the revision petition preferred by the appellant against the Judgment and Order dated 22.03.2003 passed by Learned Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 104 of 2001.

2) Since we intend to remand the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal, it is not necessary to go into the factual matrix. Suffice to state that the appellant had filed a complaint against the respondents dated 24.11.1988 which was registered as FIR No. 393 of 1988 at P.S.- Srinivaspuri, New Delhi. Subsequently, the charges were framed against the respondents under Sections 498-A, 304-B read with Section-34 and Section 302 of the IPC by Shri. Prithvi Raj, learned Additional District & Sessions Judge dated 15.05.1995. Thereafter, the case was listed before Shri. S.N. Dhingra, Additional Sessions Judge for the trial, however, the learned Judge had recused from hearing the matter for personal reasons vide Order dated 25.09.2000. The said Order is extracted below:

“25-09-2000

Present:- Spl. P.P. for the State All the accused on bail.

For personal reason I do not want to try this case. The case be sent to Ld. Sessions Judge, Delhi for marking it to some other court.

Put up on 11-10-2000 to find out to which court case has been allocated.

A.S.J. New Delhi

25-09-2000"

3) Accordingly, the case was withdrawn from the Court of Shri. S.N. Dhingra, Additional Sessions Judge and transferred to the Court of Shri. S.M. Chopra, Additional Sessions Judge vide the Order dated 29.09.2000 of the Sessions Judge. Eventually the accused respondents were tried and acquitted vide Judgment and Order dated 22.03.2003 passed by Ms. Manju Goel, Additional Sessions Judge. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and Order, the appellant preferred a revision petition before the High Court. The same was dismissed vide impugned final Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2010 passed by learned Judge, Shri. Justice S.N. Dhingra.

4) It is apparent that the fact of earlier recusal of the case at the trial by learned Shri Justice S.N. Dhingra himself, was not brought to his notice in the revision petition before the High Court by either of the parties to the case. Therefore, Shri Justice S.N. Dhingra, owing to inadvertence regarding his earlier recusal, has dismissed the revision petition by the impugned Judgment. In our opinion, the impugned Judgment, passed by Shri Justice S.N. Dhigra subsequent to his recusal at trial stage for personal reasons, is against the principle of natural justice and fair trial.

5) It is well settled law that a person who tries a cause should be able to deal with the matter placed before him objectively, fairly and impartially. No one can act in a judicial capacity if his previous conduct gives ground for believing that he cannot act with an open mind or impartially. The broad principle evolved by this Court is that a person, trying a cause, must not only act fairly but must be able to act above suspicion of unfairness and bias. In the case of Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi,1 AIR 1957 SC 425, it was observed:

“5. ... every member of a tribunal that [sits to] try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that Judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.”

6) In the case of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India,2